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Abstract 
How do ideologies and cities shape each other? This work offers a theoretical 
strategy for explaining how urban forms and political projects have afforded each 
other's development historically, while avoiding a deterministic account of how 
political aims are realised in particular urban forms. To do this it focuses on the 
emergence of nationalism in the context of the modernisation of European cities in the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. As background, the development of the 
concept of citizenship in the context of the medieval city is explored and an 
understanding of the exceptional political space of the city in political philosophy is 
outlined. The political philosophy of nationalism is seen to engender an urban-rural 
tension and the works of Rousseau and Herder are read to understand further the 
relationship between nationalist thought and the modern city. Then in order to structure 
an investigation of how urban form and ideology interact, an analytical framework is 
developed using JJ Gibson’s theory of affordances. The framework is applied to 
European urban forms which developed during the rise of nationalism, specifically in 
three historical city cases: Budapest, Vienna and Venice. The cases share in common an 
experience of Habsburg administration and the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth 
century but have quite different formal contexts. Urban forms and affordances are 
discussed more generally using the phenomenon and concept of Haussmannisation and 
the usefulness of that concept is discussed. More general conclusions are drawn in 
which political ideas, ideologies and urban forms are understood to afford each other 
ranges of such possibilities without determining them. 
Keywords: urban history, urban forms, affordances, politics, political ideas, 
ideology, history, nationalism, intellectual history, architecture, planning, modernity, 
philosophy, Budapest, Vienna, Venice 
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Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with how political projects have interacted with the 
material and institutional structures of the city and with the city as an assembled, human 
environment. It seeks a novel way of understanding this relationship through historical 
analysis and in doing so it has a particular concern for what the modern city has enabled 
politically. Three cases are drawn upon to explore this and many other shorter examples 
are used to inform and apply a theoretical framework. This framework is based on the 
work of JJ Gibson, in particular his concept of affordances. Though he specifically 
applied it to the field of ecological psychology, this concept has found itself transferred 
to several other fields such as design and, perhaps surprisingly, to literary criticism; it 
is this last application which is used as a starting point for analysing the city. Categories 
of forms developed by Caroline Levine, building on Gibson’s theory of affordances, 
are transferred for use with the historical case studies and a framework is elaborated 
which can be used to understand the relationship between urban environments, political 
ideas and ideology. 
The theoretical framework allows for the possibility of a distinct urban life in 
which socio-economic conditions and cultural expression inform each other. It is used 
to examine cities which had been become well-established in medieval Europe, which 
at the commencement of their modernisation shared the experience of Habsburg 
administration, and whose politics were infused with nationalising projects in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The case studies expand what might have been 
afforded, where that affordance was realised, where ideological practice might have 
narrowed the range of affordances and examine how cities, and more broadly place, 
impinged upon nationalist thought. 
 13 
 
 
In investigating the city and its political and ideological possibilities, the 
opportunity presents itself to re-think and re-imagine urban concepts in a way that is 
not necessarily attached to a wider programme of social theory and is wary of locking 
in ideological biases and perspectives: a reading which accounts for the role of historical 
processes, institutions and structure in the creation and use of urban space while at the 
same time acknowledging such accounts as provisional and open to interpretation. The 
cases are drawn from emerging modern cities at a critical historical moment before 
urbanisation became a planetary phenomenon (Lefebvre, 2003, p. 113) and during 
which both modern urban and cultural forms and practices evolved within boundaries 
that were more clearly delineated in cities with perhaps a more distinct sense of place 
than in later periods. Thus, a way for reimagining how place and ideology relate to each 
other can be developed. The juncture in question is one in which cities globally, though 
initially concentrated in Europe and North America, became recognisably modern in 
structure and outlook. The latter half of the nineteenth century was a time in which 
industrialisation was at full acceleration and began to have a fundamental effect on the 
lives of all classes in Europe and beyond. 
This is a reading of history through concepts. It is not a history of concepts, 
which is what ‘conceptual history’ tends to mean, but history organised by concepts. As 
historical research it should not be viewed as an inductive exercise in archival retrieval, 
although there are aspects of archival research to it. Instead it sets out to organise an 
understanding of what to look for in cities when seeking to understand the function of 
urban form and the associated use of ideology in the development of the modern city. 
It is not aligned with a particular theoretical tradition or school of interpretation. 
The theoretical framework which is developed does not amount to a kind of explanatory 
theory of everything that happened in a certain period, in a way that a Marxist or 
14 
 
 
Weberian account might aim to do. It is not working with a set of concepts at a macro-
theoretical level but neither does it take on an inductivist scepticism towards concepts. 
It operates instead at a level that works with ideas but wants to keep more fluent 
relationships between them rather than to try to put them into a more rigid structure. It 
draws conclusions which are generalisable beyond urban history and says something 
about how we read a city in any context, using a historical lens for this particular reading. 
Nationalism is selected as an example of a set of political ideas, with the nation 
as an ideological project, which coincided with the development of the modern city at 
its moment of rapid growth in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe. In 
the first chapter, background on nationalism and urban history is outlined with reference 
to literature on the relationship of cities to nationalism. The reading of existing literature 
shows that there is an opportunity for conceptual innovation to understand better the 
relationship of political ideas to the built urban environment. 
In the second chapter, political thought that had an influence on nationalist 
politics is examined with the aim of showing how it could account for modern cities 
and how nationalism could make use of modern urbanisation. How did the city itself 
impinge upon political philosophy, theory and political programmes? The development 
of the concept of citizenship is proposed as a historico-legal phenomenon aligned with 
the development of cities and urban institutions. The extent to which cities are 
interpreted as an exceptional space in political philosophy is explored along with the 
notion that politics itself is the product of this exceptional space. Turning to nationalist 
political philosophy, an urban-rural tension is identified as present in much nationalist 
thinking. Political nationalism has theoretical roots in the writings of Rousseau and 
Herder and their work is interrogated to understand a political philosophy of the city 
which accounts for ‘nation’. This is set within a wider understanding of the Western 
 15 
 
 
political philosophical tradition. They are read for evidence of an urban-rural tension 
and to understand their strategies for dealing with it. Rousseau advocated for an urban 
environment which could maximise human freedom and facilitate a life of ‘amour de 
soi’ over ‘amour propre’. Herder treated cities as cultural products, the outworking of 
different kinds of civilisation and nation. Examining both of these writers shows both 
what the city affords political philosophy and how political theories can attempt to open 
up and shape different kinds of urban development. Even when it has been set up by 
romantic nationalism as a fount of modern corruption, the city’s future existence and 
role in a nationalist scheme have still had to be accounted for. 
In the third chapter, a diverse set of short examples are set out to which the 
concepts of forms and affordances can be applied. Each of these examples shows 
different expressions of urban forms and what they afford politically. The geographical 
scope of the examples is wider than physical Europe and the historical scope extends 
out of the period covered in the main case studies. This enables a general exploration 
of what might be possible when cities are thought about through their constituent forms 
and highlights the role of urban forms that have endured over an extensive period in 
structuring modern cities. The examples show how use and meaning interact with the 
long persistence of urban forms. Combinations of material form and urban practices are 
shown to provide an underpinning for political and ideological programmes. The 
multiple examples also reinforce how the formal categories used – wholes, rhythms, 
hierarchies and networks – overlap and synthesise. 
The conceptual framework of forms and affordances is then elaborated further 
through the three historical case studies in the next three chapters. The cities in the case 
studies have in common the experience of a process of modernisation during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the specific context of nationalism. They 
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also share a common administrative context, that of historical Habsburg administration. 
The Habsburg lands were particularly rich in ethnic diversity and this was reflected in 
the composition of their cities. However, each of the three cases had its own diverse set 
of demographic, economic and social conditions which can show that similar dynamics 
of the interaction of political ideas and structure can occur in quite different contexts 
and that the framework’s conceptual categories can be applied far afield. 
The cases studies offer a means to interrogate particular circumstances to shed 
light on a very broad research question. Approaches to urban questions have tended to 
be attenuated over time from unabashed grand narration to a more particularised 
investigation as the human sciences and the humanities have problematised and shied 
away from universal theorising. There is a tension, then, between the universal and the 
particular that is not easily nor necessarily resolved. The focus here is not on finding a 
resolution but instead to consider themes which might be described as universal and 
cases which are decidedly particular. It applies the theoretical framework to thinking 
about both, as it seeks to understand the relationship between urban forms and political 
and ideological practices and the possibilities afforded by the city in its various 
instantiations. 
Chapter 4 takes Budapest as the first case study, the quintessential example of a 
‘national’ city. Budapest presents a relatively straightforward case of an explicit 
political programme to nationalise the city and so provides straightforward examples to 
which a theory of forms and affordances can be applied. From relatively early in the 
nineteenth century there was activity aimed at creating an autonomous or independent 
Hungary centred on Budapest. National institutions or proto-national institutions were 
established in Pest and Buda during the 1820s and 1830s and the twin cities became 
central to Hungarian national culture. During the 1840s, nationalist unrest in the 
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Austrian Empire opened up the opportunity for urban centres to act as conduits for 
political activity, and particularly nationalist activity. The failed Hungarian Revolution 
of 1848-49 further cemented its role as a national centre and its part in a narrative of 
nationalist development, Budapest briefly being united and made national capital in 
1849. As Hungary coalesced as an autonomous polity during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, so it was that Budapest was developed as a Hungarian 
administrative centre, playing its part symbolically as a centre of nation and being 
subject to a process of nationalisation. The merging of urban centres into a unified 
Budapest was heavily linked to the carving out of a Hungarian nation. Therefore, 
Budapest provides the clearest case in this study for examining the reciprocity between 
political programme and urban development. 
Chapter 5 provides a more equivocal case study, Vienna, a city that is perhaps 
best understood more as an imperial city than it is as a national city. The city’s historic 
position on the edge of the German-speaking world and adjacent to eastern Europe and 
the Balkans has contributed to it having a complicated relationship to nationalism; both 
to German nationalism which might lay claim to the city and to the various nationalisms 
which arose during the nineteenth century in the Habsburg lands for which Vienna was 
an administrative and cultural centre. The extent to which Vienna was shaped by its 
position in relation to nationalist political aspiration is more difficult to ascertain than 
for Budapest. Nevertheless, it is shown that it is possible to perceive how nationalism 
and ideologies more generally impinged upon its development and this makes Vienna 
a fitting comparison to its Habsburg urban relation downstream on the Danube. Vienna's 
relationship to power was quite distinct, the long-term presence of the Habsburgs 
having a marked effect on the development of the city. The city maintained an 
aristocratic core until much later than equivalent cities which in the nineteenth century 
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had come to be dominated by the bourgeoisie. There is a tension within the city of 
Vienna in which class dynamics and various political programmes are contested and it 
is possible to perceive this tension being worked out through its architecture and urban 
layout. 
In Chapter 6, Venice, the final case study, provides the least straightforward case. 
It was an object of Italian nationalist desire and yet also the only city in the case studies 
which had a long history of self-government and independence with a kind of urban 
self-government which did not necessarily map on to a nineteenth century nationalist 
idea of a nation-state. Yet even here the possibilities of the affordance of nationalist 
politics in the city’s forms are seen. Venice’s position at the edge of western Europe 
and in the marginal land of its lagoon presents a special set of urban conditions quite 
distinct from the other two cases. Furthermore, it is a city of two overlapping identities, 
one more national, one more civic, both having a strong appeal to the majority 
population of Romance language speakers. These claims distinguish Venice from the 
relatively monolithic construct of Hungarian identity in Budapest and German or 
Austrian identities in Vienna. In terms of the aspiration of nineteenth century Italian 
nationalists to nationalise the city, Venice was, again, distinct in its being as much the 
object of nationalist attention as it, or its institutions, being active nationalist subjects. 
Venice had and has an extraordinary status. Its long history of independence, its 
mediating role between eastern Europe, Asia and western Europe and the celebration of 
its architecture have added to the sense of the city itself being a unique work of art. It 
is a city which might be claimed not only by the local Venetian population and the 
Italian nation-state but also claimed as part of an international patrimony. This makes 
for an instructive contrast with Budapest and Vienna in an investigation of the 
interaction of politics and urban forms. 
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Having shown how an analysis based on forms and affordances can be used to 
expand on how a city can incorporate nationalism or be part of a programme of 
nationalisation and, in turn, shape that nationalist programme, in Chapter 7 a wider view 
is taken in order to see how this this kind of relationship operated more broadly. To do 
that, the analysis turns to a form of urban development, commonly seen as influential 
on all three of the case studies and also more generally on the modern European city. 
The restructuring of Paris in the late nineteenth century under Baron Haussmann 
produced the concept of Haussmannisation, a concept which can be applied 
descriptively, normatively and romantically. Descriptively, it is useful in naming a set 
of characteristics of the modern city in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
in which straight boulevards were cut through irregular street plans and buildings were 
made to conform to a set of standards thereby providing a measure of visual unity. 
Normatively, it can be applied to describe a process in which authoritarian urban 
planning radically restructured diverse urban centres. Romantically, it can be used to 
glorify a kind of high modernist aesthetic order. Haussmannisation could be seen as the 
underlying context for all three cases in the late nineteenth century. 
Analytically, though, the concept has its limitations. It is a concept which has 
been understood deterministically as if it were a template which could successfully 
reproduce certain kinds of social and political outcome, interpreted positively or 
negatively. The usefulness of Haussmannisation as a framework for understanding how 
political and ideological programmes are furthered in city design is explored and 
critiqued within the wider context of nineteenth century urbanisation and what it 
afforded politically and ideologically.  
In the final chapter, conclusions are drawn about how different types of urban 
form can afford a variety of political practices. These types of urban form – ‘whole’ 
20 
 
 
forms, rhythms, hierarchies and networks – each offer a range of affordances, from the 
mundane and prosaic to the ideologically and politically loaded. This typology of forms, 
adapted and developed to look at the environment of the city, is shown to be highly 
applicable not only in the three case studies but also to multiple smaller examples with 
the intention of producing a generalisable analysis. The typology of urban forms is 
noted as implying a separation of categories which in practice cannot be perceived 
separately. The streets of a city are not experienced as a series of discrete transactions 
with urban forms but rather the interaction between people and forms, and between 
forms themselves, is a synthesis. A synthesis of forms constitutes an experience unique 
to place and is complex in both how it is immediately experienced and how it is 
sustained over time. 
This complexity, it is suggested, inures the city to total domination by particular 
ideologies and is what makes the concept of affordances, where multiple possibilities 
remain open even as ideology seeks to close them down, powerful. The conceptual 
framework based on forms and affordances offers an alternative to thinking about this 
urban complexity in terms of the hegemonic capture of the city. Instead, political ideas 
and urban forms are understood to afford other potentials without necessarily 
determining them. Even as the city’s streets are controlled and policed, other 
possibilities are present though they might be temporally narrowed. 
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1. Nationalism and Urban History 
As industrialisation exerted an increasing influence on urban life – as, for 
example, manufacturing moved from being proximate to natural resources to being 
located in large population centres – cities whose structures both physical and 
institutional had persisted over centuries experienced tensions previously unimaginable. 
The forces of modern production were superimposed on medieval urban infrastructure 
and therefore urban forms had to respond both to the threat of those tensions and to the 
opportunities modernity engendered. Adaptations to massive inward migration, new 
technologies and new social and political forces were to reshape old cities and to 
reconceive what a city was. Modernised cities in Europe became modern not just 
because of ad hoc responses to socio-economic forces but also because urban authorities 
mandated large scale public works and administrative innovations. The resulting 
modern city not only looked different to the casual observer but also created a novel, 
modern urban experience which structured social and political action and responses. It 
provided a previously inconceivable range of possibilities for social and political 
organisation. By addressing how modern European cities enabled political projects, this 
work seeks to outline changes to urban forms as they modernised and create a 
framework for understanding how urban forms afford a range of ideological responses 
and practices. 
During the period covered in the case studies, Budapest, Vienna and Venice were 
subject to different degrees to emerging nationalist narratives and competing claims on 
the allegiances of their populations regarding an identity beyond identification with the 
city itself. The overlapping claims of German, Austrian, Habsburg, Magyar, Hungarian, 
Venetian and Italian identities and additionally significant minority claims of Jewish, 
Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, Slovak and Czech ethnicities provide particularly rich sites 
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for investigation of modern urbanisation and the emergence of nationalist culture and 
ideology. Budapest, with its rapid expansion during the nineteenth century alongside 
vigorous nationalist activity and the formation of proto-national institutions, is the most 
clear-cut case of the three to apply and elaborate the proposed theoretical framework. 
Vienna during the same period also grew significantly but the influence on urban 
politics of nationalism strengthened later and was complicated by the city being the 
capital of a multi-ethnic empire. However, the affordance of ideology is still detectable 
and this case stretches the theoretical domain of affordances. Both Budapest and Vienna 
were modernised broadly along the same lines of other European cities during the 
period with the use of large, new boulevards and grand structures to transform the 
aesthetics and function of city centres. The case of Venice provides an example which, 
again, demonstrates broader potential for the application of the theory of affordances 
by showing how ideology worked in a city which had few roads to make into boulevards. 
How nationalism was adopted and contested in the cities of central and eastern 
Europe is the subject of a growing body of scholarship and debate in history and urban 
studies. Several accounts in urban histories have sought to understand how nationalism 
was adopted and contested in the region. Gary Cohen’s ‘The Politics of Ethnic Survival’ 
has been important in this area, taking as it does the case of Prague in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries and showing how the city itself created an environment 
for the contest of German, Czech and other identities (1981). Robert Nemes’ ‘The Once 
and Future Budapest’ studies the move of Magyar nationalism into Budapest’s cafe 
society and into the public realm (2005). These works have approached the subject of 
nationalism in particular urban contexts showing the city in the context of the rise of 
nationalism. In work such as Nathaniel Wood’s ‘Becoming Metropolitan’ the emphasis 
has been on the wide range of influencing forces on the urbanisation process, in Wood’s 
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case on Krakow (2010). Nationalist practice in these works features in the wider context 
of forces shaping urban society during this period. Indeed, these case studies of Prague, 
Budapest and Krakow are valuable in isolating nationalisms as ideologies which 
impacted the development of modern cities, ideologies whose influence can be difficult 
to identify clearly at the greater scale of the nation-state. Chad Bryant has noted, ‘urban 
history can reduce the scope of our inquiries – whether they be about nationalism, 
modernization, or something else – to a manageable size.’ (2011, pp. 776–777) The 
ambition of this thesis is to go a step further than using urban history as a method for 
more easily observing the effective functioning of wider ideological and social forces; 
it is to understand how urban form has been and is an active agent in the engagement 
of such forces, using historical urban cases in the context of nationalism to elaborate 
the mechanism by which they interact. 
Key concerns relating to urban forms and affordances can be detected in Göran 
Therborn’s work on the monumental geographies of European capital cities (2002) 
which takes a view of the processes that made major European national capitals as a 
capture of cities by the state. Public architecture and monuments, the planning of urban 
spaces and the naming of cities are the material used by Therborn to provide a credible 
explanation for the increased importance of capitals in Europe, helping the state to 
assert itself against traditional authority and autonomous city-states. He shows how the 
first modern national capital cities, with Paris as the prime example, came about in the 
wake of the French Revolution, reordering them to act as the ceremonial focus for a 
'national public' (2002, p. 45). Outside of this revolutionary influence other capitals 
were to follow this example including London and Berlin. The height of capital city 
building was, according to Therborn’s work, the latter half of the nineteenth century 
and up to the First World War. At this time: 
24 
 
 
  
 
‘A future-looking historicism and mass didactic purpose constituted a common 
frame of reference among the iconographers of the epoch. Architecture and 
public sculpture drew heavily upon the old repertoire of European form, above 
all upon the Classicism of Antiquity, but also significantly upon medieval 
Gothic.’ (2002, p. 21) 
 
He presented the European capital as having four monumental cornerstones. 
First, there was a network of wide streets, squares and grand railway stations for 
ostentatious bourgeois display. Second, there were national state institutions celebrated 
in such edifices as the parliament building. Third, there were buildings of high secular 
culture such as museums, libraries, operas and universities. Fourth, there was urban 
space which was politicised and monumentalised as never before, the aim being a 
national community of common, public symbols. The monumentalisation of cities 
suggests a complex interplay of factors which is shown as closely aligned with their 
nationalisation and which extends beyond capital cities to any city finding itself the 
object of nationalisation. 
In each of Therborn’s examples, urban forms in capital cities afford different 
possibilities for nationalisation. Regarding what cities directly afford political projects, 
each of Therborn’s four cornerstones supports ideological affordances. The provision 
of large public spaces in the modern capital makes possible mass appreciation of 
ostentatious, nationalised architecture and monuments. Likewise, the capacity of the 
modern city’s accommodation allows a state’s authorities to draw on a labour force to 
power its administration at a previously inconceivable scale. Similarly, increased 
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population size made nationally-inspired high culture economically viable. Large 
public spaces afforded the crystallisation of imaginary national narratives in real space 
through monumental architecture. Insight into Therborn’s cornerstones can also be 
gained by considering what affordances of urban forms are blocked by ideology. 
National pride promotes a grandiose architectural aesthetic over a more functional one. 
The presence of national institutions can crowd the development of urban identities 
distinct from the national. As a national high culture is promoted, so a cultural hierarchy 
develops in which vernacular culture is downgraded. Monumental nationalism 
overwhelms contrasting narratives and imposes a more singular interpretation of 
‘national’ events. Turning to how urban forms can afford the reinforcement of ideology, 
the ostentation of boulevards, railways stations and so on underpins the celebration of 
national achievement in the everyday life of the capital city. National institutions in the 
city bolster urban identity even if they narrow the possibility of a more autonomous 
identity for the city. Capital cities were benighted by their high cultural status, the 
presence of national orchestras, ballet and opera companies boosted their position on 
any international ranking of cultural cities. Finally, a permanent cast of national figures 
and stories in monumental form reinforced national identity for the urban citizen.  
Work on nineteenth century urbanisation has generally understood nationalism 
as a relatively small component of the process, if such ideological constructs as 
nationalism are acknowledged as significant at all against urbanisation's socio-
economic causes. Even in cases where the narrative of nationalism was very strongly 
associated with the creation of a nation-state, as with the ‘unification nationalism’ of 
Italy, the tendency has been to downplay its influence. Using the Italian example, 
however, recent reassessments of the period of the Risorgimento question the view that 
unification nationalism played an insignificant role in the formation and development 
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of Italy and, by implication, in the development of modern Italian cities. Lucy Riall 
outlines this shift in ‘Risorgimento – The History of Italy from Napoleon to the Nation 
State’ and highlights the work of Alberto Banti. Of particular interest is the attention 
she draws to theatre: 
 
‘Theatre in particular played a nationalising role. The popularity of opera led to 
a wave of theatre construction in major cities and small towns, and these theatres 
created a recognisable and uniform public architecture across the Italian 
Peninsula.’ (2009, p. 126)  
 
This can augment Therborn’s high cultural cornerstones of monumental 
European cities with the inclusion of urban settings beyond capital cities. In its 
identification of the development of an architectural template for the replication of 
public buildings with an Italian identity, it has shown a way forward to understanding 
the overlap between technical urban forms and programmatic ideological messaging. 
The emphasis on nineteenth century Europe here is not aimed at obscuring the 
deeper roots of social change which opened up the way for modern urbanisation and 
ideological movements. Hohenburg and Lees have suggested that in the late eighteenth 
century ‘a new egalitarianism was developing around shared tastes and pursuits in 
literature’ and that ‘the new vertical bond of nationalism was already at work, ironically 
spurred by the same revolutionary wave that exacerbated horizontal divisions.’ The 
vertical bonds of nationalism were to subsume and replace the social structures of the 
early modern city (1985, pp. 150–151) and processes of replacement could be said to 
be afforded by the preceding social forms. The historical context for the conditions of 
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modernity and ideology in each of the city cases examined here are expanded in order 
to draw out such deep historical affordances. 
To understand how ideological narratives and practices have meaningful effects 
on the formation, morphology and development of modern cities, it is helpful to set the 
scene in the context of broader historical trends. The influence of nationalist narratives 
on European society and politics can be viewed from three different but interrelated 
perspectives. First, there is a philosophical and theoretical development coming out of 
Romanticism which could be observed in the political philosophy and writings of 
Rousseau, Herder, Fichte and others. Second, there is the development of a discourse 
of nationalism which increased in intensity and volume during the nineteenth century 
as some of the great land empires of Europe began to experience internal tensions and 
alternative state structures – smaller and more dynamic than the imperial set-up – were 
contemplated, advocated for and fought for. 
The rejection of traditional forms of political authority during the European 
Enlightenment, which had been previously vested in the Church and aristocracy, created 
the need to posit forms of political community suitable for a rationalised, secular world. 
The difficulty was that such communities required some kind of emotional appeal in 
order to replace those traditional institutions. There were, and are, a variety of European 
identities which could be defined as based on the concept of ‘nation’ (Hobsbawm, 1997, 
pp. 103–110). All are drawn from earlier, pre-modern and early modern European 
society and politics giving a modern spin to them to serve the purpose of creating 
national identities which appealed to modern citizens and served the interests of the 
modern state (Tilly, 1992, p. 63). 
These new political, communal identities emerging during the Enlightenment 
gained particular importance in the wake of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
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expansion (Rowe, 2013, pp. 127–148): as the French military-imperial state constituted 
itself as the liberator of European peoples so it appealed over the heads of traditional 
figures of authority by creating new states in Italy, Germany and Poland. In the wake 
of the revolutions across Europe in 1848, during which time mass politics emerged in 
the context of population expansion, working class political organisation and migration 
from country to city, the idea of the ‘nation’ was particularly potent in what has been 
called the Springtime of Peoples (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp. 21–40). It was perhaps Fichte 
who operationalised the concept of the nation most readily in the early nineteenth 
century in his ‘Addresses to the German Nation’ (1922). Although he addressed himself 
to an elite liberal audience his words had the characteristics of an appeal to a mass 
audience as opposed to the drier political philosophical context in which the nation was 
spoken of in the writings of Rousseau and Herder.  
In Europe, this politicisation of the concept of nation was most readily seen in 
the large land empires of Continental Europe as well as in the British Isles in Ireland 
(Hobsbawm, 2014, p. 171). In the Ottoman Empire it was seen early in Greece then 
Serbia (2014, pp. 173–175) and in the Habsburg lands the idea of nation was 
increasingly important in Hungary and Italy (2014, pp. 164–166). It is in the writings 
of such people as Mazzini that the Italian nation was elevated to a holy cause and a 
more complete ideological construct (Mazzini, 1891). In Germany, the ‘German nation’ 
was deployed to motivate movement towards a constitutional settlement which could 
unify the disparate political entities of the former Holy Roman Empire and the later 
German Confederation (Hobsbawm, 2014, pp. 111–112). In Russia as well as Prussia 
and Austria, agitation for an independent Polish state was increasingly underpinned by 
an appeal to a notion of the Polish nation (Lukowski & Zawadzki, 2006, pp. 168–170). 
The series of uprisings and revolutions in the late 1840s culminating in 1848-9 across 
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many of these lands saw the crystallisation of political movements which were heirs to 
the spirit of the French Revolution. That these various political programmes, originating 
in diverse social groups and locations, should realise some of their revolutionary plans 
and have such a dramatic effect on Europe in 1848, largely in an urban context, is 
significant. 
Cultural as well as political responses in post-1815 reactionary states in Europe 
accompanied by the first wave of industrialisation in mainland Europe produced the 
context for future ideological developments. In the Austrian Empire under Metternich, 
a deeply conservative police state which actively supressed political activity, a kind of 
non-political cultural expression was especially productive. The so-called Biedermeier 
period of political quietism in Austria was to prove particularly beneficial to music with 
Beethoven’s ninth symphony premiering in Vienna in 1824 and Schubert at the height 
of his powers (Beller, 2006, p. 117). Music-making in the home enjoyed great 
popularity in the period between the Congress of Vienna and the 1848 revolution. 
Domestic music was a much-loved family pastime and informal gatherings such as the 
‘Schubertiads’ featured Schubert's music, poetry readings and dancing indicative of the 
bourgeois, inward spirit of the Biedermeier era (Olson, 2015, p. 97). From the 1830s, 
however, there was evidence of dissatisfaction with the Metternich regime and Austrian 
literature had a more critical political edge, particularly from Austrians abroad. Charles 
Sealsfield anonymously published the critical ‘Austria As It Is’ in London, which was 
banned in Austria. The ‘Grenzboten’, a German magazine espousing liberal ideas which 
the conservative regime wanted suppressed, was imported illegally into Austria during 
the 1830s and 1840s. (Beller, 2006, p. 118) This increase in political opposition was 
triggered at least in part by a marked acceleration of industrialisation and economic 
growth in key parts of the Austrian economy, especially in Bohemia. The government 
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continued to supress political life but permitted throughout the different lands outlets of 
a cultural life that were, in the era of Romanticism, often to focus on the idea of the 
‘nations’ of the Austrian Empire. Institutions such as the Bohemian Patriotic Museum 
in Prague (Agnew, 2003, p. 66) and the Scholarly Society of Budapest (Nemes, 2005, 
p. 55) were founded with Austrian state support but rapidly became centres for the 
production of research on Czech and Magyar ‘national’ topics. The ‘historic nations’ 
such as the Bohemians, Poles, Italians and Magyars each had elites which were 
conscious of a sense of the rights set aside for their local royal or imperial territory and 
it was through them that cultural nationalism and political nationalism combined (Beller, 
2006, p. 120). The Austrian administration could use these nationalist sentiments to its 
own benefit, effectively setting one ethnic group against another with rival nationalisms 
and deflecting political unrest that might have otherwise been directed at Vienna. So, it 
was that the use of the concept of ‘nation’ around which much cultural activity was 
organised was extended into political contestation. It was, at this earlier stage, largely 
used by the aristocracy and intellectuals of the Empire’s localities, (Judson, 2016, pp. 
212–214). However, nationalist outlooks became more widely disseminated and 
increasingly informed the politics of the Habsburg lands just as modernisation and 
industrialisation were beginning to have an impact on its society, creating the conditions 
for a wider mass politics to emerge (2016, pp. 273–275). Nationalist ideas and rhetoric 
were to have increasing potency and became attached to a politics of resistance to the 
imperial centre. This might well have worked out differently for the Austrian Empire if, 
as Beller has speculated, the political culture of the Empire after 1815 had been more 
open – perhaps then German culture might have been more politically neutral and 
available as a complementary supra-national identity (2006, p. 121). 
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The increasing importance of the nation as a unifying identity and political 
community coincided with dramatic changes in migration occurring across Europe: 
migration increased to various places outside and also within Europe, with migration 
from the countryside to the city allied, of course, with increasing industrialisation 
(Hobsbawm, 1997, p. 228). These changes stretched and broke traditional social bonds 
thereby creating the opportunity for new forms of social, political and cultural identity 
and bonds to take root. By the late nineteenth century, as the franchise in various states 
expanded to create for the first time a mass politics, the appeal of ideologies such as 
nationalism could be used by politicians to target groups within the electorate. 
New kinds of community and cultural affinity emerging during this period did 
not necessarily radically break with what went before them. As Benedict Anderson has 
it, ‘If nation-states are widely conceded to be “new” and “historical,” the nations to 
which they give expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and still more 
important, glide into a limitless future.’ (1991, pp. 11–12) Nineteenth century 
nationalist rhetoric frequently appealed to a deeper and longer history. In this appeal, a 
‘nation’ without a state was one whose capabilities and power needed to be restored and 
this idea of restoration was fundamental to nationalist narratives. In an urban context, 
cities in which various sacred places needed restoration or rescuing from an alien 
authority could come to be the focus of nationalist activity. This could be detected in 
the wake of Greek War of Independence as Athens was reclaimed from the Ottomans 
and made capital of Greece, despite its diminutive size, conveniently appealing to the 
philhellenism of the educated bourgeoisie of other European states (Bastéa, 2000, pp. 
9–12).  
Liberalism had developed into a powerful set of tenets centred on concepts such 
as liberty and rationality; conservatism emerged in many ways as a response to liberal 
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challenges to the established order, drawing together disparate groups by appealing to 
notions such as order and authority; socialism was by the mid-nineteenth century a 
significant political phenomenon appealing to a newly industrialised working class, 
organised around a desire for equality and human wellbeing. As mass politics emerged, 
so these political traditions increased in their potency and through political parties and 
other institutions of civil society enabled different groups to coalesce and organise to 
influence and to take over policymaking. Liberal, conservative and socialist parties and 
groups were increasingly programmatic in their approach, organising on a large-scale 
and developing political language and materials which not only elaborated a core 
political philosophy but also aimed at activating and motivating a mass audience to 
action (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp. 122–142). It is this evolution from a debate around 
political ideas to a programme for mass political consumption that Michael Freeden has 
described as marking the transition from contestability to the determinacy of ideology; 
going from debate about, for example, human nature to a more concrete statement about 
what human nature actually is and thereby narrowing the possibilities for challenge 
(1996, p. 75). 
The emergence of the modern European city afforded this kind of ideological 
transition. Monumental architecture could be used to take control of how urban forms 
were to be interpreted, for example. The many military monuments to national sacrifice 
dotted around European cities projected a connection between the modern city and a 
traditional order of church, monarchy and military and legitimated the use of the street 
for the processions of all three and narrowed the opportunity to contest that use. Further, 
urban forms could be narrated in order to control their interpretation and hence the 
perception of what they afforded. In the most literal sense, the narration of urban forms 
could be uttered through the naming of a city’s streets and buildings. The modern 
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boulevard Gran Vía in Madrid exemplifies such narration and its naming can be tracked 
through the naming of its three sections on completion between 1909 and 1921 (Conde 
de Peñalver, Pi y Margal and Eduardo Dato: in sequence, named after a former 
conservative mayor, an anarchist politician and conservative Prime Minister), their 
renaming during the Spanish Civil War (CNT, Rusia and Mexico: after the anarcho-
syndicalist trade union, the country forming the core of the USSR which supported the 
Republican government and the major Spanish-speaking nation supporting the 
Republican government), their renaming on the victory for the Nationalists (all three 
sections named José Antonio, the founder of the Falange) and finally the post-Franco 
renaming to Gran Vía, the intentionally non-partisan name for the dawn of a supposedly 
post-ideological age (Corral, 2004, pp. 214–215). Each name not only advertised 
ideological merits but also tuned the street’s affordances as a site of official display, of 
protest and of commercial opportunity. The naming of the street masks other potential 
affordances – it is not that major retail brands were not afforded the possibility of setting 
up shop in Avenida José Antonio but that the association of the brand with fascism in 
the age of neo-liberalism might jar. 
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Avoiding Deterministic Accounts in Urban History 
 
‘But in vain I set out to visit the city: forced to remain motionless and always 
the same, in order to be more easily remembered, Zora has languished, 
disintegrated, disappeared. The earth has forgotten her.’ Invisible Cities 
(Calvino, 1997, p. 13) 
 
Zora is not an especially fine city. Its layout and its urban furniture, however, 
are profoundly evocative and are used as a device for memory. It is a city which has 
crossed from the bodily world to that of the mind so as to achieve a kind of immortality. 
Its permanence is illusory, however, and the preservation of a Zora of the mind has led 
to it vanishing in the world. The separation of mental processes from the environment 
is not just shown to be misconceived but degrading of the earthly city. In Zora, Calvino 
has Marco Polo conjure a disguised description of Venice. It is also a parable for the 
perils of the division of human from the urban environment, both in the conception of 
a city’s design and the appreciation and understanding of its design. It also contains a 
tragic inevitability: as soon as the whole form of the city is imagined it becomes frozen, 
a graveyard of ideas rather than a living place and rather than a place for living that is 
entangled in human activity. 
The example from Zora warns of the danger of separating human action from 
the physical environment when thinking about the city. There is, though, an obverse 
danger: that the clear delineation of a well-established and attested object of history, the 
city, is lost in the effort to dissolve the line between a frozen, rational entity and the 
lived social world. Just as the street and architecture of the city are not in isolation from 
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each other, so the social use of the city is not isolated from the morphology of the city 
itself. 
Cities are, of course, more than their material positioning. They are constituted 
as much by social practices and complex intermingling of material and social structures. 
Definitions of cities which focus upon absolute population size and density do not 
capture an essential urban quality – that they are places in which certain kinds of human 
settlement and practice are structured such that they create opportunities for regulated 
but unmediated social collaboration. That these possibilities present themselves outside 
of the urban context does not detract from the scale at which this can happen in a city. 
The complex array of material and social characteristics makes the city a slippery 
concept that is difficult to identify as an object of analysis and there may well be more 
definitions of a city than there are cities to define. Further, as urbanisation has increased 
vastly in scale and scope in the early twenty-first century, the question arises of whether 
cities have become too indistinct from other forms of modern settlement to be useful as 
a category. 
The modern city since the nineteenth century has developed through the 
application of technical innovation, bringing together services, infrastructure and 
architecture into a functioning system. Urbanisation, expressed as this kind of technical 
phenomenon, has extended its reach in the meantime beyond what was typically defined 
as a city to the point where such technologies and services have, in many regions, 
become ubiquitous in both urban and rural areas. However, the city maintains a 
powerful identity which impinges upon political programmes and the significance of 
urban place cannot be ignored even as cities become a part of larger conglomerations. 
The city is a place not just of established sophisticated urban machinery but also 
as somewhere which can focus human identity and action. It also persists as a historical 
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artefact: the historical city is the material with which modern cities have been grounded 
and built out. So, the persistence of the historical city, or at least its traces, secures the 
city category some relevance both to history and to any analysis aspiring to understand 
the trajectories followed over time to arrive at contemporary urban conditions. What is 
more, a city can have identities which are charismatic, identities which float free of a 
city’s physical forms and which focus and inspire social action. This charismatic city 
also gives some security to the city category if only as an object of narrative analysis. 
As cities were modernised and expanded in Europe and elsewhere during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they drew on the historic foundations of early urban 
settlements and reused and reconfigured those places and space. Analogous processes 
were at work at the same time in a shift in cultural and political ideas which took 
traditional concepts and used them as historical bricolage for modern political discourse. 
Making sense of this coincidence of modern urbanisation and the rise of mass politics 
and its ideologies is central to this thesis. The aim is not to develop or add to a 
systematic theory of ideology: a cluster of terms such as ‘political projects’, ‘political 
ideas’ and ‘ideology’ are used to a certain degree interchangeably here to indicate a set 
of objectives around which groups organise, the emphasis being on how such objectives 
impinge on the city rather than how those objectives are arrived at. There is a particular 
focus on nationalism, a concept which can be defined as a standalone ideology or as 
part of a greater set of ideas, such as conservatism, which could be the level at which 
the term ideology is applied. For the purposes of this work, nationalism and 
programmes of nation-building provide the means by which political identities in 
modern Europe have laid claim both to the loyalty of a set of people and to territory, in 
particular to the loyalty of city-dwellers and their city. The mechanisms by which 
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political programmes and ideologies, such as nationalism, could be propagated in the 
city are considered more relevant than the extent of agency and intentionality involved. 
The term ‘political projects’ does not necessarily imply conscious planning or 
consciously set objectives. Distinct nationalist organisations did have stated goals and 
plans but that is not the same as suggesting that their pursuit required an intentional, 
coherent plan. Rather the term ‘project’ here is used to describe a development of 
proposals around which people identifying with that nationalism could coalesce. To this 
extent there is human agency involved in working within a kind of programmatic 
politics. Regarding intention, a programmatic set of proposals could have multiple 
origins and may not have an intentional coherence, let alone cohere logically. An 
example of how such projects and proposals are worked out is seen in the Avenida da 
Liberdade in Lisbon. It may well have been constructed in the 1880s without significant 
nationalist influence and with, instead, the influence of Pombaline urban planning and 
the Enlightenment and liberal goals of late nineteenth century liberal ideology (Silva, 
2016, pp. 53–54); it came in the twentieth century, through an accumulation of later 
additions, such as the avenue’s termination at Praça do Marquês de Pombal and the 
‘Monumento aos Mortos da Grande Guerra’ depicting a figure of Pátria (the Fatherland) 
crowning a Portuguese soldier, to be used by the Novo Stado regime as a site of 
nationalist procession and commemoration. The avenue afforded this use as part of a 
nationalist project though an original nationalist ‘intention’ is not readily detected. 
Much more generally, cities themselves, as with all kinds of human settlement, can be 
viewed as being planned projects if projects are understood not just to be intentional, 
time-bound schemes but as sets of commonly understood, if modifiable, principles 
which guide development over generations. 
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The form and function of the city and urban space in human society have been 
theorised by multiple disciplines and the significance credited to the urban 
problematique varies as much as responses to it. The city is by some accounts merely a 
by-product of socio-economic conditions and by other accounts is a distinct object for 
research in and of itself. The coincidence of the rise of mass politics and rapid 
urbanisation can be interpreted through classical Marxism as being driven by an 
underlying proletarianisation of productive forces; in other words, attention should be 
focused on the base, with culture and particularities of the city being ideological 
superstructure. This reduction of the city to primary socio-economic forces is not only 
a Marxist reading but imminent in more liberal and conservative ones found, for 
example, in Rasmussen1 and Hayek2 . If some reciprocity is acknowledged between 
                                                 
 
1 Rasmussen’s classic account of the development of London implies an ascendency of 
liberal democratic norms in London (over Absolutist Paris), a triumph which he celebrates. The 
London which Rasmussen portrays has not been determined by autocratic planners but 
conforms to his ideal of unfettered, organic urban development. It essentially reads the modern 
city as a by-product of political and productive forces rather than those forces operating in 
reciprocity with urban forms: ‘Wren's plan, finished in a few days, is a fine example of a certain 
type of town-planning - that type which is now going to be abandoned. It is the town-planning 
of Absolutism, which - as far as the exterior is concerned - has given such imposing results at 
the same time as the monumental form suppressed the vital functions of the towns. Paris, that 
has been admired as a most beautiful city, is a striking example of a great city, the natural 
growth of which has been checked. The government has constantly checked its expansion 
development, with the result that houses have grown higher and higher, and it has been possible 
to lay out grandiose streets and squares. The reverse side of the radiant medal is the 
disappearance of recreation grounds and too crowded and too populous quarters, a breeding 
place for the most dangerous type of populace. According to modern ideas it is impossible to 
give a town a definite and fixed form. A town plan is no longer a beautiful pattern of streets 
which a clever man can design in a day or two.’ (1937, p. 112) 
2  Hayek’s account of modern urbanism is underpinned with a reduction of its 
development to the mediation of individual property owners’ interests: ‘A different set of 
problems is raised by the fact that in the close contiguity of city living the price mechanism 
reflects only imperfectly the benefit or harm to others that a property owner may cause by his 
actions. …. In order that the market may bring about an efficient co-ordination of individual 
endeavours, both the individual owners and the authorities controlling communal property 
should be so placed as to enable them to take into account at least the more important effects of 
their actions on other property.’ (2011, pp. 474–475) 
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underlying socio-economic conditions and cultural expression, however, then tools are 
needed to understand how the physical phenomenon of the city and cultural and 
ideological practices relate. Analysis of urban space, spurred by Lefebvre (1991) and 
expanded in various ways by Harvey (1973), Massey (2005), Berman (2010) and others, 
have in different ways looked to address this and account for how cities structure social 
relations. Every mode of production is seen to produce its own kind of space and 
strategies for maintaining or changing social conditions must have their spatial 
correlative. This approach opens the possibility of neither being reliant on an essentialist 
understanding of the city category while at the same time accounting for the specificity 
of human experience in the urban setting. However, to theorise the interaction of a city 
with political and ideological projects pursued within it needs something additional to 
spatial analysis, tools which are appropriate for analysing the modern city both in its 
contemporary context, its origins and points in between. 
As a historical inquiry into relationships between the modern European city, 
nationalism and nationhood, this work seeks to make some more generalised claims 
about relationships between urbanisation and ideology and, more tentatively, 
relationships between place and culture. An inquiry of this kind necessarily touches on 
and draws from a daunting body of literature in a wide variety of disciplinary categories 
and dialogues including nationalism studies, urban studies, political science, history – 
urban and otherwise – philosophy, literature and others. It would not be feasible to 
address debates regarding nationalism, nationhood and the city in each of these fields 
adequately while doing justice to these historical case studies; the method adapted here 
however has the flexibility to engage with each of these fields. The objective is not to 
find a methodology which is all-encompassing but rather something which can open up 
an understanding of the urban in which the possibility of multiple overlapping forms 
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are tolerated. The aim of identifying and analysing urban forms in this way is not to 
reinforce broader social and political theory but rather to describe what politics and 
social action such forms, and the interaction between different forms, make conceivable 
and viable. The open public square, connected to transport networks, administered by 
local government, served by retail outlets, cleaned by street cleaners makes possible the 
political demonstration, the military procession and the chance encounter of citizens. 
The form of the open public square does not determine these possibilities – neither do 
public transport, government or street cleaners – but they afford them. 
JJ Gibson’s work examined how perception of the environment affords an 
organism various possible actions. By taking situated behaviour as his object of study, 
Gibson assumed a radical stance on the possibilities of predicting human behaviour: 
that humans are deeply embedded in their surroundings in a way which means that 
predictions about their behaviour can only be made by understanding their context and 
the rules governing their conduct cannot be generalised in isolation. Gibson 
conceptualised ‘affordances’, latent possibilities for action in an environment, which 
are independent of an animal recognising their potential but which are nevertheless 
dependent upon an animal’s ability to utilise them. 
For Gibson, an animal’s environment was made up of surfaces whose 
composition and layout constituted what they afforded the animal. When an animal 
perceived a surface, it perceived what the surface could afford: in other words, things 
in the environment could be perceived directly without the addition of internal 
representation. An example Gibson started with is a horizontal surface: so long as it had 
the properties of sufficient scale and rigidity it would afford support for the animal and 
permit walking with an upright posture. In the language of ‘affordance’, a ‘horizontal, 
flat, extended and rigid’ surface offered the affordance of support to a biped, the 
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affordance being related to the animal’s characteristics. The affordance was something 
which had to be expressed in terms of the animal rather than the physical properties of 
the material of the surface in isolation from the animal. (1979, pp. 127–128) 
From these simple principles was built a theory of affordances which Gibson 
used to frame his work on visual perception. What is helpful in terms of an analysis of 
the relationship between ideology and the city is the prominence given to the 
environmental context prior to the implementation of social practice. The affordances 
of an environment are real but also subjectively perceived. Unlike what Gibson terms 
‘values and meanings’, which are conceived as subjective, affordances bridge the 
‘environment’, notionally external to the animal, and ‘behaviour’, supposed to be 
internally motivated. In his words, ‘[a]n affordance cuts across the dichotomy of 
subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy’ (1979, p. 129). 
Gibson's theory of affordances opens a conceptual field which, though its 
methods might not be suitable to be applied exhaustively, can be usefully applied to the 
historical context of the modernisation of European cities, especially since this kind of 
investigation is so particularly engaged with the built environment and with human 
actions within it. Before proceeding with the historical analysis of the city and 
nationalism in Europe, this conceptual field should be elaborated. 
Gibson bases his definition of an ‘environment’ on animals (including persons) 
existing in a ‘medium’ in relationship to ‘substances’, ‘surfaces’ and ‘objects’. An 
animal in a terrestrial environment, for example, exists within the medium of air which 
affords respiration, unimpeded locomotion and visual and vibratory perceptions. The 
substance of water can have a boundary surface with air and affords drinking, 
containment, pouring and washing. Some solid substances afford nutrition to particular 
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animals; solid substances also have characteristic surfaces. A body of water lacks 
rigidity for walking but it may afford floating. 
The ‘horizontal, flat, extended and rigid’ surface mentioned earlier is descriptive 
of the earth, or the ‘flat earth’ which is the earth experienced at the scale of the animal 
rather than the globe which is not directly experienced in everyday life. Surfaces, of 
course, can be modified: the surface forming a steep slope might be cut into with steps 
which afford ascent and descent. Objects in an environment are very diverse but in 
Gibson’s use they are, critically, perceived by animals according to what they afford 
rather than a more abstract set of properties. An example he gives is of an ‘elongated’ 
object which affords ‘wielding’. A human might use this object to hit something – the 
object is used as a hammer; a chimpanzee might use this object to pull in a banana from 
outside its cage – the object is used as a rake. The object’s classification might change 
according to how it is regularly used; however, its affordances are the complete set of 
its potential uses by an animal and the animal directly perceives the meaning of the 
object by what it affords that animal. (1979, pp. 130–135) 
As humans have populated the planet they have altered the natural environment, 
converting substances and surfaces to change what they afford. In the scheme of the 
theory of affordances, humans have not created a new environment by doing this but 
have modified the pre-existing environment (1979, p. 129). Urbanisation then is a 
complex accumulation of changes to the substances and surfaces of the environment by 
humans. The scale of urbanisation and the layering of modifications to the environment 
mean that the theory of affordances, which for Gibson was applied to a generic 
‘environment’, needs to be effectively transposed to the specifics of time and place 
found in the cities under investigation. 
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This transposition can occur by focusing on some key concerns inspired by 
Gibson which have particular relevance to the city and ideology. First would be a 
concern with the constraints which an environment, such as a city, could impose upon 
collective human activities and practices, such as those conceived of as ideological. 
Since humans perceive surfaces and substances to offer certain affordances, so other 
affordances are not offered. In an ideological scheme, this might either mean that certain 
collective activities are not available in reality, though they may be pursued through a 
shared imaginary world which is augmented by that which is afforded by the real 
environment. Further to this there may also be what Gibson referred to as ‘negative’ 
affordances which enable damaging behaviour which may undermine something like 
an ideological project. Second would be what affordances ideology might block in an 
environment. Although humans might perceive affordances, it might be possible that 
ideological language and practice would prevent such affordances from being realised. 
Gibson is concerned with an individual animal’s ability to distinguish between ‘real’ 
and ‘imaginary’ (1979, pp. 256–257) and this can be augmented with the notion of a 
collective imagination enabled by language. When considering the effects of 
ideological language and practice, however, it is possible that there are social 
constraints, communicated by cultural and ideological means, which preclude the 
realisation of certain affordances. Third would be the extent to which human changes 
to the environment might reinforce ideology. Just as ideology might influence the 
perception of affordances in the environment, so certain surfaces, substances and 
objects might be co-opted to the purposes of ideological projects; this might well just 
be a case of adopting what is afforded by the environment prior to human changes to it 
but of particular concern for this study is the possibility of changes which are ‘designed’ 
in some way to influence cultural and political behaviours. 
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By using Gibson’s concepts of animal habitats and their affordances there is the 
possibility of thinking through the materiality and form of urban places and what they 
afford in particular, neither omitting wider socio-economic and political forms nor 
subsuming the particularity of the city under universal themes. Such an application of 
the theory of affordances follows Caroline Levine’s utilisation in connecting literary 
forms to their social, political and historical context. Just as she states that literary forms 
operate within certain restraints across different contexts and that therefore examining 
their affordances gives the possibility of ‘a generalizable understanding of political 
power’ (2015, p. 7), so the same possibility is present when analysing urban forms. A 
theory of affordances is suitable for examining how formal arrangements order urban 
habitats. The urban environment can be viewed as being capable of shaping, and being 
open to being shaped, by political and ideological forces by looking at how the city is 
arranged and what the forms that give it order afford its citizens. 
Levine’s ‘Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network’ (2015) provides a 
framework in which to start examining urban forms, how they overlap and what they 
afford. It is provided in the context of her demand for a new literary formalism but its 
application can be extended. Levine assembles her examples of forms under the four 
headings of the book’s title. ‘Wholes’ include containing spaces such as nations and 
prisons; ‘rhythms’ cover temporal forms like institutions which persist over time; 
‘hierarchies’ are expressed in gender, class, and race; ‘networks’, though often 
confounding containing forms, have rules and patterns that give them their own form, 
with transnational markets, transportation and print culture being Levine’s initial 
examples. Levine goes on to show how forms under these four headings have structured 
culture, politics, and scholarship. In order to do this, Levine utilises Gibson’s theory of 
affordances, mediated through its application to design theory (Levine, 2015, p. 6; see 
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also Norman, 1998). In Levine’s account, a form has certain properties which afford 
uses which can be implemented, ignored, reacted against, undermined or transformed. 
Thus, a form can be seen to influence human action over time but cannot said to 
determine it entirely. Levine’s formal framework provides a structure for the application 
of an analytics of affordances in an urban context. 
Urban wholes are several but almost always overlapping. The boundaries of the 
whole of the city can be marked on the ground and on a map. The morphology of a city 
is its whole shape which can be the object of improvement. Urban rhythms can be 
identified in all kinds of contexts: systems of government meeting regularly over long 
periods of time and also the ebb and flow of traffic. Urban hierarchies can be 
expressions of broader social ones, such as gender, class and race. They can also be 
specific to the city: citizen versus visitor; homeowner/renter/homeless. There are a 
profusion of urban networks: societies, associations, friendships; mass transportation; 
trade. It is the interactions between, conflict between and modifications of these forms 
which are used to highlight how political ideas and ideologies are brought to bear on 
urban space. 
For the cases under examination, this can be useful in addressing more specific 
questions such as: how did modernising improvements to European cities impact their 
existing urban forms and what new affordances were created? For Budapest, Vienna 
and Venice their pre-modern existing forms were very varied and set each on a unique 
path which was to be navigated as improvements came to be implemented. The way in 
which Budapest came together as a new whole out of Buda, Óbuda and Pest; the way 
Vienna broke through its walls to create an expanded modern city; and the way that 
Venice, constrained by water, developed modern services and practices which 
modernised the experience of a pre-modern urban morphology; each of these paths to 
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modernity interacted with powerful forces such as nationalism, liberalism, populism 
and socialism. 
For each city case this formalist reading can be applied at a more detailed level. 
To take Andrássy Avenue in Budapest as an example, the whole form is the complete 
boulevard with its grand vista, its processional space and its encapsulation of a certain 
kind of European bourgeois identity. Its rhythm can be found on the most immediate 
everyday level in mechanised traffic, particularly the regularity of mass transit, and on 
the much larger scale of the timing of the anniversary of the Hungarian Millennium in 
1896 and the Avenue’s embellishment for that occasion. Hierarchy is demarcated by 
different sized plots affordable to people with different income levels and by socio-
economic exclusion in high-end retail and in institutions like the opera house. The 
Avenue, of course, lies in the heart of several different networks: road and rail, social 
and political institutions, and so on. 
This formalist reading can help define the extent to which new forms of 
wholeness, rhythms, hierarchies and networks constituted the improved modern 
European city, primarily through how new urban spatial forms were created which 
meant that modern cities could act as a backdrop for mass ideological movements in a 
way that the pre-modern city, with its more narrowly-defined spaces, could not. It is 
these kinds of urban practice and experience which are to be focused on. In emphasising 
the formal and the structural there is less scope to assign agency to individual actors 
and movements; the project is not to unmask a deliberate programme of manipulation 
of urban space. Justifications for modernisation could be primarily based on the 
immediate enhancement of citizens’ lives with arguments for the moral improvement 
of citizens being a secondary, though frequently expressed, goal. The economic drivers 
for these improvements are not to be ignored. Urban development provided a means to 
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absorb surplus capital and create profit; urban improvement projects were often 
effectively job creation schemes. The ideological context shaped and was shaped by 
urban forms that were in turn derived from other social and economic forces. These 
forms thus shaped then provided for a new and different urban experience and politics. 
Theorising this process provides a basis for thinking through contemporary urban 
development as much as making sense of urban history. 
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2. Theorising Politics, City and Nation 
This chapter explores the development of the concept of citizenship in the 
context of the medieval city and shows how Western political philosophy opened an 
exceptional political space of the city. Turning to political thought underpinning 
nationalism, the texts of Rousseau and Herder are read to understand how nationalist 
thought could respond to and make use of modern urban forms. 
The development of modern conceptions of citizenship has deep roots in the 
emergence of autonomous urban institutions in the Middle Ages. Citizenship entails an 
element of voluntary participation in a way that membership of a nation does not: the 
rights of a citizen need to be exercised whereas a member of a nation is deemed to have 
been born to their status or qualified through a one-off act of induction. Although the 
modern state has made effective use of both the concepts of citizen and nation, there is 
a sense in which citizenship could be said to fit well with the modern city with its 
dynamic and diverse populations, while national identity fits either with territory larger 
than just one city or with groups of people who are not necessarily territorially fixed. 
From this it might appear that there is a misfit between nationalism and the city, at least 
intellectually. However, there is a linkage between them to be found in works of 
political philosophy highly influential to nineteenth century European nationalism.  
In this chapter, the historico-legal development of the concept of citizenship is 
explored in the context of the medieval city. An understanding of the exceptional 
political space of the city in political philosophy is elaborated. The political philosophy 
of nationalism is seen to engender an urban-rural tension and the work of Rousseau and 
Herder is read to understand a political philosophy of the city. This is set within a wider 
understanding of the Western philosophical tradition. Their approaches to the city and 
its relationship to the national community are shown to have a role for modern 
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urbanisation even if their attitude to the city is ambiguous. Hostility to city living as a 
corruption of the spiritual life of the nation is expressed in different ways by both 
Rousseau and Herder though there is a sense in which both are looking to find 
alternative urban models for the kind of society they want to support. 
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The European City and Citizenship 
In the case of what Weber calls the ‘Occidental City’, social regulation in 
European cities historically had its basis in the ‘comune’, an urban entity which was to 
gain its own legal personality (1978, p. 1248). The creation of an administrative order, 
embodied in the urban corporation, shaped the mediaeval and early modern city prior 
to modernisation and was the indeed the subject of that modernisation. The modern city 
was institutionally built on that order and understanding changes to it helps understand 
what practices a city could afford before and after modernisation. 
Weber’s ideal-typical city had five features which he derived from a historical 
study of cities, ancient and modern, with the mediaeval European city exhibiting them 
most clearly. A city had to be equipped with: a fortress; a market; its own law court; an 
‘associational structure; and a degree of autonomy in which burghers could influence 
the appointment of administrative authorities (1978, p. 1226). Accepting these features 
as constitutive of the form of European cities since the Middle Ages, these last two 
features are of specific interest when explaining the changes to communalism 
influencing the development of the modern city and modern citizenship. 
The medieval European city’s associational structure was that of a ‘sworn 
confraternity’ in which the members bound themselves directly one to another in the 
collective body of the commune (1978, p. 1248). People who had previously been 
unknown to each other were ritually brought together in a group for mutual benefit. 
This gave the member, the burgher, privileges derived from the group which meant that 
they had, ‘a “subjective” right to be dealt with under a common “objective” law’ (1978, 
p. 1249). Although this membership status levelled social groups in the city in a novel 
way by claiming primacy over other bonds, when dealing with city matters it is 
important to note that the confraternal corporation was a closed system in the sense that 
 51 
 
 
it had strict barriers to entry and an effective limitation on widespread participation 
beyond the burgher class. While it is credible to claim that these urban institutional 
arrangements were precursors of modern citizenship it would be mistaken to imagine 
that citizenship at that time was recognisably close to its modern counterpart. Rather 
the corporate body of burghers informed the development of secular institutions at state 
level and developments at state level fed back into urban communalism. 
Anticipating the formation of chartered cities in western Europe, Harold 
Berman described the opening up of a ‘secular’ legal sphere as a consequence of the 
Investiture Controversy in the eleventh century, what he referred to as the Papal 
Revolution. In order to resolve the powers of the Emperor and the Pope, more 
immediately with regard to the right to appoint bishops, a distinct body of law, the canon 
law, was brought into being for the Church and by so doing it for the first time 
established ‘political entities without ecclesiastical functions and nonecclesiastical 
legal orders.’ (1983, p. 273) The new secular polities, ‘imperial, royal, feudal, manorial, 
mercantile, urban’ required their own types of law and this opened up possibilities for 
autonomous social formations which administered their own laws and represented 
themselves communally to other polities. It was in this context that the wave of cities 
created by charter across Europe in the High Middle Ages became places where a new 
kind of subject, the burgher, could operate. Sassen characterises this context described 
by Berman as one in which urban law was ‘communitarian, secular, and constitutional’ 
(2008, p. 64). By ‘communitarian’ Sassen means a body of citizens associated together 
as a collection of individuals rather than deriving legitimacy from a kinship group 
external to urban relations, as set out by Weber (1978, pp. 1244–1248). By ‘secular’ is 
meant the location of urban authority outside ecclesiastical authority, permitting cities 
to produce their own variations of law. ‘Constitutional’ implies that there was ‘a 
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fundamental law establishing rights and constraints’ in the city, typically enshrined in 
its charter, and whose authority was paramount and empowered a citizen to be involved 
in government of the city (Sassen, 2008, pp. 65–66). It is this view of the medieval 
city’s political structure as an embryonic form of citizenship which developed later at 
state level. It would be inaccurate to suggest however that the city was an incipient 
modern state since although it had characteristics in common – an increasingly 
depersonalised administrative order – its type of communitarianism was in a critical 
sense a closed arrangement. What marks out the modern city is the extent to which its 
community is open – perhaps not to all-comers since membership is still restrained by 
significant economic barriers as well as state control but the modern administrative 
urban order is one which makes external bonds and identities a secondary concern. 
The transition to such an order can be traced through changes in the 
communitarian, secular and constitutional aspects of the city. As the guild system was 
dismantled, city walls both physical and in the form of tariff barriers, ethnic and 
religious restrictions and privileges were removed and property in the city rationalised 
so the nature of the commune became more open-ended and the secularisation of urban 
institutions became more pronounced. At the same time, the constitutionalism identified 
by Sassen was encroached upon by the rise of the state, especially in those cities which 
were under Absolutist rule from the seventeenth century on. This reconfiguration of the 
urban order was to have a significant effect on the affordances of the city such that they 
could respond to the demands of modernisation. The expansion of the electoral 
franchise and the opening up of urban government to scrutiny changed the 
communitarian characteristics of the city, moving from the notion of a membership and 
privilege to citizenship and rights. The acceleration of secularisation meant the 
desacralisation of tracts of the city previously given over to non-commercial, 
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ecclesiastical purposes; it also meant the removal, formally at least, of confessional 
barriers such as the ghettoisation of Jews. As technologies of state power developed, 
the constitutional element of the city which brought about a local ‘rule of law’ was 
increasingly challenged by state-level administrators whose objectives were to bring 
the city into a wider territorial system. The effect of this last point was to make possible 
large-scale schemes which impinged upon local property rights and for which the local 
urban administration lacked the distance from powerful local interests to enact 
significant change. 
The historico-legal background to the modernisation of the European city shows 
how institutional forms were innovated and applied to increasingly sophisticated urban 
wholes at first in the European context and then, as European colonialism spread, 
globally. The breakdown of older forms of membership and privilege afforded the 
possibility of reimagining citizenship both at a state and a city level. While doing this, 
a tendency to attempt to find first principles from which a more rational order could be 
constructed was in evidence in the works of Enlightenment political philosophy. Even 
for philosophers whose work reacted against systematic approaches like Rousseau and 
Herder there was an effort to envisage the world prior to its perceived corruption. An 
account of how the world had changed up to the time of the Enlightenment was one 
which had to throw light upon the emergence of cities and politics. 
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The City as an Exception 
 
‘The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, took it into his head to 
say, “This is mine,” and found people simple enough to believe him, was the 
true founder of civil society. How many crimes, how many wars, how many 
murders, how many misfortunes and horrors, would that man have saved the 
human species, who pulling up the stakes or filling up the ditches should have 
cried to his fellows: Be sure not to listen to this impostor; you are lost, if you 
forget that the fruits of the earth belong equally to us all, and the earth itself to 
nobody! … Let us therefore take up things a little higher, and collect into one 
point of view, and in their most natural order, this slow succession of events and 
mental improvements.’ (Rousseau, 2009, pp. 63–64) 
 
Rousseau identified a critical point of departure for humanity whose destination 
was inequality and bondage. At that point, the imposter enclosed property and created 
a kind of division which had previously been unknown. These prelapsarian conditions 
were ones in which civilised society had yet to be conceived. Rousseau took the idea of 
savage man and extrapolated from that device an essential, common humanity. Savage 
man was located, in Rousseau's time, everywhere that had not been colonized or had 
just been recently colonized by Europe; savage man’s reach also extended into periods 
preceding civilisation. Rousseau was careful to avoid resorting to a positive definition 
of a state of nature for humanity but negatively managed to derive an essential human 
nature using the savage placed on a timescale to show that the relatively short duration 
of civilisation made it an exception. This is a narrative strategy which effectively 
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conceals fundamental assumptions about human nature upon which a political 
philosophy can be structured, an unverifiable narrative explanation for the 
philosopher’s preconceptions. In the case of Rousseau these preconceptions were 
geared towards an understanding of humanity as fundamentally good. 
Viewing the phenomena of the city and of politics with a lens that takes in the 
entirety of human social existence could be analytically excessive and such a broad 
perspective might not be needed to give insight into the modern city. Yet, in the 
narratives of political philosophy and nationalist ideology, underlying assumptions 
about human nature have their roots in the long span of anthropological time. The scale 
of this conception of time lends itself to the search for the ‘natural’ origins and 
conditions of human community because its greater part is dominated by a swathe of 
time in which human social development is understood as being relatively static. This 
is relevant to an understanding of the meaning of the city because of the sheer bulk of 
time in which there was no urban society and no recognisable politics as such. 
This perspective on the development of human society looks to the emergence 
of settlement and agriculture after the end of the last ice age as the beginning of an 
exceptional era before which humans existed on a subsistence basis. Though there 
would have been human communities, typically in the tens rather than in the hundreds 
of thousands of people, these communities would have been mobile and often nomadic. 
They would have operated, as some very small societies today still continue to operate, 
on a hunter-gatherer basis (P. Jordan, 2014). For a civilised society to be afforded under 
such conditions, a series of changes over a relatively short time span would be necessary. 
The emergence of associated settled communities and the development of agricultural 
practices provides a place in time to locate a revolution in human social conditions. The 
existence of this historical break point lends itself to a broad understanding of 
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civilisation which perceives it as exceptional and, in some way, ‘unnatural’. It follows 
from this that the emergence of politics and cities is not possible under ‘normal’ 
conditions, the conditions under which human animals have existed for millennia, and 
a revolutionary transformation was required so that political human animals could 
emerge.  
To take the notion of the revolution in agricultural practice as being a critical 
break for theorising the origins of politics further, it is the point at which agriculture 
was introduced that permanent settlement on a large scale also became possible and out 
of which politics became necessary. That critical juncture was reached when there was 
a development of technologies which enabled agriculture or when forms of agriculture 
developed which drove the production of new technologies. This moment was reached 
in geographically dispersed areas across the globe independently (Larson et al., 2014). 
In Mesopotamia, in China around the great rivers and in Central America agricultural 
practices emerged separately in the wake of the last ice age and the global dispersal of 
human populations. Outside of these agricultural societies, both before their creation 
and in human communities which were contemporary but outside of these exceptional 
areas, societies were very small. Following on from this it is relatively easy to read into 
this shift from hunter-gathering to farming a moment at which the prevalence of flexible, 
small communities shifted to the beginning of something more hierarchical with 
complex structures of power.8 
                                                 
 
8 These kinds of interpretation have been challenged within many disciplines – it is by 
no means commonly accepted that there is a fundamental developmental revolution leading to 
human modernity and, indeed, modern structures of power. However, their simplicity lends 
itself to narrative deployment and of particular interest here is how it might be deployed in 
nationalist narrative practice. 
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Agriculture, according to this line of thinking, provided surpluses at certain 
points which needed to be administered. Buildings were not only needed to house 
produce, institutional structures were also needed to maintain them. To facilitate this, 
accounting and writing developed to keep track of resources. Political structures were 
needed to decide how surpluses were allocated after the labour that had been required 
to gather the surpluses. Ideological and religious narratives could be readily applied to 
justify these structures and their decision-making. Therefore, by this account it is 
through agriculture that politics was brought into being and, because agriculture worked 
most efficiently if there was a reusable field system, ready availability of labour for 
seasonal work and ready availability of structures to handle surpluses, communities of 
humans gathered and settled in one place. This line of reasoning is somewhat 
deterministic and as such provides material for an essentialised conception of the 
origins of politics. It is a genealogy of politics that presents itself as empirically 
grounded but which is readily deployed ideologically.  
Since humans have not lived in cities and have not had power institutionalised 
as politics until recently relative to anthropological time scales, this understanding of 
time enables a narrative exceptionalism to develop when theorising political community 
regarding the city and its relationship to politics. It is a device available to any political 
theory seeking to authenticate an account of how contemporary conditions can be 
overcome: that modern society, and its politics, can change because both modern 
society and politics are a recent, exceptional phenomenon. If civilisation is exceptional 
and is viewed as corrupt then it can be purified and doing so would change the course 
of history for the better. It is its deployment in urban relations and urban politics which 
gives it its primary power rather than its basis in fact. It gains its authenticity by 
association with the scientific study of human origins, though whether close scrutiny of 
58 
 
 
the evidence supports such an interpretation is secondary to its effectiveness as a 
rhetorical move. Human prehistory, as understood empirically by archaeology, 
anthropology, biology or other relevant disciplines, serves to colour an account of 
society which has already been conceived. Its effect is to place both politics and the city 
as phenomena coming from a common, artificial source. 9  By applying an 
anthropological time scale to the political, the notion of the ‘political’ and the ‘city’ are 
temporalised in such a way as to make them appear ‘unnatural’ when set against an 
account of human ‘nature’ which occurs over a very long timeframe. 
This narrative move is of course available both to emancipatory politics, where 
the desire would be to completely change society and to more reactionary politics which 
would want to roll back. The direction of travel of the narrative device, whether it is 
forwards to or backwards from a contemporary political urban moment, does not 
necessarily affect its successful operation. It is the tension between current 
circumstances and human prehistory which is the key to its deployment. It enables 
claims about human history and how civilisation and politics relate to it, a powerful 
message which says that humans have lived naturally in the distant past but now live in 
a civilised society constituting a polis; and it is because of these exceptional 
circumstances in the context of human history that politics is needed to organize people 
to respond to these circumstances because they cannot rely on normal human instincts, 
adapted as they are for a pre-civilised world. 
                                                 
 
9 The relation of the two is problematic as Heidegger, in discussing the Romanisation 
of Classical Greece, suggested that the Greek conception of the polis has been lost by the 
imposition of the Roman imperium: ‘[W]e think the “political” as Romans, i.e., imperially. The 
essence of the Greek πόλις will never be grasped within the horizon of the political as 
understood in the Roman way.’ (Heidegger, 1998, p. 43) 
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A variation on this narrative is found in Hegelian thought. ‘This determinate 
spirit of the people, since it is actual and its freedom is as nature, has on this natural 
side the moment of geographical and climatic determinacy,’ was Hegel’s reconciliation 
of human agency and geographical determinism. It is not so much that there is a radical 
break but rather a dialectical development which generates civilised life. He went on, 
‘it is in time and, as regards content, essentially has a particular principle and has to go 
through a development, determined by this principle, of its consciousness and its 
actuality; it has a history within itself.’ In this, Hegel’s use of time expands from the 
anthropological to the anthropocentric as historical developments unfolded with 
purpose. ‘As a limited spirit its independence is a subordinate matter; the spirit passes 
over into universal world-history, the events of which display the dialectic of the 
particular national spirits, the judgement of the world.’ (2007, p. 246) The actualisation 
of a human consciousness was analogous to the exceptional break with nature and the 
creation of politics but with a conception of the cycles of history which seemed not to 
offer the possibility of the recovery of an essential, pre-political human society. 
However, by transforming Hegel’s dialectic to one in which the ‘display’ of ‘particular 
national spirits’ was a product of an ideological superstructure masking the true 
economic basis for society, classical Marxism offered another account of how 
somewhere on the anthropological time scale a kind of exceptional politics had 
intervened from which humanity would be emancipated. 
This exceptionalisation of politics and the city evokes the separation of action 
from environment in theorising the city that was touched upon in Calvino’s illustration 
of the city of Zora. In thinking through the separation of political theory from an 
embodied world, a fissure opens up between the politics and its territory. It is a 
separation which an understanding of the world being territory on to which human 
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violence projects itself. Heidegger contrasted this with what he perceived to be the 
Greek model of the polis: the polis was not simply a city with inhabitants but an entire 
political project in itself. In this scheme, the Greek polis and Roman civitas were 
distinct realisations of political community again temporalised in such a way as to make 
the older version the more authentic (1998, p. 43). It was a more nuanced variation of 
the application of a long timescale to contextualise the development of political 
communities but there was a similar effect in setting the more recent urban model as 
the less authentic community. They both suggested the possibility of a recovery or 
revitalisation of an older kind of human community and the removal of more recent 
political arrangements.  
Not only does this temporalisation impose itself on how the city and politics are 
conceived by reference to a more modern, systematic understanding of human origins 
but it also works well with more traditional origin myths. Gilgamesh, the Garden of 
Eden and flood stories described similar worlds which were in some way closer to a 
divine ideal or at least a better human existence which through external intervention are 
somehow wiped away or lost. Being in a world which was identified as proceeding from 
that lost world demanded an attitude towards its lost inhabitants, the ancient ancestors. 
They could, for example, be poor, foolish folk or possessors of an ancient wisdom and 
a now obscure truth. National mythmakers could infuse their stories with these 
attitudes: late nineteenth century Hungarian nationalist discourse valorised the ancient 
Magyar nomads (Freifeld, 2000, pp. 16–17) who brought their simplicity and 
connection with the land to the Pannonian Basin and established order as they finally 
settled and farmed. Although they became settled farmers they sustained, in this account, 
a more ancient and less corrupt spirit. 
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Nationalism, Political Philosophy and the City 
The activists of nineteenth century nationalism were often operating in a 
revolutionary mode, actively opposing traditional authorities and engaged in a struggle 
to build new national structures (Hobsbawm, 2014, pp. 164–166). As such, political 
philosophy and political theory were not often at the forefront of their writing and public 
rhetoric and indeed theoretical perspectives could be open to derision in such a 
politically active culture. Moreover, the notion of action coming from a national spirit 
rather than a rational philosophical position was often integral to nationalist political 
culture. For the Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini, for example, philosophers had 
instigated aberrations such as the Rights of Man which promoted individual rights and 
neglected social duties. It was from Dante that he found the ideal for a combination of 
thought and action: ‘God created us, not to contemplate, but to act. He created us in His 
own image, and He is Thought and Action, or rather, in Him there is no Thought which 
is not simultaneous Action.’ (Mazzini, 1862, p. 39) 
Mazzini thought, wrote and acted against conservative forces controlling Italian 
lands and propagandised for an Italian nation to establish its control, with ‘Young Italy’ 
as its vanguard. The combination of Thought and Action was to bring about this control 
and central to that was control of an Italian urban inheritance: 
 
‘Why should not a new Rome, the Rome of the Italian people – portents of 
whose coming I deemed I saw – arise to create a third and still vaster unity; to 
link together and harmonize earth and heaven, right and duty; and utter, not to 
individuals but to peoples, the great word Association – to make known to free 
men and equals of their mission here below?’ (Mazzini, 1891, p. 38) 
 
62 
 
 
Lajos Kossuth, borrowing from Mazzini's lexicon in describing a "young Pesth", 
described the events of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and focused on the specific 
demands of the Hungarian nationalists centred on the abolition of feudal practices in 
the countryside. In the description of actual events, however, a journey connecting 
Pressburg, Buda and Pest is evoked as news spreads of the revolutions in Vienna and 
Pressburg down to "old Buda" and "young Pesth", placing the aspirations of the nation 
in the city of Pest. (Kossuth, 1853). Although the narrative of nationalism cited deep 
rural roots for the nation and the language of territory and control, its aspirations were 
to be played out in the urban setting and the nationalisation of the city was a realisation 
of national ambition. The city was not just a site of national struggle, it was an end in 
that struggle. Much as nationalists resisted a pure philosophical or theoretical position, 
the narrative associated with these aspirational targets exposed a theoretical position 
and it was one in which cities were to embody national goals. 
Margaret Canovan distinguished between Romantic-Collectivist nationalism, 
coming out of the historicism of thinkers such as Herder, and Liberal-Individualist 
nationalism, citing later thinkers such as Mill (1996, pp. 6–9). She clearly placed figures 
like Mazzini in the former category and, with his Romantic notions of holy national 
destiny and the figure he cut in Italian national activism this would seem to be fair. 
However, the example of Mazzini shows that such nationalists cannot be excluded from 
the latter category – his nationalism was a means to an end, and that republican end was 
one which was more universal and had space for a kind of liberal individualism. Making 
a clean distinction between regressive and progressive nationalisms is not 
straightforward: nationalisms contain potential for both and contradictions sustaining 
both. Indeed, these potentialities and tensions shape nationalist responses towards 
modernity and urbanisation. Not all European nationalisms could be characterised as 
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being hostile to modernity; they might be seen as on a spectrum of attitudes to modernity, 
from a French nationalism rooted in revolutionary bourgeois politics to the deeply 
mystical varieties seen in Russian nationalism. They shared, however, an assumption 
about the past in which nations were constituted in a pre-modern environment. In that 
sense a nation’s genius, even as it might come to fruition in the modern city, lay in pre-
modern soil. 
Two key sources for European nationalist political philosophy contain a tension 
between idealised human communities and an emergent urbanisation and modernity. 
Though the intellectual lineage of nationalism can be taken further back than Rousseau 
and Herder, they both directly informed the intellectual milieu of nineteenth century 
political philosophy. Both exercised considerable influence over the development of 
nationalist thought and so it is appropriate to consider what influence they may have 
had in the production of a nationalist urbanism. While positive urban projects could be 
supported by readings of Rousseau and of Herder, both clearly show explicit hostility 
to cities, especially Paris, a city so closely associated with the Enlightenment. What can 
be drawn from their writings, however, are elucidations of forms of habitation and 
dwelling which would lend themselves to national identities that can be reconciled with 
modern urbanisation. For Rousseau, the institutional and physical configuration of 
Geneva provides for a model community and one which contrasted with corrupt Paris. 
For Herder, each ‘Volk’ had a unique set of characteristics developed in response to its 
environment and its climate. It is in the Classical world that the city had its day, the 
cities of Greece and Rome being at the height of their cultural achievements. That 
Herder believed the day of the city to have gone, to be replaced by a more agrarian 
northern culture, was a belief which could not be sustained through the nineteenth 
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century. Perhaps instead there was a new form of city which was suited to a new 
conception of European ‘man’. 
Regarding the use of anthropological time scales to understand how 
urbanisation was contextualised in a wider narrative of human and national 
development, one purpose of examining both Rousseau and Herder is to draw out how 
some of the underlying theoretical structures of nationalist thought might have relied 
on such temporalisation. Performing such an analysis requires sensitivity to the 
possibility of applying similar temporal frameworks to the phenomenon of nationalism 
itself. To do so would be to contextualise nationalism itself as somehow derived from a 
kind of exception of civilisation. To avoid this assumption of an exceptional corruption 
of human history requires different ground on which to stand when drawing out the 
implications of Rousseau’s and Herder’s attitudes to urban life. The approach here will 
be to take modern ideologies and urbanisation both to be the products of unexceptional 
human practices, modern modes of interpretation of the environment and how humans 
interact and settle within it. In other words, something akin with ideology has been 
present in human communities in all of its interactions with the environment and 
nationalism and modern urbanisation are contemporary iterations of intrinsically human 
practices. There is of course the danger of overreaching with this approach and 
effectively substituting one essentialised ideological fixed point with another and it is 
at best a provisional position which can be deployed to gain a strategic distance from 
such a fixed point. 
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Rousseau 
If Rousseau is acknowledged as ‘the doctrinal founder of political nationalism’ 
(Barnard, 1983, p. 231), his stridency on the corruption of the emerging modern city 
would suggest a dissonance between a project of national legitimacy and the 
development of the modern city. Rousseau informed a tradition of civil, or liberal, 
nationalism. Rousseau sought to promote the essential human capacity for compassion 
and in large cities he saw artifice which obstructed this capacity's fulfilment. This 
artifice deluded the people and enabled them to be enslaved. So, it would seem that for 
a people to be free while living under government which is subject to the General Will 
there would be a need to restrict the development of the city. Nevertheless, a more 
careful reading of Rousseau shows a place for the city in his thinking. His attitude to 
the city should be thought of more as a bid to recast the role of the city in the world 
after the Enlightenment. He would contrast examples of urban life thus: 
 
‘What deceives reasoners is that, seeing only states that are ill-constituted from 
the beginning, they are impressed with the impossibility of maintaining such a 
policy in those states; they laugh to think of all the follies to which a cunning 
knave, an insinuating speaker, can persuade the people of Paris or London. They 
know not that Cromwell would have been put in irons by the people of Berne, 
and the duke of Beaufort imprisoned by the Genovese.’ (Rousseau, 1998, p. 105)  
 
The implication is that there are cities less susceptible to cunning knaves than 
others; that the cities of Berne and Geneva would have dealt swift justice to people who 
in London and Paris were permitted to engage in follies. A hierarchy of urban rectitude 
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is deployed; this was not simply a passing comparison made by Rousseau but one which 
was underwritten by a developed understanding of the relationship of urban place to the 
morality of citizens. For Rousseau, a society would become corrupt when a pre-social 
love of self which allowed for empathetic pity, ‘amour de soi’, would degenerate into a 
form of self-love which would depend on the opinion of others, that of ‘amour propre’. 
The theatrical backdrop of Paris provided a setting where citizen-actors sought the 
approval of an urban audience rather than attain self-respect. He located societies in 
which ‘amour de soi’ was a defining feature within cities with smaller populations. He 
held up Geneva as an ideal in this regard and was explicit in praising that city for its 
industry, a place where ‘[e]veryone is busy, everyone is moving, everyone is about his 
work and his affairs.’ (Rousseau, 1968, p. 3)  
Despite this advocacy for Geneva, Rousseau has been read as vehemently 
against city life. Richard Sennett claimed that Rousseau ‘investigated the great city 
thoroughly, as though dissecting a cancer’. Sennett took Rousseau's ‘Letter to M. 
d'Alembert on the Theatre’ to be a general indictment of the city (Sennett, 2002) rather 
than a concerned intervention in the affairs of an urban model admired by Rousseau 
and the promotion a moral project for the city. Rousseau did, though, use Paris as an 
example of a failed city and an inauthentic community. He sought direct intervention in 
the affairs and in the design of the city of Geneva in order to promote a healthy 
community and through this demonstrated an appreciation of a different kind of urban 
life than that exemplified in Paris. 
Sennett identified oppositions in the ‘Letter’ – cosmopolitanism versus small 
town, acting versus authenticity – and placed them in a wider theory of corruption. 
Sennett correctly identified Rousseau's hatred of that corruption in a kind of theatrical 
mode, one which could disturb the city's morality. However, Sennett so closely 
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identified the modern city with theatre that he too easily dismissed Rousseau's project 
to reinforce cities against the corrupting influence of the theatre instead. In the ‘Letter’, 
Rousseau presented his case against the establishment of a theatre in Geneva. 
Rousseau's portrayal of Geneva was one in which the people are hard-working and 
naturally happy. His view was strongly gendered and deeply misogynistic: the 
introduction of the theatre would, in his view, promote the somewhat trivial concerns 
of women and ‘extend the empire of the fair sex’ and undermine the citizens through 
gossip, an effect he perceived as being demonstrated on the streets of Paris. The public 
presence of women would promote the corruption of young men and took them away 
from their patriotism. Men's vices, such as excessive drinking, were supposed to have 
a less negative social effect than female vice. He cited the public silence of women in 
Sparta, despite their central governing role, as a example of a more virtuous city in this 
regard. Theatre, moreover, contained people in enclosed spaces and made them passive 
observers – far better, he believed, to have public, outdoor festivals which would bring 
the people together with nature. (Rousseau, 1968)  
What is important here is that in his Romantic understanding of an ideal society 
Rousseau is interested in preserving and shaping urban institutions. His invocation of 
pre-social humanity was not an attempt to idealise a rural existence: rather it was a 
method to understand an essential human nature in the hope of using this understanding 
to create an ideal order. Indeed, in in The Discourse on Inequality he remarked of other 
philosophers that, ‘[t]hey spoke about savage man, and it was civil man they depicted,’ 
but that the thought, ‘did not even occur to most of our philosophers to doubt that the 
state of nature had existed, even though it is evident from reading the Holy Scriptures 
that the first man … was not himself in that state.’ (Rousseau, 1987, p. 38) Whilst using 
an artificial pre-social state to illuminate human nature, Rousseau specifically 
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addressed himself to the urban form, with Geneva embodying an ideal of a city with 
‘moeurs’. In setting up this ideal, Rousseau effectively established a hierarchy of cities 
ordered by compliance with this moral exemplar. Geneva was the benchmark by which 
other cities could be measured and it was also an ideal whose reality needed to be 
actively preserved against the corruption of theatre. 
A contrast can be drawn between Rousseau's Geneva and Kant's Königsberg. In 
the former an ideal is set up for a moral citizenry while the latter is set up as a 
cosmopolis and, as such, is an ideal location for the study of anthropology (Kant, 2006, 
p. 4). Both Geneva and Königsberg were trading centres, though the latter larger, in the 
eighteenth century when both Kant and Rousseau were writing. Politically these cities 
were different in that Geneva was a city-state and a republic whereas, although it had 
its own rights within the state, Königsberg was a part of the Kingdom of Prussia. 
Commenting on Geneva had the potential to have an effect on the politics of the republic 
itself: indeed, Rousseau frequently addressed the city's rulers directly throughout his 
work. Kant's cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, was not principally addressed to 
Königsberg, in part because of the universal nature of cosmopolitanism as he 
understood it, but also because the state was not a republic and his writing had less 
opportunity to have a direct political effect on the city itself. 
A reading of Rousseau which concludes that his thinking indicated a rejection 
of urban life fails to account for the crucial point that Rousseau was explicitly 
promoting an urban ideal. That this ideal is at odds with one which sees a cosmopolitan 
city as a stage in which urban actors can lose themselves behind masks must not be 
interpreted as a form of anti-urbanism. To do so would be to misconstrue the Romantic 
response to the Enlightenment and to modernity as a purely negative move. Rhetorically 
there was certainly a strong element of negativity towards the city and a promotion of 
 69 
 
 
a rustic past. However, this pastoral ideal was not an exclusive construction. Rousseau 
reminisced about the outskirts of a town he knew in his youth where he saw, ‘a mountain 
entirely covered with dwellings, each in the midst of its land, so that those houses, as 
equally spaced as the fortunes of their owners, at once gave the numerous inhabitants 
of that mountain the inner contemplation of withdrawal and the charms of society.’ 
(Rousseau, 1968) In Rousseau’s writing, his harking back to a pre-urban, and then to a 
pre-social, life is best read as a methodological pose, one which seeks to tell a story 
about the origins of humanity or a people. Rousseau looked for an urban form in which 
a better human life was possible and was quite adamant that the exemplar of Paris was 
not it. The advocacy of Geneva was not on the basis of it being less city-like, however; 
rather it was on the basis of it not being an excessive city like Paris: ‘Its aims, its use of 
time, its vigilance, its austere parsimony, are the treasures of Geneva.’ (Rousseau, 1968, 
p. 93)  
It is the notion of the city of moeurs which is a key to understanding how anti-
cosmopolitan movements such as nationalism might construe the city. The nation is an 
imaginative construct and one which fulfils a replacement role – it is not dependent 
upon religious or feudal ties which made sense of rural medieval European communities. 
It is a response to a problem of modernity and one which is from the outset an urban 
response. That it glorifies an imagined rural/pastoral authenticity does not mean that it 
rejects the urban. It seeks, instead, to shape the urban. Rousseau's ‘Letter’ provides a 
template to understand how this plays out. 
The corruption to which Rousseau referred was one in which artifice 
predominates in human relations. As a corrective, he was proposing a regulated 
environment and one which was most effectively regulated through urban institutions 
and structures. Irrational feudal and religious structures could just as easily be corrupted 
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but it is in Geneva that Rousseau identified a specific configuration of institutions which 
could in his view preserve a more equitable existence. 
There is, perhaps, a distinction being drawn between a theatrical city and a moral 
city which might in turn see its realisation respectively in the cosmopolitan city and the 
nationalist city. In this simple typography, it is only the former which Sennett 
acknowledges as a city proper and, hence, his claim that Rousseau is against urban life. 
Opened up to the possibility of more than one formulation of the city, it becomes 
possible to perceive a different nationalist urban project which is not necessarily at odds 
with nationalist pastoral ideals. Cosmopolitan and nationalist cities can overlap, 
contend for territory and co-operate – it is not a scheme in which Paris necessarily ends 
up in one type and Budapest in the other. 
Of later nineteenth century Europe Sennett says, ‘Rousseau hoped for a social 
life in which masks would become faces, appearances signs of character. In a way, his 
hopes were realized; masks did become faces in the nineteenth century, but the result 
was the erosion of interaction.’ (Sennett, 2002, p. 217) Sennett traced the onset of public 
silence as cities modernised in which the spectacle has a passive audience rather than 
active citizen. The implication is that Rousseau's hopes for society became expressed, 
ironically, in a form which was against his overall ambitions. Yet it is precisely this 
passivity which is at the heart of Rousseau's critique of the theatre. ‘People think they 
come together in the theatre, and it is there that they are isolated. It is there that they go 
to forget their friends, neighbors, and relations in order to concern themselves with 
fables, in order to cry for the misfortunes of the dead, or to laugh at the expense of the 
living.’ (Rousseau, 1968) (see also Kohn, 2008)  
It is into this alienated late nineteenth century urban form that popular 
nationalism made its intervention. In the absence of a society in which people dealt with 
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each other face-to-face but rather were passive observers and consumers of the city, 
nationalism provided a pseudo-communal, spiritual dimension. To this extent it was a 
travesty of Rousseau’s ideal society. However, nationalism's idealisation of community 
overlaps with Rousseau’s ambition for a society in which the communal experience 
mattered. It is this shared ambition which drove a moral project for the city which 
contended with, and is in dialogue with, more cosmopolitan notions of the city. 
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Herder 
Herder provided an alternative Romantic geography framing the purpose and 
function of cities in Europe. Whereas Rousseau maintained a certain universal 
humanism in his notion of community, Herder was decidedly particular in his approach. 
Cities, in this view, would be the product of a people, the physical geography of the 
land shaping their customs and, as a result them of following these customs, marking 
the land. This could be set beside a more universal Romantic conception of the city as 
a moral project – in this model the city, although its more moral form might be produced 
by particular circumstances and conditions, would potentially be available to all 
cultures. Though there is an exclusionary element in both models, the city as the height 
of cultural achievement has the potential to be one which is the product of just one Volk 
to the exclusion of others, a more exclusive urban geography than that of Rousseau. 
The city as a moral project most certainly condemns other cities as immoral and corrupt 
and this stance is there from the outset in Rousseau’s work with his denunciations of 
Paris. There are also, however, overlaps with something akin to a cosmopolitan city – 
a more plural city – in both. The city held as the height of a nation’s cultural 
achievement could surely tolerate other cultures as its civilising effects are a gift from 
one people to many. The city as a moral project has its universality embedded if only 
from a perspective which says all humanity can be freed in a more equitable world in 
which corruption has been excluded by well-run institutions. 
For Herder, geography and culture were bound together in a way which 
produced distinct expressions of human genius. Geographies could shape peoples: cold 
northern European climes made for a rugged individualism and southern European 
warmth and fertility fed civilisation and languor. This effect was reproduced across 
space and time from the dawn of civilisation in the East to the rise of the Germanic 
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world and Christianity. All of this had hints of Hegel’s teleology but without a strong 
underlying systematic dialectical explanation. This noted, Herder’s claim that Roman 
civilisation in southern Europe had cleared the way for northern tribes was a variety of 
dialectical explanation. However, there was less of a sense, despite Herder’s exuberance 
about German culture, of a progression to a pinnacle of human achievement. Instead 
certain expressed characteristics, entities and institutions could be seen as a kind of 
blossoming of a people. In the case of Classical civilisation, this blossoming took the 
form of large cities. 
John Breuilly suggested that Herder’s political values contradicted his 
historicism and that he could not be described as a nationalist (1994, p. 56). This may 
well be true of a narrower nationalism which necessarily defines itself as chauvinistic. 
Herder’s historicism sat perfectly well with what might be described as a proto-
nationalist position. He certainly tries to find a means of getting away from narrow 
parochialism and, importantly, away from the possibility of war between nations. 
Breuilly set out a process for the development of nationalist ideology: historicism, a 
legitimate intellectual response to modernity and a rebuttal of universalist approaches 
of the Enlightenment, was turned into ideology through notions of ‘authenticity’ and 
‘teleology’ (1994, p. 102). Herder's historicism could well be ideologically 
operationalised as narrow nationalist doctrine but the possibility of its influence on less 
chauvinistic approaches is something to be explored further. 
In ‘Another Philosophy of History’, Herder explored radical differences 
between peoples and cultures over different periods. Allied to an embryonic German 
nationalism this provided for an explanation of the role of northern European cultures 
in the development of contemporary Europe and a close reading of Herder shows that 
he took a deliberate position on the role of the city in that development. For the northern 
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cultures, Herder identified that cities were initially not aligned with their characteristics 
and tendencies, replacing as those cultures did the more urban Roman one: ‘The fine 
Roman laws and insights could not … revive driving forces that had been depleted; thus 
death! – an emaciated corpse lying in a pool of blood – when in the North a new man 
was born.’ (Herder, 2004, p. 33)  
Roman civilisation, with cities as its most visible achievement across Europe, 
had lost its vitality only to be replaced by new barbarian energy in northern Europe. 
This new northern force though was primarily rural and feudal rather than urban and 
culturally refined: 
 
‘But as they brought nature instead of the arts, healthy Northern intelligence 
instead of the sciences, strong and good, albeit savage customs instead of refined 
ones, and as everything fermented together – what a spectacle! How their laws 
breathed manly courage, sense of honor, confidence in intelligence, honesty, and 
piety! How their institution of feudalism undermined the welter of populous, 
opulent cities, building up the land, employing hands and human beings, making 
healthy and therefore happy people.’ (2004, p. 33) 
 
So, the health of the wild barbarian tribes of the North defeated corruption in 
cities of the South in Herder’s account. As European culture was Christianised, Herder 
asserted, it maintained these Northern values and later in ‘Another Philosophy’ he 
defended feudalism as being a means by which the growth of cities was constrained. 
The glory of the German people and its moral virtue was something inward here, an 
expression of a culture which was psychologically clear-headed and healthy, not one 
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which expressed itself through the city. This might have presented problems for German 
nationalists drawing on the work of Herder later during a period of industrialised urban 
expansion. Herder’s conception of a plurality of cultures, however, might have 
presented a way out. Non-German cultures, both ancient and contemporary, had 
different characteristics which meant that there were different material expressions of a 
people’s genius according to their geographic context. Regarding Greek culture, for 
example: ‘How distasteful, even now, are agriculture, city life, the slavery of the 
artisan’s shop to the Oriental!’ The roots of Greek civilisation lay in 'Oriental' culture 
in this account. At its base, Herder claimed, the structures of city-life were rejected by 
this component of Greek culture. In contrast to this Oriental aspect, the Egyptian 
influence on Greek culture provided a different dimension: ‘To the Egyptian … how 
loathsome and repulsive was the shepherd … when the more refined Greek later 
elevated himself above the Egyptian and his vices, this meant nothing more than when 
a boy is repulsed by an infant.’ The conflict in attitudes to different forms of life 
expressed in the Oriental, Egyptian and Greek aspects of Greek culture should create a 
tension. However, Herder would have it that, ‘all three belong together, following one 
upon the other. The Egyptian would not have been Egyptian without his Oriental 
childhood instruction, the Greek no Greek without his Egyptian schoolboy’s 
diligence—their very loathing demonstrates development, progression, steps on the 
ladder!’ (2004, p. 13)  
So, the urban form had its cultural context. On Herder’s ‘ladder’, the city had 
risen to a cultural summit, though by this logic it informed ‘the German’ as the German 
would not be German without an urban Roman heritage. Indeed he sets out to 
demonstrate how the Roman world made a clearing in Europe for northern values to 
thrive (2004, pp. 42–45). Since Herder was reacting in ‘Another Philosophy’, and in 
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much of his other work, to what he perceived as the pretensions and errors of the French 
philosophes (Berlin, 2000, p. 168), to identify a preference for or against the city is to 
some extent beside the point. He was in favour of the particular and this preference 
shows which direction a ‘Herderian’ approach to the modern city might follow. 
Elsewhere Herder specifically addressed city life and identity in his discussion 
of Greek civilisation. For Herder, there was a puzzle in the identification of citizens of 
the Classical city-states as Greek. He described a system in which Greek local ties – 
both urban and rural – could assimilate. It was a system which used the ritualised 
performance of violence and struggle to form a common Greek identity. The creation 
of and participation in, ‘common games and competitions … gave Greece a unity and 
diversity that here, too, made for the most beautiful whole. Hostility and assistance, 
striving and moderating: the powers of the human spirit were most beautifully balanced 
and unbalanced.’ (2004, p. 20)  
The possibility of a competitive city-state system with the common bond of 
Greek-ness was maintained, as Herder would have it, through ritualised interaction and 
competition. This was something which, later in the nineteenth century as urbanisation 
in Europe took hold, resurfaced as a means of providing a bond for cities and nations 
in a new way for Europe, through the codification and popularisation of such spectator 
sports as football and, indeed, through the re-creation of the Olympic Games. 
However, to take any of these positive historical references as an indication of 
a positive forward-looking urbanism on the part of Herder is to take things much further 
than he intended. In ‘Another Philosophy’ he intervened in an Enlightenment discourse 
on universal brotherhood, in which distinctions like the nation would dissipate (the 
‘another’ in ‘Another Philosophy of History’ is an ironic reference to philosophies of 
history informed by this universality produced by philosophes such as Voltaire (1965)). 
 77 
 
 
He attacked the notion that history is progressive and that each age improves upon the 
last. For example, the institution of serfdom, condemned by Enlightenment 
philosophers, had for Herder in its own time a worthwhile function in which, ‘so-called 
primitive country estates restrained the excessive, unhealthy expansion of the cities, 
those abysses for the vitality of mankind; the scarcity of trade and refinement prevented 
self-indulgence and preserved simple humanity.’ (Herder, 2004, p. 41) 
Rather than taking Herder’s pluralism (cf. Berlin, 2000) as his guiding principle, 
the tension which is perceptible in ‘Another Philosophy’ between an almost reluctant 
admiration for other people, their customs and their cities should be set against a certain 
triumphalism regarding northern European, and specifically Germanic nations. These 
nations, he explicitly stated, were not only non-urban in their best manifestation but 
anti-urban in the way that their institutions squeezed the spaces of European urbanism. 
So, cities, especially in their Classical form, were to be both admired and to be feared 
as corrupt. This tension was nothing new – Babylon and Rome feature persistently in 
Christian discourse in demonstrating the attractions and perils of the city. What Herder 
brought to this, however, was the notion that the city had been overcome and replaced 
by something better.  
Elsewhere Herder made clear his disdain for the idea of the possibility of a 
return to the cultural heights of previous great nations: ‘the path of fate is iron and strict’ 
(2004, p. 77). There was a forward-looking impulse in much of Herder’s philosophy 
which would preclude Classicism and medievalism in a Germanic national project. 
Despite this, Herder had admiration for Greek and Roman urban models because in 
them he could identify a working patriotism which would promote virtue. He found his 
‘small societies’ exemplified in the Greek cities. The city-states were an ideal because 
it was in such societies that it was, ‘the land of the fathers that one protected; it was 
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companions from one’s youth—siblings and friends—for whom one yearned. The 
league of love into which young men entered was approved and made use of by the 
fatherland.’ This loving bond enabled a concept of friendship to be on a par with that of 
family: ‘One wished to be buried with one’s friends, to enjoy things together, to live 
and die with them.’ The cost of building such a community by ancestors meant a price 
of loyalty to them was to be paid later: ‘And since the noble ancestors of these tribes 
had built the community to which they belonged with the protection of the gods … so 
the bond of such laws was sacred to their descendants as a moral fatherland’ (2004, p. 
111).  
Out of this bond to a fatherland the descendants of these Greek citizens were 
able to hold to the laws of previous generations and thus it became a moral fatherland. 
Through this process, then, the sense of a fatherland was strengthened: a small society 
created laws and institutions that reinforced bonds through a naturally occurring love 
for each other; then that fatherland became abstracted into something which could be 
followed by descendants without the original context. In other words, patriotism could 
be transmitted to a larger society over time. The particular geography which guided the 
formation of Classical Greece led to city-states which were adapted to the cultural and 
institutional characteristics of the Greeks. By the same token then the characteristics of 
the Germanic and northern European peoples were not seen to lead to a city-based 
culture. This was a proposition which for nationalists would have to shift as the 
nineteenth century progressed and the proportion of that northern European population 
which was urbanised vastly increased. It is less Herder's prescription of the 
characteristics of northern European culture which is important here, rather a model of 
understanding a culture’s relationship to place. 
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Both Rousseau and Herder had in their influential writings idealised urban 
forms which were suitable models for nationalist narrative and aspiration. Rousseau’s 
city of moeurs was one in which its formal composition affords and was afforded by a 
society free of bondage and a people able to act morally. Herder’s understand of the city 
was situated in history as a cultural product – it reflected the characteristics of a 
particular culture. It was not something which every culture could produce and in the 
German case was not for Herder its emblematic product but, much as ‘Oriental’ and 
‘Egyptian’ modes of thought and living contributed to Greek culture the ‘Roman’ city 
contributed to the German one.  
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3. Urban Forms and Affordances 
Before going on to conduct formal analysis on the specific cases of Budapest, 
Vienna and Venice, forms and affordances in a diverse set of examples will be explored 
in this chapter. The geography of these examples goes wider than physical Europe and 
further back than the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The role of urban forms which 
persist over long periods of time and which structure modern settings is drawn out by 
these examples. 
For urban wholes, the examples are: Barcelona, looking at the demolition of 
walls and the creation of repeatable patterns of expansion of an urban whole; Rome, 
and the superimposition of contended urban wholes; and Bruges/Chicago as an example 
of an organic whole/planned opposition. Rhythms which structure urban forms are 
examined: on the London to Birmingham Railway and the structuring effect of 
timetabled rhythms; and in Amsterdam with its regulation of water courses. 
Hierarchical forms which impact and shape cities are demonstrated by the examples of: 
legal developments in medieval northern Italy and the contention for authority over 
cities creating a gap for urban autonomy; and, later, in the city of Krakow and the 
physical separation of districts embodying urban hierarchies. The connections within 
and between cities forming urban networks are exemplified: in Saint-Nazaire in which 
physical geography afforded modern shipping, the transfer of large scale port facilities 
and connection to global trade from nearby Nantes; in Nantes itself and the creation of 
the first omnibus service in 1826, prior to rail, which compressed urban space for 
ordinary citizens whilst expanding intra-urban networks; by the trans-Saharan trade and 
Islam as affording regularised trading links over vast distances; and by the Randstad 
conurbation in the Netherlands which in the twentieth century became a hybrid intra- 
and inter-city network, coordinating existing urban infrastructure to create a new 
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networked urban form. What these examples will show is how a scheme of formal 
affordances can be applied to a variety of urban settings and begin to detail how 
ideology and urban forms are enmeshed. 
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Urban Wholes 
 
Figure 2: Map of Barcelona 1855 (Sala, 1855) 
Figure 2 shows a plan of the city of Barcelona as it was before the completion 
of demolition of most of its defensive walls and the subsequent development of the 
city’s extension. The city administration, the Ajuntament de Barcelona, had 
commissioned a report published in 1841 which had called for the demolition of the 
walls largely on public health grounds (Monlau, 1841). The resistance of Madrid-based 
state institutions to the project made the report’s prime recommendation a rallying cry 
over the next decade. The opportunity was taken during a political crisis and popular 
unrest to go ahead with the demolition in 1854. The project became strongly associated 
with Catalan nationalism as a result of the impasse with Spanish authorities (Hughes, 
2001, pp. 274–278). On the plan, the city is contained within its walls and overseen by 
a fortress on it eastern flank, the Citadella. Order is afforded by the hard boundaries of 
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the city and by the elevated position of the Citadella, a military base for forces 
representing the Spanish state overlooking the activities of the citizens of the largest 
Catalan city. The street layout shows evidence of having been augmented over a long 
period, showing no obvious overarching scheme. The everyday urban experience of the 
residents is framed by the irregular buildings and streetscape. The location of the 
Roman colonia of Barceno is still evident in the street pattern around the Plaza de la 
Constitucion. Public spaces are largely related to the functions of buildings and 
institutions. The whole is divided by the straight thoroughfare of Las Ramblas, a 
culverted water course to the west of which land belonging to church institutions had 
(Hughes, 2001, p. 199) been developed and then enclosed by the walls. Since the hard 
boundary is difficult to extend, the city effectively can only grow in population by 
increasing density and therefore the outsider coming into the city makes a direct demand 
on the limited resources of the city. 
 
Figure 3: Map of Barcelona 1861 (Cerdá & Roca, 1861) 
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Figure 3 shows the plan proposed by Ildefonso Cerdá to demolish its walls and 
extend the city. Existing structures are shown by darker blocks and the proposed layout 
is shown in lighter blocks. The plan shows the scale of the proposal in relation to the 
existing city and although it is labelled as a ‘reforma y ensanche’ (reform and 
enlargement) there is ambiguity about whether the smaller whole is being extended or 
whether the larger whole is absorbing the smaller. The walls of the old city have 
disappeared and it is now delineated by straight edges rather than the jagged ones of the 
walls. The new scheme is porous with many entry points and long boulevards taking 
traffic through it. It is a repeated and repeatable pattern suggesting that newcomers 
could be accommodated by further extension while keeping population density stable. 
Since habitats are more equal in size and uniform, the urban experience of the residents 
has the potential to be equalised. Public spaces are created by the intersections of road 
layout rather than particular and adjacent institutional or building functions. It is more 
difficult to gain a panoptical view of the new city than was the case from the old city 
from the Citadella but it is more legible to policing authorities through the regularisation 
of space. The plan of the extension is not derived from the natural features of the land 
on which it sits, unlike the old city whose layout was related to the seaport and to the 
overlooking hills. 
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Figure 4: Key-Plan to Rome 1869 (Wagner, 1869) 
Figure 4 shows the outline of Rome’s defensive walls in 1871. The walls, 
constructed on the right bank in the third century CE (Claridge, 2010, p. 24; Taylor, 
Rinne, & Kostof, 2016, p. 131), in the ninth century CE on the left bank (Taylor et al., 
2016, p. 232) and well-maintained since, in 1871 enclose and defend a city that is 
controlled by the Papacy and that is the objective for inclusion by the new secular Italian 
state, it having been declared the new kingdom’s capital in 1861 (Chabod & McCuaig, 
2014, p. 125). The walls’ defensive and symbolic function overlap as the city is laid 
siege by republican troops and defended by out-numbered papal forces. The Pope 
decides that it is inevitable that the city will be ceded as Italian republican troops 
approach to take it; however, he insists that the papal forces must put up a show of 
resistance first to demonstrate non-compliance. Italian forces bombard the Porta Pia 
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and penetrate the walls enabling them to take the city (De Amicis, 1995, pp. 23–28).10 
Once the city is taken the Pope declares himself a ‘prisoner’ and retreats to the Vatican 
Palace (Mazzoni, 2010, p. 13). The Papacy is offered but rejects the offer to be allowed 
the Leonine City, on the left bank of the Tiber enclosed by the river and walls (Kertzer, 
2004, p. 42). The Holy See and the Italian state settle their dispute over Rome in the 
Lateran Pact of 1929 in which a new state is created, the Vatican City State, an enclave 
within Rome (2004, p. 292). Between 1871 and 1929 three Roman wholes are 
concurrent: disputed Rome enclosed by the Aurelian Walls, the Leonine City and the 
Vatican. 
The bifurcation of modern Rome by the River Tiber affords the separation of 
Church and State. Again, practical and symbolic functions overlap. The whole is 
separable and this permits ambiguous answers to questions of authority: Is the whole of 
the city occupied by the Italian state? Is the Pope imprisoned in a part of the whole city 
or is that part effectively removed? The river also indicates a divide between pre-
Christian Rome on the left bank of the Tiber and the right bank which was largely 
outside of the city walls, only to be fully included within new walls after the Church 
had established the Vatican as the burial site of St Peter and made it the site of a basilica. 
The definition of the Roman urban whole, although it aspires to establish hard 
                                                 
 
10 Immediately after the proclamation of Rome being the new capital, Haussmann (who 
had left his role leading the renewal of Paris under a cloud of financial scandal) was consulted 
directly by the city’s new secular authorities, as a contemporary report in The Pall Mall Gazette 
shows: ‘A correspondent of the Telegraph reports the arrival of M. Haussmann at Rome. The 
famous reconstructor of ancient cities is understood to have been called in by the Municipality 
of Rome for a serious consultation with respect to the demolition of the old and useless edifices 
in the present city and erection of public and private buildings, in conformity with the necessary 
requirements of the future capital of Italy.’ (“Summary of This Morning’s News,” 1871) See 
also Haussmann’s own account of an approach to join a commercial venture to redevelop Rome 
(1893, p. 553)  
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boundaries, is contested by different ideological perspectives on the idea of Rome. 
Urban wholes are perhaps the kind of urban form on which claims of historical 
continuity can be most readily demonstrated. Rome’s ‘Eternal City’ claim is based on 
an unbroken reproduction of the Roman urban whole at the same topos. For the new 
Italian state, built on post-Enlightenment secular lines, the claim of a link back to 
Classical Rome provided a way of legitimising the replacement of papal power. In the 
words of Cavour, ‘it is impossible to conceive a constituted Italian kingdom without 
Rome for its capital.’ (1861). The papal claim to the Roman urban whole was a claim 
of an unbroken connection to the purported first Bishop of Rome, St Peter, and the 
apostolic succession was closely aligned with continuity in the city of Rome. 
 
Figure 5: Bruges in the 16th Century, Lukas - Art in Flanders VZW, photo Hugo 
Maertens, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 (Anonymous, n.d.) 
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Figure 5 shows a plan of Bruges around 1500 and Figure 6 shows a map of 
Chicago in 1893. Both are used by Scott to advance an argument regarding the 
imposition in the modern era of rational order as part of a project to make geographies 
‘legible’ to emerging state institutions (Scott, 1998). Urban geometric order is, 
according to Scott, notable for being ‘most evident … from above and outside’ (1998, 
p. 57); in other words, the imposition of this kind of rational order on a city is an external 
instrument. It could be said that the concept of a ‘whole city’ itself is an instrument of 
control, a large and potentially unwieldy population made visible through a panoptic 
lens locating its place, plan and identity. Scott contrasts Bruges, whose plan has organic 
resemblances and whose order is not immediately obvious to the external observer, to 
Chicago, on a grid whose order he describes as ‘utopian’ for an administrator.  
 
Figure 6: Map of Chicago 1898 (“Bird’s-Eye View of the Business District of 
Chicago,” 1898) 
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The organic/planned opposition in urban thought is one which relies on an urban 
whole as its analytical object. The evidence of centralised planning is highly visible on 
a city plan in a way which is more difficult to demonstrate over a wider territory. For 
this reason, urban wholes are readily available for demonstrating the efficacy of 
planning over time as they help make claims to be stable objects on which a chronology 
of changes are intelligible. In the case of the comparison Scott makes, his descriptions 
of the plans for each city are in fact descriptions of the street plans. He ignores the 
similarities in arrangement of water courses in both sixteenth century Bruges and 
nineteenth century Chicago which conform less to a regular pattern but instead are a 
compromise between the topology of the underlying earth and access to wharves in the 
concentrated urban core. In fact, both cities required thoroughgoing planning for their 
water-based economies to function. What marks them out as different to each other 
however is their relative liminal restrictions: Chicago is without walls and, though 
bound on the east by Lake Michigan is in the open for undefined development in other 
directions with a repeatable urban street plan; Bruges with its walls has its development 
bounded and any new additions or alterations happen within a highly contextual system. 
What Scott’s comparison does highlight is the apparent separation of street-level 
urban experience from that of the urban whole. A city does not present its entire layout 
to its inhabitants at street level, with the possible exception of specific vantage points. 
The ‘whole city’ is a synoptic view. It would therefore follow that discourse regarding 
the whole city – whether, for example, it is an ‘organic’ or ‘planned’ city – is necessarily 
removed from the everyday experience of the city. It is this removal that he then 
explores further in his account of the High Modernist City and the work of Le Corbusier. 
Le Corbusier’s work not only separated itself from everyday urban experience through 
its functional separation of human activities which effectively atomised the citizenry 
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but also it radically decontextualised urban development, making it follow Cartesian 
forms at the expense of underlying, pre-existing forms. Le Corbusier’s architecture 
represents the violent assertion of the primacy of the whole over other formal 
categories: it is the all-encompassing remit of the Plan which seeks to order and regulate 
all other forms. 
Urban wholes defined by a grand, open layout contrast with those defined by 
constraint and delineation, ways of controlling cities that are facilitated by containment. 
As European cities modernised, there was a recurring question of what to do with 
physical walls. The debate around the demolition of walls in Vienna, explored further 
in its case study, has its parallels in Barcelona and Rome. All three had their walls 
removed prior to the modernisation of each city. In each city, however, quite different 
justifications were deployed. In the case of Barcelona, the demolition of the walls was 
justified both on health grounds and as part of a movement for Catalan separatism, the 
walls being seen as the physical embodiment of capture by the Castilian state. In the 
case of Rome, the demolition of the walls was seen as the removal of a barrier between 
the newly created Italian nation and its natural capital. The case of Vienna was also 
similarly justified as part of a scheme for improvement; the walls were also seen 
ideologically as representative of the traditional state targeted for demolition by the 
liberal bourgeoisie (Schorske, 1981, pp. 24–31) but with no significant nationalist 
sentiment associated with it . All three share a reaction to traditional institutions 
symbolised by their walls. However, they each have three quite different relationships 
to national projects. In the Barcelonan case, it is a national project expanding outwards 
that is at issue. The Roman example is one in which external national forces are allowed 
in by the walls’ removal. The Viennese example does not readily match up to a national 
project. The outcome in all three cases is very similar in the creation of modern urban 
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wholes. Different ideological movements were afforded by the walls and their removal 
but also similar physical outcomes were afforded by the same. 
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Urban Rhythms 
In communities where economic production is heavily dependent on ecological 
cycles and weather, the rhythms which govern human activity are grounded externally. 
As the primary economic purpose of a community becomes removed from these cycles, 
so new rhythms gain importance. Patterns of social behaviour constructed by a 
community internally feature more: religious rites, gatherings to decide on and enforce 
rules, structured learning, maintenance of public facilities, the ebb and flow of crowds 
and traffic are all socially generated and their links to external ecological cycles are 
secondary. Since cities are largely economically removed from production dependent 
on the land, it is these internal rhythms which are more deeply embedded in urban life. 
 
Figure 7: London to Birmingham Time Table 1839 (Bradshaw, 1839) 
Timetables became an important part of everyday life with the introduction of 
passenger rail services in the mid-nineteenth century. Since time-keeping varied from 
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region to region, the lack of standardisation made timetables difficult to compile and 
maintain and it was only by introducing the concept of railway time, a precursor of 
internationally standardised time, that the railway network could function efficiently 
and in a manner comprehensible to passengers (Osterhammel, 2014, pp. 69–71). Figure 
7 shows the timetable for services between London and Birmingham in 1839. The 
timetable uses local time for each station and therefore does not indicate precisely the 
duration of a journey. The rhythm provided by the timetable not only signals the peaks 
of noise and traffic produced by the arrival of the train but also provides intervals for 
most of the stations where trains do not stop. In the example here, only London and 
Wolverton (the main locomotive works for the line) are visited by every train. 
Birmingham and Coventry are only missed once by a train which terminates early at 
Wolverton. The regularity of trains stopping at these stations not only indicates the 
economic importance of their locations to the economic viability of the railway but also 
because fewer trains could be heard stopping at these stations, the relative unimportance 
of these locations was reinforced with their inhabitants. This contrasts with Crick and 
Brandon for which only two trains stop going up on their way to Birmingham while 
seven trains pass on through signalling their relative insignificance. The contrast here 
is between stopping and passing traffic and this is obviously something which far 
predates the railway. However, rather than the ebb and flow of traffic varying day by 
day, the timetable provided a clearly understood metrical rhythm that was repeated daily.  
What the timetable does is to regulate the rhythms governing mass transit and 
in turn human and animal movement. It is this regulated rhythm – the superimposition 
of mechanical timekeeping on ecological cycles – which is a marker of urban 
modernisation in the late nineteenth century European city. Some particular targets for 
94 
 
 
regularisation in the context of urban rhythms are water, traffic, the working day and 
public gatherings. 
 
Figure 8: Map of Amsterdam around 1300 (Tirion & Wagenaar, n.d.) 
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Figure 9: Bird’s-eye View of Amsterdam 1538 (Anthonisz, 1538) 
 
Figure 10: Amsterdam 1662 (Stalpaert, 1662) 
96 
 
 
Mumford’s selection of Amsterdam as his exemplary commercial city 
demonstrates the regulation of rhythms to afford long distance commercial trading 
(1961). Often the urban Netherlands is understood as having been built on ‘reclaimed’ 
land. As the series of plans for Amsterdam show (Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10) in fact 
they were as much a synthesis of stable land and rhythmic seas, an exercise in control 
of tides and river flows harnessed to move goods and people. The plans show the 
progression of Amsterdam’s enlargement from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. 
At each stage, marginal land is brought into the urban system, exposing it to navigable 
water courses and affording access to water-bound trade and traffic. Just as agricultural 
land can be brought into existence using irrigation and drainage, so the city can be made 
fertile for trade. Other rhythms work with this hydraulic engineering: the dams, sluices 
and polders of the Netherlands are maintained through the institution of the 
‘waterschap’, the system of water boards created in the thirteenth century which 
constitute one of its earliest forms of local government. The institution is sustained not 
just through authority being delegated by the state but also through its persistence 
through regular meetings, levy collection and day-to-day maintenance tasks of the 
waterschap (Tol & Langen, 2000). 
Amsterdam’s case is also notable in that the regulation of water occurs in 
tandem with the positive expansion of economic activity as much as by defence of 
existing urban structures. Figure 10 shows the city’s expansion in the latter half of the 
seventeenth century which was planned and directed by the city authorities but involved 
private capital and development to undertake and pay for it (Mumford, 1961, p. 442). 
As the plan shows, it created land open for speculative building which was already 
tightly integrated into an existing system of canals. Thus, land was brought within a set 
of urban rhythms and given regulated access to the city and to the sea. 
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Mumford uses Amsterdam as an example of a city which balanced long term 
urban planning with shorter term capitalist speculation and profit-making. This balance 
might be achieved in different ways in different places but Amsterdam’s development 
was afforded by its situation in the Netherlands and its context within a set of rhythms, 
both ecological and social. The setting affords regulation and then, in a self-reinforcing 
process, existing regulation orders the expansion of the setting. Regulation in this 
context is the ordering of rhythm, making it more predictable. A city which has its 
rhythms regulated is able to calculate risks – Amsterdam was well suited to replace 
Antwerp as a major centre of the insurance industry in the seventeenth century 
(Spufford, 2006, p. 165). Rhythms with complex meter whose cycles are not easily 
measured – meteorological rhythms are an example – generate uncertainty and hence 
risk is more difficult to assess and calculate. The development of a city like Amsterdam 
is one in which control is imposed to provide a simpler metrical rhythm so that a surge 
of river water produced by excess rain sluices the city’s water courses rather than 
flooding the city itself. 
Examples such as the London-Birmingham railway and Amsterdam show 
rhythms related to stable infrastructure – material interventions which shape an 
established landscape and cityscape which then shape the interaction of urban 
populations in a regularised and predictable manner. In contrast to these material 
rhythms are those which are primarily derived from social phenomena. Such social 
rhythms can be complementary to the material: tourism is often profoundly dependent 
on material infrastructure and the rhythms of scheduled flights and holiday seasons 
being synchronised. Urban social rhythms are to be observed in everyday practices such 
as commuting but also in less frequent examples associated with spectacular events, 
pilgrimage and mass tourism. The population density and urban character of cities such 
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as Varanasi, Mecca and Jerusalem are dynamically altered by seasonal pilgrimage as 
well as being shaped in the long term by their status as sacred sites. Rhythmic expansion 
and contraction of population mean that services must be provided which are redundant 
for significant periods, making a city’s infrastructure look uncannily out of scale for 
significant periods of time. Similar effects are to be observed in so-called non-places 
such as airports (Augé, 2008). Resort towns are similarly subject to such fluctuations 
though fashions and changing geopolitics might make these rhythms more irregular. 
Under modern conditions, such social rhythms proliferate as populations increase and 
as the tendency to homogeneity produces crowds to be regulated in many different areas 
of urban life. The ideological utility of these types of social rhythm are various – the 
pilgrim is the most explicitly ideological subject in this context but the tourist is 
engaged equally in the reinforcement of modern liberal economics and neo-colonial 
potentials and the passenger at the airport is subject to the attentions of control 
mechanisms which reinforce cultural norms: as Korstanje observes, ‘three institutions, 
migrations, customs and police work together to keep the security of nation state. 
Airports serve in this vein as ideological mechanism of discipline and control so 
passengers embrace the cultural values of current societies.’ (2015, p. 55) 
Since urban rhythms are necessarily regulated, they offer the opportunity for 
institutional control and manipulation thereby giving them potential as ideological tools 
at the same time as seeming to be prosaic and technocratic. The striking livery of public 
transport vehicles regularly plying the streets of a city are advertising their services and 
convenience to the public but can also represent the bountiful provision of an urban 
administration and can even be integral to urban identity in much the same way as a 
navy and a flag can be for a nation. In the era of the modern city, the proliferation of 
rhythmic forms through mechanisation and industrialisation has created many new 
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opportunities for ideological co-option and reinforcement. These forms are the means 
by which order is projected on to a city and shape the habits and customs of citizens 
and visitors alike. The rhythm is one in which the citizen is relatively passive and 
therefore receptive – to move to a different rhythm in a city is to go against a crowd and 
to be immediately identifiable as such. 
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Urban Hierarchies 
Forms of hierarchy in cities shape social practices and also locate a city’s 
identity within a wider context of other places and territories. Human settlement is the 
instantiation of the principle of hierarchy as the agricultural life which sustains it needs 
a sharpened division of labour. However, hierarchical order is not static or uncontested. 
Claims of control in the city and of the city are constantly wrestled. Urban inhabitants 
can be subdued, in contest with or can override urban elites. The city can dominate its 
hinterland, be subsumed into larger territorial structures or, again, be in conflict with its 
neighbours and powers that seek to dominate it. 
The cities of Lombardy and Tuscany in the High Middle Ages exemplify this 
tension. Cities in northern Italy emerged as significant economic entities around the 
tenth and eleventh centuries. These cities found themselves caught between the imperial 
power of the Holy Roman Empire, whose core lay on the other side of the Alps, and the 
Church in Rome and both vied for temporal authority in the Italian peninsula. Given 
their increasing economic power, however, the cities had significant leverage of their 
own. This leverage needed both military and ideological forces to give it legitimacy. 
When the University in Bologna first became established, in around 1088, it was the 
first of its kind and its purpose was initially primarily for the study of the recently 
rediscovered Roman legal code enshrined by Justinian. A code of civil law was 
increasingly desirable as trade grew in the northern Italian cities and the Justinian code 
provided a legal framework for the adjudication of such things as contractual disputes 
(Landau, 1999, p. 115). As universities at Bologna and elsewhere developed, the study 
of law in northern Italy matured and so the beginnings of a set of conceptual tools began 
to be produced which would enable the cities to defend against claims over them 
(Skinner, 1978). By the time of the military campaigns of Holy Roman Emperor 
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Frederick Barbarossa in the twelfth century which sought to consolidate imperial power 
or claim imperial power in northern Italy, the cities were in a position to combine into 
a defensive military force through the establishment of the Lombard League under the 
leadership of the Milanese; and, crucially, an interpretation of the legal status of the 
cities was developed and promoted by the cities themselves through legal theory in the 
universities and through the deployment of the rhetoric of rights and liberty. At this time, 
conceptual defences started to be deployed, appealing for example for the defence of 
the ‘honour and liberty of Italy’ (Bueno de Mesquita, 1965), liberty in this context 
meaning the ability to act independently of imperial authority and maintain local 
systems of government. In the latter half of the thirteenth century the Papacy, a 
counterweight for the northern cities to imperial power, claimed increasing influence 
that was seen to encroach upon urban autonomy. In cities such as Padua, conflict over 
whether the Church needed to pay local taxes represented a wider struggle for control 
and the use of legal and rhetorical argument to assert and dispute local rights (Skinner, 
1978, p. 7). As ongoing struggles for control continued into the fourteenth century, the 
centre of defence of autonomy shifted from Lombardy to Tuscany where Florence had 
become the leading city. Emperor Henry of Luxembourg arrived in Italy from across 
the Alps in 1310 in an attempt to assert his imperial power, much as Frederick 
Barbarossa and Frederick II had before him. The concept of liberty was again deployed 
in the service of the right to rule themselves as Florentine diplomatic letters proclaimed 
the ‘liberty of Tuscany’ (Bueno de Mesquita, 1965). As the century progressed 
jurisprudence evolved with ‘postglossators’ such as Bartolus de Saxoferrato shifted 
from applying the law strictly to shaping the facts to prioritising facts when they 
appeared to conflict with the law. The outcome of this approach was to further legitimise 
the de facto independence of the Italian city-states (Skinner, 1978). 
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In the Italian city-state example, several hierarchical forms vied for primacy and 
not only was urban autonomy afforded by the authority of legal scholars but also the 
conflict of hierarchies itself afforded the growth of independent city-state institutions. 
Imperial and papal precedence was exercised but the theoretical claims of a new 
academic class asserted the primacy of law. The legal framework could be used to make 
power abstract and reduce the claims of imperial and ecclesiastical authorities with 
argument, thereby reinforcing economic and social power originating in the expanding 
and successful cities of northern Italy. Urban institutions were afforded increasing 
autonomy through conflicts between existing hierarchies and the creation of new ones. 
Forms within the city’s physical layout itself can embody this tension of 
hierarchies. Krakow was the royal seat of the Kingdom of Poland until the sixteenth 
century. The institutions of Polish royalty were located on the Wawel hill to the south 
of the main settlement on the River Vistula (Carter, 2006, p. 65). The administration of 
Poland-Lithuania moved from Krakow to Warsaw in the early seventeenth century 
(2006, p. 186). Although Krakow’s fortunes waned in subsequent centuries it 
maintained a symbolic state role as the venue for royal coronations and burials. By the 
time of the dissolution by partition of the Polish-Lithuanian state at the end of the 
eighteenth century, a long period of deterioration through warfare had reduced the city 
so that it ‘presented a picture of complete decline’ (Bieniarzówna & Małecki, 1994; 
cited in Damljanović & Makaš, 2015). Krakow’s occupiers in the aftermath of the 
partitions removed the crown jewels, downgraded the site of coronations from a 
cathedral to an ordinary church and sited barracks and a hospital on the Wawel hill 
(Damljanović & Makaš, 2015, p. 190). Such actions were intended to symbolise the 
demise of the Polish-Lithuanian state and as such the Wawel conversely took on the 
symbolism of aggrieved defeat. 
 103 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Map of the City of Krakow and its Suburbs 1809 (“Situationsplan der Stadt 
Krakau und ihrer Vorstädte,” 1809)  
Krakow was, however, to take on a new role in the years after the Napoleonic 
wars. It was granted a measure of independence. This Free City of Krakow in fact not 
only included the city centre itself but also its hinterland to the north of the River Vistula. 
It was subordinate to its neighbouring empires but enjoyed administrative autonomy 
and a duty-free status which gave it economic freedom. It became a focus for Polish 
nationalist sentiment and activity such that it was the focus of the Uprising of 1846 in 
support of Polish independence. Its failure led to the annexation of Krakow by the 
Austrians, adding it to the province of Galicia (Lukowski & Zawadzki, 2006, pp. 169–
170). 
Krakow’s reshaping during the nineteenth century shows the repurposing of a 
separation in the layout of many European medieval cities which divided a castle district 
from the rest of a walled city; this separation went from being one in which aristocracy 
and ecclesiastical symbols are reserved in a sanctified, elevated site from more mundane 
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industry and trade of the civilian population, to one which was transposed on to one in 
which a deracinated castle district becomes symbolic of a national group and the rest of 
the city is regularised in a modern scheme. In the case of Krakow, the Wawel Hill was 
maintained in its walled state under the Free City authorities while the main body of the 
city underwent major demolitions in order to open it up to modernity – its walls were 
removed and replaced with open greenery, the Planty; also, the Town Hall was 
demolished, opening up a massive public square (Damljanović & Makaš, 2015, p. 191). 
Accordingly, the stratification of the medieval and early modern city was reordered by 
modern developments creating new hierarchies of meaning. This order was continuous 
with a distinction between the ‘historic’ centre and other zones of cities in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century in which meanings are encoded in urban layout. 
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Urban Networks 
Cities are embedded within multiple networks, connected as they are to their 
hinterlands and to other distant places. Indeed, when viewed within a network they are 
nearly always crucial nodes, termination points of people, goods and information 
travelling along network vertices. In addition to, and complementing, this urban 
interconnection is urban intra-connection which at its most basic is exemplified by city 
streets and neighbourly relations. As with other urban forms, urban networks can 
overlap and contest with other forms; there is no rigid structure organising and isolating 
urban forms proposed here. However, the components of urban networks can be 
difficult to identify and grouping their types can help analyse their operation and impact. 
Urban networks as understood here are at their most basic level made up of vertices that 
convey people, goods, utilities and information which intersect at nodes. The simplest 
network is a conveyance by one vertex between two nodes and the most complex can 
contain an enormous set of nodes and vertices which crossover each other many times. 
Networks can be represented through multiple layers of abstraction but can be reduced 
to physical phenomena; the metro map represents an abstraction of the physical network 
of rails, rolling stock, passengers and stations of the underlying metro network, for 
example. Urban networks afford many kinds of social activity and cultural 
representation. 
Port cities provide a good example of nodes in a physical network. The 
evolution of port facilities in the Lower Loire in the nineteenth century tracks the eclipse 
of the old slaving port of Nantes 50km inland from the Atlantic by the planned port of 
Saint-Nazaire which built modern facilities to handle transatlantic passenger and goods 
traffic for steamships in the post-slavery, capitalist economy of the north Atlantic in the 
late nineteenth century. Saint-Nazaire’s placement was afforded by its physical 
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geography, in a section of the Loire that could handle the deeper draughts of modern 
ships which could not travel up to Nantes but still sheltered from the stormy seas of the 
Bay of Biscay (“Plan Local d’Urbanisme,” 2009). Although it largely replaced Nantes 
as a port it nevertheless ensured that the economy around Nantes was sustained and the 
area became an embarkation point for the United States and the throughput of people 
from areas outside of the region provided cosmopolitan cultural input of a sort which 
would have been very different to the slave-based colonial economic network to which 
it had been connected in the previous century. 
Nantes itself provides a historical example of the initiation of an intra-connected 
network with the development by of the first omnibus service in 1826 by Stanislas 
Baudry. Baudry’s concept was to develop a service which could transport potential 
customers from the centre of Nantes to a bathhouse on the city’s outskirts (Belenky, 
2007). The innovation he introduced was to provide a regular, timetabled service which 
did not need to be pre-booked. In this way, citizens of Nantes had a permanent 
connection to an urban facility which was depersonalised. By instituting a network 
which was not dependent on demand from specific passengers but which would provide 
a vertex between two nodal points automatically, urban space began to be compressed. 
Urban mass public transport could be developed to afford cities which were no longer 
restricted by how far people could walk or the high cost of specialised carriages; instead 
the omnibus, which Baudry quickly introduced on a large scale to Paris, along with 
railways, afforded a massive expansion of urban space. 
The establishment of regularised trade across the Sahara demonstrates features 
which afford successful urban connections, enriching the cities at the nodes of a vast 
network. The Sahara is surrounded by very diverse economies and this has been the 
case for millennia. To the north, the Mediterranean coastal regions are fertile and have 
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been in reasonably constant cultural, political and mercantile contact with the northern 
and eastern Mediterranean and beyond (Austen, 2015, p. 665). To the south of the 
Sahara is a region rich in materials such as salt and gold and a source of labour, forced 
through slavery or otherwise (2015, p. 667). Complex cultural formations have arisen, 
fallen and reconfigured on the margins of the desert over a long period. However, 
evidence of trans-Sahara trade prior to the eighth century suggests that it was not a 
constant, embedded feature of these societies (2015, p. 672). 
Austen defines the two main conditions for conveying commodities across the 
Sahara as ‘the presence of goods with sufﬁcient value to warrant the expense and risk’ 
and ‘the availability of a transport system that could make the cost … competitive’ 
(2015, p. 668). The first condition may well have been dependent on the existence of 
the second as much as the other way around – salt mining in northern Mali became 
established as caravan routes were starting in the fourth century CE. The second 
condition has a technical and political element: the technical element was fulfilled by 
the domestication of the dromedary whereas the political element required a stable 
political and diplomatic system for the camel caravan system to be regularised. Austen 
identifies the gap between ‘the presence of domesticated camels’ and the 
commencement of ‘direct and sustained trans-Saharan trade’ as a delay explained by 
the lack of this political element until the establishment of Islam throughout the 
Maghreb and with it an ideology that would provide common cultural and political 
bonds across distant Saharan communities (2015, p. 676). West African state systems 
in the Islamic era developed around urban centres such as Kumbi Saleh and Gao, and 
later Timbuktu, and thrived from trans-Saharan trade. Routes connecting these centres 
with areas to the north and east of the desert have been in constant use since this time 
transporting goods and people, including devout Muslims completing the Hajj to Mecca. 
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Figure 12: Trans-Saharan Trade Network (Austen, 2015, p. 664) 
Urban connections, where urban centres are nodes in a network, require not only 
differentiated, high-value products for trade but also political and social consistency in 
the form of the protection of travellers, common standards for vehicles so that they can 
pass without significant obstruction and be maintained. For a network like that of the 
Sahara which has lasted for over 1,200 years, this consistency has not necessarily been 
provided through stable state institutions so much as being underpinned by a durable 
set of religious practices and laws and a common lingua franca in the form of Arabic. 
Inter-urban networks can take many forms and are commonly represented in terms of 
interconnecting infrastructure such as roads and port facilities. However, the trans-
Saharan network shows that interconnecting physical infrastructure can be virtually 
absent if a clearly understood set of practices and principles are in place, are durable 
and can be maintained. 
Networked forms not only operate at inter-city and intra-city levels but also can 
be a means of integrating multiple city identities. Proximate cities can extend into each 
other forming conurbations and this enmeshing can serve several purposes. A 
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conurbation with multiple centres might be identified in order to measure the operation 
of a social formation or economy at the level at which it most regularly functions. The 
Randstad is an example of this: first applied in 1938 by Albert Plesman, of Dutch airline 
KLM, he used the idea of the Randstad, literally ‘Ring City’, to discuss airport facilities 
in The Netherlands and to advocate for a single airport to serve Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
The Hague and Utrecht. His observation was that from the air these four cities formed 
a ring around a green area of The Netherlands and that they should be considered as a 
unit when planning for an airport. The idea of the Randstad was potent in the sense that 
it was adopted in the post-war era not only to conceptualise how the four cities actually 
operated but also as a forward-planning goal (Laar & Kooy, 2003). In this way, the 
conurbation was used to essentialise an aspiration: Plesman represented the Randstad 
as a reality that was only visible from the air and used this to promote a project with 
economic benefits for his company and hence brought that reality into being. The 
Randstad describes a kind of hybrid intra/inter-city network, one in which existing 
infrastructure physically links proximate cities and in conceptualising itself allows for 
that network to be expanded, reinforcing the reality of the conurbation. This mechanism 
is to some extent operating with all conurbation concepts to a greater or lesser extent. 
In many cases, proximate cities ‘collide’ in the sense that the accretion of planning and 
development decisions bring cities together so that their dense urban infrastructure 
become contiguous. There are many examples of this where administrative structures 
lag behind the emergence of a networked urban form which combines multiple cities. 
A prime example of this is London where the collision of the City of London with 
Westminster has never been reflected comprehensively in its administrative structure, 
with the Corporation of London continuing to control the City in parallel with other 
London-wide authorities. As the built-up area of London has expanded so its networked 
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infrastructure has been used to consolidate it functioning as a city; in the case of the 
London Underground system it has been used to encourage urbanisation of rural areas 
by private developers through the extension of the Metropolitan Railway into the 
Middlesex countryside (Sheppard, 2000). Such enmeshing of neighbouring urban 
territory through network consolidation applies and expands an order, systemising 
citizens’ lives. This process is at work in suburbanisation which has been boosted by 
the expansion of road networks and enables the compression of time and space within 
one urban system as well as between multiple urban nodes. The urban network entails 
a distinct challenge to nation-state identity with the possibility of excessive urban 
growth being described in terms which blur national jurisdictions and boundaries 
(Copenhagen-Malmö, made possible by the Øresund Bridge, spans Danish and Swedish 
national boundaries) and this can open new ideological meanings and contests. 
In this brief survey of examples of urban form, a series of diverse cases has laid 
out what might be possible when cities are thought of through their affordances. A 
common thread is the interaction of physical persistence of urban forms with choices 
made about use and meaning. Historical patterns and new technologies combine to 
shape and change cityscapes and human action and language mediates this process as 
it progresses. These combinations of material form and practice can provide the basis 
for ideological interaction and intervention in the city. It is also clear that formal 
definitions overlap: networks, for example, operate by being entwined with rhythmic 
and hierarchical forms. The detailed cases of Budapest, Vienna and Venice during their 
development in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will show how the creation of 
modern urban forms from a variety of pre-existing structures and arrangements afforded 
the advancements of ideological projects, programmes of nationalisation of cities and 
nationalist politics. That they did so to different degrees and through different means 
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helps demonstrate a variety of urban forms in different combinations can enable the 
practices of nationalism and, more generally, political projects. 
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4. Budapest 
The first case study, Budapest, will show how the cities which came to constitute 
Budapest functioned until the mid-nineteenth century, how they came to be unified and 
how the newly merged city’s spaces, layout and architecture related to a project of 
nationalisation of the urban environment. Urban forms are identified, Budapest’s 
‘whole’ forms being developed from the restoration of Pest after flooding, the 
construction of a bridge across the Danube linking the cities of Pest and Buda and a 
statistical view of Budapest’s population after its unification. These forms are joined 
with rhythms created by institutional forms, the attachment of the city to a national rail 
network and its place in a hierarchy of cities to show how nationalism and processes of 
nationalisation engendered a Hungarian Budapest. In turn, the unified city afforded the 
performance and practice of national and nationalist activity and three examples from 
the 1890s are explored with the funeral procession of a nationalist leader, the Hungarian 
Millennium Celebrations of 1896 and an early electronic broadcast service bringing 
news and cultural events in the Hungarian language to subscribers in the city. 
The emergence of a distinct, modern Hungarian proto-state, a Hungarian capital 
called Budapest and an assertive Hungarian nationalism with mass appeal all occurred 
within a period of decades and had its greatest momentum between 1848 to 1873. All 
three phenomena were closely related and, focusing on two of them, Budapest urbanism 
and Hungarian nationalism were entangled in a way which exemplifies how urban 
forms can enable ideological projects. Budapest's transformation in the nineteenth 
century, of course, was part of a wider movement of European urbanisation. Its 
development occurred in the wake of and was influenced by the modernisation of Paris, 
Vienna and others. Of particular note with regard to Budapest, however, is the extent to 
which its creation worked in alliance with the emergence of a modern Hungarian 
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identity and state and the ways in which that identity and state shaped Budapest (Nemes, 
2005). An idea of the nation was forming in the late nineteenth century which defined 
itself increasingly by its exclusions. Budapest conformed with this national idea through 
its increasing use of Hungarian over German in everyday life (2005, pp. 122–189, 182). 
It also began to provide places which allowed for the practice of nationalism – 
processional geographies imposed themselves; monumental artifice focused national 
devotion. Budapest provides a strong example of the nationalisation of the European 
city, a process which had varying impact upon most European cities and which has left 
a deep mark on the contemporary city. The systematisation and rationalisation of urban 
infrastructure and practices were perhaps an indication of the death of control by 
traditional authorities on the fundamental form of cities. Cities were becoming 
increasingly secular and commercial and their inhabitants were increasingly isolated 
from more traditional social relations. Rather than simply creating a class of 
individuated, rational citizens, however, this isolation created a desire for, and presented 
the opportunity for the exploitation of, secular communal belief. The rite of nationalism 
could be practised across the classes and be put to the service of the formation of mass, 
national politics and as an organising principle for the deployment of capital. 
Nationalism could provide spiritual nourishment for the citizen of the supposedly 
disenchanted city and provided a guiding hand to the city's physical and practical 
development; its modern urban forms fed this through boulevards and public squares 
and the paucity of interpersonal communion on the streets. Desanctified urban forms 
were vacuums into which ideology could expand. 
As cities modernised they became the focus for social relationships which were 
increasingly regularised and monetised (Simmel, 2002, pp. 12–13). The modernised 
city became a resource to exploit both in terms of systematic deployment of capital to 
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provide new infrastructure and to speculate on land prices, and in terms of providing 
places in which consumers could pursue shopping and culture in a money economy. 
These kinds of commercialisation were by no means new to the city, but the modernised 
city provided for them on a scale which was unparalleled. Previous constraints such as 
guilds and tariffs were swept away and the city became open to market forces. When 
markets faltered, such as in Europe during the 1870s, and protection was put in place, 
safeguards were generally at a national rather than a city level. The exposure of 
modernised cities to market forces gave rise to a search for social protection and an 
organising principle for action (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 223–228). In late nineteenth-century 
Budapest, as in many other places, this search was often mediated through a national 
idea. 
There is no process of history to be isolated in describing great social change in 
Budapest any more than elsewhere. Change in nineteenth-century Europe can be 
ascribed to the expansion of free market capitalism, industrialisation, modernisation, 
political and social liberalisation, urbanisation and so forth. There was certainly a 
dramatic change in human life across the continent during the nineteenth century. A new 
form of life developed focused on cities – a form from which today’s urbanised world 
derives. The sweeping away of older social arrangements is a movement which in a 
classical liberal interpretation leaves space for an essential human actor who is well 
placed to pursue individual interests without further hindrance. A more complex reality 
is found in the development of Budapest where the formation of a new urban entity – a 
transition from a conglomerate of ancient social arrangements in which German 
language and culture were integral to a set of modern arrangements in which Hungarian 
rapidly became the dominant urban identity – and notions of ethnicity and nationalism 
played an increasingly important part of the politics of the city and its hinterland. 
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Historical Context 
Hungary in the nineteenth century was transformed from being effectively an 
Austrian province to being a proto-state with a fully-fledged polity and control over its 
affairs apart from foreign policy. The cities of Pest, Óbuda and Buda were transformed 
from three medium-sized provincial towns with a majority of German speakers to one 
metropolis, Budapest, with a majority Hungarian-speaking population and acting as 
capital to the Hungarian Kingdom. 
The Hungarian Crown Lands, in which the three cities lay, were far from 
homogeneous in demography or in administrative arrangements. Two territories, 
Transylvania and Croatia, were notionally separate and linguistically dominated by 
Romanian and Croatian respectively (Ingrao, 2000, pp. 12–13). Since the entire region 
had been significantly depopulated during Turkish rule, many different ethnicities had 
migrated to Hungary during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and many of the 
supposedly Magyar12 nobility, though most frequently Magyar-speaking, had diverse 
European origins (Várkonyi, 1970, pp. 156–159). Even in the mid-nineteenth century 
the Hungarian lands were only just over one third Hungarian-speaking (Dányi, 1992, 
pp. 66–67). So, the question of national identity was contentious. The Hungarian capital 
during the eighteenth century was Pozsony (Pressburg in German and today the 
Slovakian capital, Bratislava). Pozsony was, like Buda and Pest, a city of mixed 
ethnicity with German predominating. There was a movement of the Hungarian elite 
                                                 
 
12  The terms Magyar and Hungarian are often used interchangeably; a distinction 
broadly followed is between a Magyar ethnicity and language based on an idea of blood lineage 
with a Hungarian civic identity which includes non-Magyar elements. This distinction does not 
always hold up and indeed a certain conceptual slippage is at the heart of tensions in varieties 
of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism. 
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towards the end of the eighteenth century from Pozsony towards the Buda area 
following a move of the Habsburg administration of Hungary in the same direction 
(Bácskai, 1975, p. 28). 
The history of Buda, Óbuda and Pest13 contains many interruptions and shifts 
in power. The first significant Hungarian settlement in the area was in what became 
Óbuda – the original Buda – in the ninth century. Built on the site of the old Roman 
town of Aquincum on the right bank of the Danube, it appears to have had princely and 
royal associations from its foundation (T. Nagy, 1975, p. 83). The town of Pest emerged 
on the left bank as a chartered municipality in the thirteenth century (Kubinyi, 1975, p. 
12). An acceleration of trade in the area during the twelfth century drew settlers from 
further afield, principally German speakers. Mongol incursions during the thirteenth 
century led to fortifications being built on hills to the south of the original Buda and 
this took on the name of Buda, the old site becoming Óbuda – Old Buda. Charters were 
granted during this period to both Buda and Pest and the two were closely related in 
terms of rights and governance, with Buda taking precedence (1975, p. 13). The towns 
continued to grow and to establish commercial links across Europe until the sixteenth 
century when they were taken by Turkish forces and incorporated into the Ottoman 
Empire. The towns’ economic activity was then focused away from European 
Christendom for the next 145 years and they developed under Ottoman rule with a 
significant Turkish population (1975, p. 24). The conquest of Buda and Pest by forces 
                                                 
 
13 There are numerous names used in Hungarian, German and English for the towns 
which came together to form Budapest and for Budapest as a whole: the contemporaneous 
Hungarian use will prevail here. The three towns in Hungarian are Buda, Óbuda/Ó-Buda and 
Pest, being rendered in German respectively as Ofen, Alt-Ofen and Pesth/Pest and in English 
as Buda/Ofen, Old Buda/Old Ofen and Pest. The unified city is referred to from 1873 almost 
exclusively as Budapest though other usages from before crop up including Buda-Pest, Pest-
Buda, Pesth-Ofen and so forth. 
 117 
 
 
allied to the Holy Roman Empire in the late seventeenth century left the towns 
depopulated and new settlers arrived, the re-expanding cities in the post-Ottoman era 
sustaining both German and Magyar speakers alongside Slovak, Croat and Serbian 
minorities (Bácskai, 1975, p. 25). Town charters, administration and guilds were re-
established under the new regime – the Habsburg family who were Dukes of Austria 
also then took the Crown of Hungary, which had remained at the city of Pozsony in the 
part of Hungary which had not come under Ottoman rule. During the eighteenth century, 
Hungarian administrative machinery was transferred from Pozsony to Buda and Pest 
and together the towns ended that century as Hungary’s principal commercial and 
administrative centre. In the latter part of that century reforms in the Habsburg Austrian 
Empire saw improvements to both cities being enacted and to a rationalisation of 
administration (L. Nagy, 1975, p. 66). 
The transformation of a collection of ancient towns on the Danube, governed 
and operated by a complex web of old corporate arrangements, to the modern, singular 
city of Budapest is all the more remarkable because of the timespan in which it took 
place. The development of a more sophisticated urban whole in the Budapest area which 
took its cues from wider trends in European city planning started to occur on the 
instigation of the Enlightenment-influenced Emperor Joseph II in the late eighteenth 
century (1975, p. 66). The class structure of early modern Buda, Óbuda and Pest was 
complex and governed rights of different ethnicities and their interrelationships. The 
town councils of Buda and Pest were both dominated by German merchants and artisans. 
Hungarian nobility and some merchants also had a degree of influence. The 
administration of the town was conducted in German. Until late into the nineteenth 
century the cities had several administrative masters: the town councils under the sway 
of mercantile interests (Bácskai, 1975, p. 26); Pest-Pilis-Solt County representing 
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landed interests and included the rural hinterland (Nemes, 2005, pp. 21–22); and the 
Austrian Habsburg administration which formed such city-based organisations as the 
Embellishment Commission (2005, pp. 42–43). By the 1830s Habsburg reforms had 
made Pest, at least, a relatively modern provincial town and there were increasing signs 
of Hungarian national sentiment influencing life there with, for example, instances of 
student action against German signage of the traditionally German shopkeepers. 
(Nemes, 2005, p. 124) Indeed, the Hungarian national movement made great headway 
during the 1830s and 1840s in promoting a spoken and written Hungarian through the 
Hungarian Scholarly Society which had an official role in the development of the 
Hungarian language and the study and propagation of the sciences and the arts in 
Hungarian (2005, p. 84). Largely German speaking institutions were augmented by 
Hungarian institutions such as the Hungarian Academy, the Museum and the Parliament, 
all of which had national significance but all of which were rooted in Budapest rather 
than in the original Habsburg Hungarian seat at Pozsony. 
The promotion of Hungarian was of course a programme for the whole of 
Hungary, but its effect on the identity of Buda and Pest was particularly pronounced 
given the entrenchment of German in everyday life there. This national effort had its 
more liberal proponents but it also had a strong section of supporters who saw linguistic 
and cultural homogeneity as essential. An article from 1844 by Imre Vahot, cited by 
Robert Nemes, gives an indication as to what this would mean in terms of a Hungarian 
urban vision, his vision of a 1950s Budapest being somewhere: 
 
‘One will somehow be able to learn that Budapest was once German only from 
the German inscriptions on the scarcely legible gravestones in the cemeteries, 
and our national capital can say with proud confidence to the homeland and the 
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nation: “I am proud that you named me the head and center of Hungary.”’ (2005, 
p. 105) 
 
The towns of Buda, Óbuda and Pest were far from this homogeneity, however, 
and German continued to be a major language even as it contended with Hungarian. 
Many citizens were bilingual and not all saw the replacement of the area’s other 
languages with one, national language as essential (2005, pp. 101–102). The course of 
nationalisation of Budapest would have obstacles to overcome to the create a 
functioning, modern and unified city and to mould a population which would identify 
as Hungarian. 
 
Figure 13: Map of Pest and Buda from 1832 (Blaschnek, 1832) 
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Urban Forms 
Unified ‘whole’ across the Danube. Hungarian national aspiration and the rise 
of Budapest as a major European city were driven not only by local circumstances but 
also by processes of European industrialisation, modernisation and the breakdown of 
traditional structures. For Budapest to go from being a collection of German dominated 
towns to a large Hungarian city required all of the large, epoch-shifting processes 
moving Europe. For Budapest to become a Hungarian space required modernity and 
the conversion of the peasantry to urban life. Indeed, this came to pass: from 1848 to 
1873 the Budapest area became a huge metropolitan area, its population increasing 
greatly and a majority now spoke Hungarian. 
A pivotal moment in the creation of the modern city is the Great Flood of 183814 
(Nemes, 2005, p. 107). In March of that year the Danube broke its banks and the 
resulting damage devastated both public buildings and domestic dwellings alike. The 
subsequent rebuilding of Pest and the regulation of the Danube provided the basis for 
the transformation of the whole region during the latter nineteenth century and the 
creation of a unified entity. The disaster acted as a spur to make Pest into a city which 
had a sturdy infrastructure and which had buildings appropriate for a modern city. The 
rebuilding effort attracted donations from across Hungary. It took only four years for 
over 1,000 buildings to be constructed, changing the character of the city from that of 
a provincial town to one which, according to Nemes, foreign visitors reported as being 
more like other European cities. (2005, p. 108) The flood provided the opportunity for 
                                                 
 
14 In the modern period, the opportunity lent by catastrophe for a new start for a city is 
a recurrent theme, most famously in the cases of London (the Great Fire of 1666) and Lisbon 
(the earthquake of 1755) but more recently and closer to Budapest: the 1895 earthquake in 
Laibach (Ljubljana in today’s Slovenia) triggered a significant redevelopment of the city. 
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people identifying themselves as the Hungarian nation to take part in a collective effort 
to produce a city worthy of that nation. 
Aside from the rebuilding activity necessitated by the flood, reformers such as 
Count István Széchenyi had been calling for the reform of Hungary from the early 
nineteenth century onwards. Reformers of Széchenyi’s kind were often of Magyar 
aristocratic origin and were interested in reforms which would create a rational 
Hungarian territory to govern rather than necessarily an ethnically Hungarian one. Since 
Hungarians were still in the minority in Hungary some of the aristocracy, and especially 
Széchenyi, saw it as in their interests to take careful consideration of other minorities 
(Nemes, 2005, p. 57). In his proposals for modernising Buda and Pest Széchenyi 
therefore was unlikely to have been looking to create a purely Hungarian idea of the 
city. Others in the Hungarian national movement, such as Lajos Kossuth, were less 
conciliatory and effectively sought the elevation of Hungarian culture as the natural 
dominant culture of the Hungarian lands, above Romanian, Croat and Slovak culture, 
if not German (Judson, 2016, pp. 162–163; Sugar, Hanák, & Frank, 1990, p. 200). The 
idea of the Hungarian nation was one which had been closely associated with the 
nobility, to the effective exclusion of other Hungarian speakers, and the creation of a 
wider Hungarian culture had the potential to mobilise these others even as it drew 
clearer lines between other minorities. Széchenyi’s more classically liberal vision for a 
modern Hungary, and a modern Budapest, started to lose out to more direct appeals to 
a more exclusionary nation as the nineteenth century progressed. 
It was around at around this time of reconstruction of Pest after the flood that 
proposals were put forward for the construction of a permanent bridge joining Pest and 
Buda. There had been an impermanent pontoon bridge across the Danube since the late 
eighteenth century which listed and had to be removed during the winter months when 
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the Danube froze. What Széchenyi proposed was put in its place was a modern, British 
built suspension bridge. Its construction began in 1840, as rebuilding work in Pest after 
the flood was progressing, and it was opened in 1849 at the time of the failed Hungarian 
Revolution and the first attempt to formally unite Budapest. The bridge acted not only 
as a piece of infrastructure to connect the two banks and stimulate traffic and trade but 
also its scale acted as a symbol of unity and of Hungarian national power and pride, 
even as the Revolution ended in failure. Crucially Széchenyi argued strongly for the 
nobility to give up many of their privileges, especially their exemption from taxes – this 
exemption extended to a prohibition on charging nobles tolls for crossing the Danube, 
an exemption done away with in time for when Széchenyi's suspension bridge came 
into operation between Buda and Pest in 1849 (Nemes, 2005, pp. 117–118). A 
permanent structure of a bridge not only overcame the physical barrier of the river but 
permanently integrated the roadways of Buda and Pest, making for a unified experience 
of a modern Budapest. Renovated Pest and the Castle District in Buda were brought 
into the same the urban whole, the banks of the river becoming an urban feature rather 
than lines drawn between the cities and brought a new urban whole into existence.15 In 
this way, the bridge symbolised not only the integration of Budapest but also a modern 
replacement for the old order. Beyond the symbolism was what this new whole afforded 
                                                 
 
15 'The bridge swings over the stream "with ease and power." It does not just connect 
banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. 
The bridge expressly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the 
other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the 
dry land. With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the 
landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighborhood.’ 
(Heidegger, 1993, p. 354) 'Thus the bridge does not come to a locale to stand in it; rather, a 
locale comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge.’ (1993, p. 356) 
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the citizen: movement from one side to the other without restriction, a new viewpoint 
from the river from which to stop and gaze upon Buda and Pest balanced together in 
view, their unified identity reinforced. The new bridge went further than replacing the 
old pontoon structure – it created something novel which was to enable the cities to 
integrate and set a precedent for further infrastructural developments to bring modern 
Budapest into being. 
The connection between the regularisation of Budapest and the fate of the nation of 
Hungary was emphasised right at the beginning with the first instance of a liberal 
Hungarian state. The merger of Buda, Pest and Óbuda was decreed in 1849 by the 
Hungarian government set up in as a result of the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and was 
independent of Austria. Bertalan Szemere, the Minister of the Interior, was direct: ‘an 
administrative reorganization throughout the whole Hungarian state is now urgent . . . 
on these grounds that the two sister capitals together with Ó-Buda, are destined to form 
one municipality as both in their situation and in the number of their inhabitants’; and 
further, ‘the Hungarian state can only have one capital in which Pest chiefly provides 
the living strength and Buda chiefly its ancient historic memory’. (Ságvári, 1975a, p. 
90) 
So, the regularisation and rationalisation of the towns which became Budapest 
meant the elimination of old privileges and traditional forms of life which allowed for 
a more plural cultural world. In place of that world came one in which a form of social 
organisation which took care of the identity of citizens needed to form and nationhood 
was at the core of Budapest's new identity. 
By the time of the Ausgleich in 1867 and the granting of effective autonomy to 
Hungary, the ‘sister capitals’ were primed for their next, unified role in the new 
Hungarian state. Significant energy was directed by the newly autonomous Hungarian 
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state into developing a capital city and during the next 6 years primary national 
legislation created a Board for the development of the capital and finally formally 
unified the city. It is in the Ministerial Preamble of the Budapest Municipality Act from 
1871 that a clear indication of motivations for creating a unified city is given: 
 
‘The Hungarian state stands in need of a centre, which should serve as a real 
focus for its interests and their principal support and promoter which should 
worthily represent the ideal of Hungarian statehood, and should exert an 
irresistible force of attraction on both the intellectual and material sectors of the 
country, in the interests of national development.’ (Ságvári, 1975a, p. 93) 
In many respects, late nineteenth-century Budapest took on the symbolism of 
its predecessors more than their functions. The Pest side was – and remained – a 
mercantile centre on top of which national administrative, monumental, industrial and 
retail layers were placed; Buda continued its ceremonial role and in doing so vested the 
new capital with an authenticity grounded in older Royal traditions. What is important 
to note is the extent to which those roles were put to the service of a national idea. It 
was not just that Budapest was to be the hub of nation; it was to serve a deeply symbolic 
purpose and take on a role in the creation of a self-sustaining Hungarian state. Implicit 
in the Ministerial Preamble is the desire for Budapest to enable freedom from 
domination by Vienna. In other words, what could not be achieved through revolution 
and armed force would be achieved through urbanisation set to work on behalf of the 
nation. 
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Figure 14: Map of Budapest in 1872, map sketch by Zoltán Kemény, © Ágnes Ságvári 
1975, used by permission. (Ságvári, 1975a, p. 221) 
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Measuring the demographic whole. The desire to create a Hungarian identity 
for Budapest, as expressed by Vahot in the 1840s, was initially given momentum by the 
active promotion of language and culture in order to encourage the existing population 
to identify with the nation. However, as the nineteenth century wore on, the massive 
expansion in population was driven by the migration of Hungarians from the 
countryside into industrial jobs in the city and hence the Magyarisation of Budapest 
was largely a product of that migration (see Figure 15). Important too is the inclusion 
of Jewish migrants in Hungarian statistics. Jewish, Hungarian-speaking migrants from 
the countryside were co-opted by Hungarian statisticians into a conflation of language 
and ethnicity with the effect of boosting Hungarian numbers. So, alongside an official 
programme of active Magyarisation there was the passive element of Hungarian inward 
migration which fuelled the nationalisation of the city, though undoubtedly the two were 
able to reinforce each other. 
 
Figure 15: Chart of changes in Budapest’s population between 1880 and 1920 
(Ságvári, 1975c, p. 158) 
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Budapest's statistical office took an active interest in the process of 
Magyarisation of the city and in 1881 produced a report for the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences which sought to analyse and explain the phenomenon. It was noted that with 
regard to the languages spoken in Budapest that, ‘[two] common factors exercise 
influence on each language: schooling and immigration. Since the rapid expansion of 
Budapest is not due to natural growth but is thanks to immigration, the question arises 
as to how the country’s counties are represented in the nation’s capital’ going on to 
point out that, ‘not one geographical region contributes to population growth in 
Budapest’, Pest county, in the immediate vicinity, excepted. This indicates that not only 
was the proportional reduction in German's prevalence in the urban area reduced 
through massive immigration of Hungarian speakers but also that the city authorities 
and Hungarian academics had a consciousness of the process for which there was a 
desire to account. (Kőrösi, 1882, p. 24) 
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Budapest’s whole forms. Four wholes have been identified here which bear on 
the development of modern Budapest alongside the pursuit of Hungarian nationhood. 
The restoration of Pest after the 1838 flood, the construction of the permanent bridge 
in 1849, the formal merger of Buda, Óbuda and Pest in 1871 and a statistical, panoptical 
view of the entire Budapest population after the merger which categorised and 
quantified inhabitants by ethnic and linguistic group. The 1838 flood afforded a kind of 
conversion of the urban whole – by developing so many buildings in one go it was 
possible to break continuity with an older Pest. The claims of tradition were washed 
over by the Danube’s waters: the city of Pest no longer afforded an appeal to continuity 
when it came to buildings damaged by the flood which needed replacing. Had the flood 
not occurred, such a large-scale modernisation – one which by contemporary accounts 
made the city more ‘European’ – would have required significant conflict with 
entrenched interests. A catastrophic intervention could constrain this opposition. The 
newly renovated city afforded the possibility of modernisation on a wider scale. 
The trajectory of modernisation continued with the proposal, coming not long 
after Pest’s reconstruction, for a permanent bridge. The close links between Buda and 
Pest were evident throughout their development over centuries. However, the river 
always mediated and intervened in those links. The pontoon bridge was an arrangement 
which made the link precarious and subject to external forces. The permanent bridge 
altered the link radically. It elevated traffic and provided a seamless experience of the 
roadways between the two river banks. Its advanced design afforded civic pride and, 
given the cities’ key role in Hungarian national aspiration, the potential for national 
pride also. 
The final unification of the cities in 1871 had its precedent in 1848-49. However, 
it was only when Hungarian autonomy was secured in the Ausgleich that such a unified 
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arrangement proved sustainable. The unification itself was predicated on national 
identity: Hungary’s elevation required an administrative centre and the rhetoric of 
national pride dictated that the capital should be one to compete for equivalence with 
other European capitals. National aspiration produced modern Budapest as an urban 
site for the further promotion of that aspiration. The new urban whole was a 
reconfiguration of the old and the production of a new urban identity which aligned 
with the modern state, and with the proto-nation-state of Hungary. 
Bringing all of this together is demographic expansion: both the multiplication 
of population and the expansion of the scientific, statistical view of the population. The 
statistical office provided a panoptic view of the new urban whole – categorising urban 
identities and membership and also layering ethnic and linguistic composition. By 
providing this objective understanding of the population, it served to give credibility 
and authority to the process of Magyarisation that was at work and to feedback progress 
on the Magyarisation process to relevant institutions. The co-option of the Jewish 
population to boost the Hungarian category is the most obvious political decision in the 
compilation of statistics (Kamusella, 2009, p. 685).  
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Institutional rhythm. Plans for a Hungarian Academy or Scholarly Society had 
existed since at least 1810 when István Marczibányi left a legacy of 50,000 florins to 
be used for its foundation. The idea was to create an institution which could both 
encapsulate and promote Hungarian culture and intellectual life and connect the nation 
to international academic life. Marczibányi’s money funded a series of Hungarian 
language publications in lieu of the foundation of a Hungarian Scholarly Society 
(Nemes, 2005, p. 49). It was in the 1820s that Széchenyi gave the project impetus as 
part of a string of civil society institutions he funded to promote Hungarian culture 
(2005, p. 55). The Hungarian Scholarly Society in Pest became the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences in 1845 and has maintained a continuous presence there since (“History of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,” 2017). In the 1850s, the suppression of many 
economic and political clubs and societies meant that nationalists retreated to other 
areas of civil society that were purely cultural (Nemes, 2005, p. 158). The Academy, 
perceived as a more conservative institution and regulated to control its political 
influence, survived as an entity with its President, Emil Dessewffy, imposed by the 
authorities in Vienna. However, if it was their intention to use Dessewffy to thwart its 
place in Hungarian culture then he was to disappoint when he continued to promote a 
Hungarian cultural hegemony in Hungary and called for ‘intellectual battles that sustain 
our nationality.’ (Gróf Dessewfiy Emil akadémiai megnyitó beszéde. (1862, January 5). 
Vasárnapi Ujság, p. 1. Pest, Hungary. Cited in Nemes, 2005, p. 159). As Hungary gained 
more political autonomy in the 1860s so the Academy increasingly featured in 
Budapest’s cultural and intellectual life and in 1865 moved into its current grand neo-
Renaissance home on the Pest side of the Széchenyi bridge (“History of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences,” 2017). 
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The point at which the wish for an academic institution to support Hungarian 
national aspirations became a reality was when the institution received official sanction, 
found premises in Pest and formed its Board. Its General Assembly has met on an 
annual basis since 1831 and this has been the backbone of its institutional life (“History 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,” 2017). The city’s whole demographic form – 
its sizeable population – and its whole physical form – its layout allowing institutional 
life at its centre – afforded the foundation of the Scholarly Society. However, what has 
been critical to its institutional survival as a key national presence has been the rhythm 
of its gatherings, programmes of events and courses and of its annual General Assembly. 
The city’s size and facilities has afforded this rhythmic form. Institutions are not just 
formed by buildings, committed resources and the association of likeminded people but 
also by the frequency and rhythm of their gatherings. 
Connecting the nation. The arrival of railways in the cities of Europe during 
from the 1830s onwards fundamentally shifted the relationship of cities to the country 
that surrounded them and to other cities. In most cities, for the first time it was possible 
to get to another city within the same day, two urban landscapes experienced without 
the barrier of sleep. Rural areas previously relatively isolated from cities were beginning 
to be connected into an urban system, at first economically and increasingly socially. 
The nodal points on the railway network are for the most part commensurate and 
provide an imaginary equality of places. 
Railways provided the physical means of integrating a nation-state (Hobsbawm, 
1992, pp. 80–81). A railway built within the confines of the nation could increase 
economic interdependence, link provinces with nationally available daily newspapers 
and increase the possibility of social mixing between citizens from different regions. 
The imaginary nation, which might be depicted narratively as consisting of a people, 
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land and topographical features, needed the compression of time and space provided by 
rail travel to sustain its imagination. The Romantic poet and Hungarian revolutionary 
Petofi Sándor made this rail and nation building connection explicit in his 1847 poem, 
Vasúton (Rail), in which the new Hungarian railway is valorised and its relationship to 
the nation likened to a vascular system. (Petőfi, 1928, p. 90)  
The consequences of the 1848-49 revolution, crushed by the Austrians with 
Russian assistance, for Hungarian liberal nationalist aspirations were dire in the short 
term. Repression of political opposition and censorship of the press ensured that 
Hungarian nationalists were unable to organise for a long time (Nemes, 2005, pp. 149–
150). However, although the union of Budapest was undone by the Habsburg authorities, 
the cities continued to develop along modern lines. Aspects of the bourgeois revolution 
succeeded from an economic point of view and capital remained unimpeded in shaping 
the urban landscape. The Budapest area became a thriving industrial centre as the 
railway network of the Austrian Empire linked it to vast new markets and industries 
such as milling and engineering made the area a major player in an increasingly 
industrialised Europe. All of this new industrial activity fuelled inward migration from 
the Hungarian countryside and the towns expanded rapidly. The new population and 
new industries overwhelmed the older urban order and a modern city, recognisable 
today, was emerging. The area became a Hungarian cultural centre and this 
complemented an increasingly vociferous Hungarian national movement agitating for 
freedom from absolutist Habsburg rule from Vienna. 
Prior to the arrival of the railways the Danube was the most efficient connection 
to the world outside Hungary. The fact that its path was restricted to passing between 
the cities was for many years to their benefit as they were able to control the flow of 
goods and people and profit from their position on the Danube. The railways, by 
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connecting with multiple destinations through numerous different routes changed this 
dynamic (Osterhammel, 2014, p. 911). Other Hungarian population centres away from 
the river were now in direct communication with the Budapest region through modern, 
fast transport – travel times went from days and weeks to hours. The railway created 
the possibility of mass migration to the city. It also, along with telegraph, improved 
outward communication through press and other publications affording the possibility 
of a shared cultural experience. Temporary events in the city could now be attended en 
masse by Hungarians from afar – the railway made it possible for the Hungarian 
Millennial Exhibition in 1896 to be a truly national experience by opening up the site 
to so many outside visitors.  
Hierarchies of urbanisation. 
 
‘Do not let our capital be like Paris and London: that is, do not let it be a home 
to maddening luxury, vast wealth, and poverty, the nest of immorality and every 
vice. Let our capital be the homeland's altar, on which the flame of loyalty to 
the homeland will ever burn.’ (Táncsics, 1976, pp. 11–12, trans. Robert Nemes) 
 
Written in 1864, before the Ausgleich, Táncsics is expressing a desire for a 
distinct city to reflect what he sees as a distinctive Hungarian nation. It is a sentiment 
that echoes that of Rousseau in his attitude to corrupt Paris against virtuous Geneva. 
Nemes shows that Táncsics text, ‘Fővárosunk’ (‘Our Capital’), brought together, 
‘different models of national-mind urbanism: Széchenyi's emphasis on infrastructural 
improvements, Szemere's insistence that the city have a pronounced Hungarian 
character, and Vahot's fantasies of national homogeneity.’ (2005, p. 168) He also shows 
Táncsics' influence on Ferenc Reitter, the Director of the Municipal Board of Works 
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joining with him in calls for urban canal building. In other words, this urbanism imbued 
with Hungarian nationalism was not just a fringe fantasy but had a direct effect on the 
future direction the city took. 
The urban plan which emerged from the Municipal Board of Works under 
Reitter’s directorship provided not only a method of creating much increased 
commercial space and more efficient and profitable use of land, it also provided a 
scheme by which the city could signal its modernity to its population and to the world. 
Boulevard construction opened up places for modern culture and it is this arrangement 
of cultural material alongside the technological and commercial as part of a unified 
aesthetic scheme that provided the opportunity for the construction of a Budapest which 
represented the Hungarian nation on such a scale as would never have been possible 
before. 
What formed at the core of the city from the 1870s to lead up to the national 
celebrations of the 1890s was a permanent demonstration of the accomplishments of a 
nation. It is significant that the Baedeker guide in 1891 described Andrássy Avenue as 
‘flanked with handsome edifices resembling those in the Ring-Strasse at Vienna’ 
(Southern Germany and Austria, including Hungary, Dalmatia and Bosnia: handbook 
for travellers with 16 maps and 31 plans, 1891, p. 345). It was a technically advanced 
place with its underground railway, a cultured place with its Opera House and museums, 
a powerful place with its massive Gothic Parliament building modelled on the British 
Parliament and, later, a proud place with its Millennial Monument. The municipal 
Board of Public Works was tasked with regulating the Danube and providing a master 
plan for the development of a modern, unified Budapest (Ságvári, 1975b). The Board 
had representation from both Buda and Pest as well as significant representation from 
the national administration. The result of the plan was the realisation of a scheme, seen 
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in such streets as Andrássy Avenue and the series of roads which made up the Grand 
Boulevard, which dazzled the rapidly expanding population with the technological 
capabilities of a maturing nation. It was a clearly-signalled urban experience – one 
could immerse oneself in the city and feel awe. 
 
Figure 16: Andrássy Avenue in 1896 (Klösz, 1896a) 
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Figure 17: Construction of the Millennium Railway on Andrássy Avenue (Klösz, 
1896b) 
New streets were erected in the Pest part of Budapest on a large scale following 
the pattern of Paris’ boulevards – Andrássy Avenue and the Grand Boulevard became 
the site of grand public buildings, commercial offices, fine shops and national ceremony 
(as can be seen in Figure 18 at the funeral of Lajos Kossuth in 1896). They provided a 
context for the representation of idealised Hungarian culture with institutions such as 
the Opera House, the Palace of Art, the Museum of Applied Arts and Royal National 
Hungarian Academy of Music and their grand facades behind which the folk art and 
music of Hungary was repackaged and reproduced for a sophisticated urban audience. 
As Budapest grew, its architecture borrowed from various European sources. 
The revival of Classical forms vied with those of the Gothic here as in London, though 
often under different labels. It took until the end of the century for a mature attempt at 
a Hungarian style, one which was distinctive and produced an architectural vocabulary 
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for Hungarian nationalism. Ödön Lechner both theorised and practised this new 
architecture and it was in such buildings as the Museum of Applied Arts that it can still 
be seen. Hungarian architects of this period were also increasingly influenced by the 
maturation of Hungarian ethnography, particularly the ethnographic studies of folkloric 
traditions and practices from the Kalotaszeg region. Much was made of the textile 
traditions of Kalotaszeg, with its intricate embroidery and this visual culture informed 
later architectural developments. (Moravánszky, 1998, p. 258) 
Táncsics in calling for Budapest to become the ‘homeland's altar’ was not 
calling for a reproduction of traditional urban forms; neither did he want a city driven 
by luxury. Instead he wanted to inject the city with meaning. It is the city as the altar 
for a modern spirituality resisting the nihilism of both capitalism and historicism.16 This 
recovery and repurposing of traditional religious imagery for modern ends cuts against 
the rationalising spirit of the modernisation seen in other cities like, for example, Paris. 
Táncsics abandoned a hierarchy of luxury for ranking cities and created instead a moral 
hierarchy. This moral preference is also seen in the choice of neo-Gothic architecture 
for the Hungarian Parliament over the Classicism of the Austrian Parliament in Vienna: 
the injection of moral purpose into modern urban forms. Nevertheless, it is far from a 
resistance to urbanisation – it is not a programme of anti-urbanism but the affordance 
of an urban spirituality infused with national myth. 
                                                 
 
16 ‘The antiquarian sense of a man, a city or a nation has always a very limited field. 
Many things are not noticed at all; the others are seen in isolation, as through a microscope. 
There is no measure: equal importance is given to everything, and therefore too much to 
anything. For the things of the past are never viewed in their true perspective or receive their 
just value; but value and perspective change with the individual or the nation that is looking 
back on its past.’ (Nietzsche, 2010, p. 19)  
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Affordances 
Nationalism in Budapest manifested itself in many different forms and indeed 
the modern city itself became a part of the mechanics for the practice of nationalism in 
the late nineteenth century. Three examples are shown here, all three from the 1890s: 
the funeral of Lajos Kossuth with its procession passing down the Grand Boulevard; 
the Millennium Celebrations of 1896 with an exhibition at the City Park, and supporting 
infrastructure such as the Millennium Railway under Andrássy Avenue; and the 
initiation and progress of a cutting-edge, broadcast technology called Telefon Hirmondó 
which brought a news service and programme of cultural events in the Hungarian 
language to the elite of Budapest. 
The funeral of the revolutionary leader, Lajos Kossuth, who had been exiled for 
many years in Turin, took place in Budapest on 2 April 1894 (Barenscott, 2010b, p. 48). 
His death in Turin had caused conflict between the Habsburgs on the one hand and the 
Hungarian government, students, nationalists and newspapers on the other. A royal ban 
on the public funding of the funeral was put in place and the return of the body, carefully 
avoiding Austrian lands, and the funeral itself was to be funded by private subscription 
(2010b, pp. 35–36). In fact, Budapest city authorities found a way to contribute 
financially to the funeral in defiance of the ban and Habsburg objections fuelled popular 
participation. Up to 500,000 people attended (2010b, n. 39) and many peasants were 
drawn from the countryside to see the funeral. 
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Figure 18: The funeral procession of nationalist hero Lajos Kossuth on the Erzsébet 
Boulevard (Klösz, 1894) 
The procession of the body occurred over a few days. First it arrived from Italy 
and was formally handed over by the mayor of Turin to the mayor of Budapest. It was 
then transferred to the National Museum, site of the 1848 revolutionary parliament, 
where the body lay in state. On the day of the funeral, the body processed along the 
boulevards on which buildings were draped in black. The massive crowds, many of 
which had arrived in Budapest by train, congregated at the sides of the route. Many had 
no accommodation in the city and had lingered for days beforehand to pay their respects. 
Barenscott notes the intersection of a notion of pilgrimage, cited by newspapers at the 
time, with that of mass tourism, a secularisation of a religious act as mass spectacle 
(2010b, p. 58). The photograph (Figure 18) shows the Erzsébet Boulevard, the road, the 
buildings and the people coming together in an act of memorialising a national hero; 
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the possibilities of the city's processional geography are fully realised in the practice of 
nationalism. 
 
‘The truly royal words of the Monarch at the opening of the Millennium 
Exhibition will resound with powerful, magical chimes in the soul of the Nation 
and cause the mountains to vibrate with proud joy, but also ring out across the 
world to convey the message that the representatives of empires and states will 
not be invited to an empty, grandiose spectacle which will only satisfy national 
vanity, but to celebrate an earnest historical moment in the evolving destiny of 
a nation that has worked its way up to the height of civilised society, thereby 
becoming a significant one, cultivating the products of civilisation and 
becoming an emerging European power.’ (“Handelsübersicht der Woche,” 1896 
trans. Nathan Charlton) 
 
This florid editorial description in the liberal nationalist Pester Lloyd newspaper 
reporting on the opening of the Hungarian Millennium Exhibition encapsulates a idea 
of national destiny which seeks meaning and expression in the city. The desire to 
proclaim Hungary's progression towards being a worthy European power is, according 
to this, fulfilled through mystical means. The royal words (‘royal’ – königlich – being 
the Hungarian adjective for the Dual Monarch as opposed to the Austrian ‘imperial’ – 
kaiserlich) are metaphorically amplified and cause the mountains which surround the 
Hungarian lands to vibrate. In other words, the location of this ‘earnest historical 
moment’ is at Budapest where the products of civilisation have been cultivated and this 
location transforms the country. Mystical nationalism here has relocated from the land 
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of Hungary with its folk traditions and into a civilised space. It is this new space from 
which the nation can compete with the rest of Europe. 
 
Figure 19: Rolling stock on the Underground Railway with the Millennium Memorial 
in the background, FOTO:FORTEPAN, CC-BY-SA-3.0 (Fortepan, 1954) 
During the 1890s the completion of Budapest’s modernisation included the 
construction of an underground railway, the second underground system to be built in 
the world after London. The first line ran underneath Andrássy Avenue and was built in 
time to take patrons from the centre of the city out to the site of the Millennium 
Celebrations. The link between a constructed Hungarian past, which legitimated 
Hungarian power through a connection of the modern polity with the occupation of the 
Hungarian Plain in the ninth century, and the modernity of the ‘Millennium 
Underground Railway’ sought to reinforce a message about the progress of the 
Hungarian nation and provided a popular and accessible entry point to a new national 
experience (Barenscott, 2010a, p. 571). 
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By the 1890s Budapest was maturing as a modern, technologically-advanced 
city. Of note was a unique system, a telephone-newspaper, Telefon Hirmondó, which 
piped news and culture in Hungarian into bourgeois homes across the city. Subscribers 
had equipment installed in their homes and a loudspeaker system would broadcast to a 
preordained schedule. A precursor of radio, this system linked the elite of Budapest with 
a common system of news and piped in a decidedly Magyar culture. Live broadcasts 
(Telefon Hirmondó was always live as suitable recording equipment was yet to be made 
practical for use on such a system) came from various cultural establishments. The first 
musical broadcast was from Budapest’s Opera House with Ferenc Erkel’s ‘Hunyadi 
László’, the first significant Hungarian opera and depicting a national myth of the 
defence of Hungary against the Turks (Kukan, 1983, p. 50). Telefon Hirmondó was 
available to a wider public via outlets at public places and at hotels and at its height had 
a subscriber base of 10,000 (1983, p. 52), with many more listeners. As with the 
Underground Railway, modern progress was reinforced with Hungarian national 
identity and myth. In this way the electrical systems of the city were gilded with 
nationhood. 
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Figure 20: Telefon Hirmondó subscriber set (Telefónia Múzeum, Budapest / Nathan 
Charlton) 
 
Figure 21: Telefon Hirmondó advert (Telefónia Múzeum, Budapest / Nathan Charlton) 
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The shift towards a Hungarian Budapest was followed during the twentieth 
century with a decisive shift by Pozsony – Hungary’s old capital – towards being a 
Slovakian Bratislava. Undoubtedly such later shifts in urban-national allegiances were 
a consequence of the ruptures of war. The ordering of ethnicity in European cities 
became more extreme and violent as the twentieth century wore on. However, what can 
be seen in the development of Budapest is how these shifts were a part of a longer trend 
of urban modernity. As cities, such as Budapest, modernised they also attempted to clear 
messiness – old, ‘unhealthy’ districts were demolished and new, gleaming boulevards 
were laid out. As well as the physical refinement of the modern city there was the desire 
for social refinement and there was an extent to which the delineation of ethnicity and 
the identification of a city with a particular nation above all others fulfilled this desire. 
Industrialisation, the rise of the market economy, the growing pressure on the 
European land empires to accommodate ethnic and national groups – all have been 
viewed through a state-territorial frame. Yet it is the city that provides mechanisms by 
which a mass market economy of individuals is created and these modern citizens can 
be organised with modern identities. The factory, mass transit, the apartment block, the 
cafe, the boulevard all provide the means by which the vestiges of European feudal 
society can be disassembled and reassembled as modern European secular society; old 
rites can come new ideologies. Ideologies such as nationalism have the potential to 
provide cohesion to a disenchanted urban population. Its mythology is rooted in the 
land; its reality is thoroughly urban. 
The close association of large city and nation was not consolidated across the 
continent until the nineteenth century. In the case of Budapest this association came at 
the same time as its formation as one city. Its development into a national city provides 
an understanding of the course of similar developments across Europe. During the 
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eighteenth century, a few European cities closely associated with nation might be 
identified. Paris was central both to the cogency of the old Kingdom of France and 
central to the realities and mythologies of the French Revolution. Moscow and St 
Petersburg both served different purposes in the Tsarist project, the former the heart of 
Holy Russia, the latter the westward facing portal for a modernised Russia. London and 
Lisbon for the English and Portuguese were ports at the heart of their respective national 
stories of overseas imperial glory. Despite this, other great cities were less national as 
such and played ambiguous role in relation to notions of nation. Vienna and Madrid 
were, foremost, royal seats. In Prague, the German population dominated and its role 
in a Czech national identity contended with its old associations having with been a seat 
of the Holy Roman Emperor. Rome’s identity was rooted in the Church and further 
back in antiquity, its Italian identity one of many competing for the allegiance of its 
citizens. 
Nationalism’s myths are dependent upon modern technologies and techniques 
which thrive in the city. From the systematic collection of folk artefacts and texts 
through archaeology, ethnography and ethnomusicology to the interpretation, 
repackaging and dissemination of folk knowledge as national myth through 
technologies such as the Telefon Hirmondó, as well as more mainstream media such as 
newspapers and through cultural institutions such as museums and concert halls, all of 
these products are complementary to the city and require the city to provide their mass 
audience. The construction of large-scale public works in the fabric of urban centres 
provides not only a focal point for ceremonial activity but also provides an aesthetic 
scale which inspires awe and the city goes beyond the individual human scale even as 
it shatters old social bonds and leaves individuals in a disorienting context. That awe 
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provides a sense of something greater than the self, the expression of the technologies 
of power bringing the individual citizen to submission. 
The urban forms which afforded the Kossuth funeral, the 1896 Millennium 
Celebrations and Telefon Hirmondó emerged through the modernisation and unification 
of Budapest and show a strong relationship with a project of nationalisation and with 
nationalist aspirations. Regarding whole forms, the city's first unification in 1848-49 
and second in 1873 were both given impetus by a wider Hungarian national project. In 
turn, the city's role as capital of Hungary opened up possibilities for Magyarisation 
concentrated in a new Hungarian urban space. Urban institutions in Budapest were 
developed which promoted a national culture, institutional rhythms such as that of the 
Academy producing cultural activity and practice as well as signalling themselves as 
permanent Hungarian presences. These forms worked in tandem with more generic 
modern urban forms developing in other cities at this time like the hierarchical ordering 
of cultural institutions and the connection to a rail network, affording association with 
the national hinterland. The nationalisation and national symbolism of Budapest was 
afforded by a synthesis of all these urban forms. 
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5. Vienna 
Vienna, like Budapest, was modernised in the same fashion as other European 
cities in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the aesthetics and function of city 
centres transformed by the cutting through of boulevards, public squares and the 
construction of grand buildings. The population of Vienna during the same period also 
grew significantly but nationalist influence on urban politics strengthened later than in 
Budapest and was complicated by the city being the capital of a multi-ethnic empire. 
Nevertheless, the modernised Viennese metropolis was a place in which spaces were 
set free of their traditional meanings and created forms in which new ideological and 
cultural practices, including nationalism, could be afforded. Whereas Budapest's 
modernisation was quite explicitly part of a programme in which the Hungarian nation 
was to be elevated, Vienna was most strongly identified with an imperial project. It 
provides a contrasting case for an investigation of its affordance of ideological projects. 
The city, which historically developed as a settlement for military and 
commercial reasons, is strategically located next to a long, navigable river, the Danube 
and in a break in mountain ranges which allows for easy transit between northern and 
southern Europe. From this strategic origin, the accretion of development meant that 
the city gained significant scale and became a centre of imperial and state systems not 
necessarily because of its physical location but because it was a city with its own 
autonomous identity and purpose. The imperial seat might have been better located 
elsewhere yet it was Vienna which became the Residenzstadt of the Holy Roman 
Emperor because of a pre-existing identity. Vienna already had its own gravity, the pull 
of architecture and thriving socio-economic activity. 
In the case of Budapest, it was the material existence of the three cities of which 
it is constituted which had continuity beyond that of its medieval socio-economic 
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activity. When the Ottomans took possession of the cities, their inhabitants and their 
economic orientation were replaced, only for the place to be reclaimed by the 
Habsburgs over a century later invoking its previous existence tied to Christian Europe 
in order to justify its conquest. What was sustained there, no matter who lived there, 
who ruled it and to where it was connected, was architecture and street plan – the cities 
of Buda, Óbuda and Pest maintained something of an autonomous identity. A narrative 
of continuity here was enough to sustain it in the absence of administrative continuity. 
Though Vienna did not have such a dramatic break, from the medieval period onwards 
it is as well to note the importance of a narrative of continuity in which the city was on 
the front line of the defence of Christendom against the Ottomans as much as the 
continuous presence of an imperial administration. Vienna has been able to draw upon 
a narrative of institutional as well as physical continuity and this additional long 
duration of continuous city life presents a contrasting case for the examination of the 
formal setting and affordance of ideological projects. 
In this chapter several urban forms will be examined that afforded Vienna's 
transformation from a conservative and traditional walled city to a modern and 
rationally ordered one. Its definition as an urban whole was facilitated until the mid-
nineteenth century by its substantial and highly symbolic city walls. It was the 
demolition of these walls and their replacement with a ring road, the Ringstrasse, which 
redefined the Viennese urban whole as a large, integrated metropolis rather than a 
traditional aristocratic core city with attached minor suburbs. This modern metropolis 
further afforded different ideologically informed plans and interpretations of the 
Viennese urban whole in the twentieth century. Red Vienna, the conception of the city 
as a social democratic ideal, is presented as one example alongside a competing 
conservative notion of Vienna being the swollen head on the newly reduced Austrian 
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republic, draining its resources. Additionally, the regulation of water provides an 
illustration of the ordering of rhythmic urban forms. Architectural hierarchies displayed 
on the Ringstrasse and the cultural network of coffeehouses are also examined. The 
affordance of a narrative of Viennese modernity is critiqued along with its use an 
allegory for the dangers of the abandonment of liberal values. The modern Viennese 
urban whole created a city which could be the subject of modern mass political 
programmes. Its cultural networks and its status as a diverse cosmopolitan city, or an 
imperial city, set it off against provincial nationalisms of the Empire at least until the 
Christian Socials won power in Viennese local government, then acted as a foil to the 
Austrian republic's largely rural conservative politics and during the 1930s saw the 
city's cosmopolitanism overtaken by the fascist, nationalist politics of its hinterland. 
150 
 
 
Historical Context 
In the Habsburg lands during the nineteenth century, rapid urbanisation occurred 
largely in areas with large non-German ethnicity, though the cities themselves often 
contained large German-speaking populations. Of cities with a population over 75,000 
by the end of the century, only Vienna (1.5 million) and Graz (130,000) were in regions 
in which German ethnicity predominated (de Vries, 1984). Whilst cities such as 
Budapest, Prague, Trieste and Lemberg were centres of Hungarian, Czech, Italian, 
Ukrainian and Polish cultural and national aspiration, urban centres in the Austrian 
German-speaking Crown Lands had a more indirect ethnic and national identity. In 
areas where other ethnic identities were strong, German linguistic and cultural 
influences could be more directly associated with Austrian imperialism, whereas in 
Vienna German identity could be set in the context of rising German power outside of 
Habsburg lands, particularly Prussia and its capital Berlin. Added to this was that 
Vienna, as imperial capital, was an administrative and economic centre for the entire 
empire and as such had the potential to present a more cosmopolitan identity, 
distinguishing it from the other Habsburg cities with more local, nationalist and ethnic 
identities. Why this identity had historical depth in addition to the socio-political 
background outlined here bears elaboration. 
Vienna sits in a river basin, the Danube flowing through between the eastern 
end of the Alps and western end of the Carpathians. It provides a route from northern 
Europe to southern Europe which avoids mountainous terrain: archaeological finds 
provide evidence that the Amber Route from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean passed 
through the area from at least the early Iron Age (de Navarro, 1925). Due to its physical 
location, the Vienna area has long been at the crossroads of culture and long distance 
trade and as such has been in frequent contact with multiple cultures. Like many large 
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cities in Europe especially in western Europe Vienna has a claim to Roman origins, it 
being the site of Roman ‘Vindobona’. This name (which is unlikely to be related to the 
modern name for the city on the same site) apparently has Celtic etymology and 
suggests that the place was named and used by Celtic-speaking Iron Age people prior 
to Roman use. (Csendes, 2001, p. 57) Etymology aside, the city can claim continuity of 
urban form and settlement from the vestiges of the Roman town layout at Vienna's 
centre. 
However, the relationship of the Roman town to its geopolitical and economic 
context was quite different to that of the city which emerged later. Vindobona sat on the 
frontier of the Roman Empire and the reason for its existence was primarily defensive 
(Scherrer & Sedlmayer, 2007). The settlement appears to have been had a military 
foundation. Later, as Roman imperial power waned, various smaller political entities – 
Germanic, Avar, Magyar and Slavic – at various points contested and settled in the area 
(Beller, 2006, pp. 10–15). The establishment of the place with the identity Wien/Vienna 
came later in the Middle Ages as the Holy Roman Empire is established. This later 
incarnation also had a defensive purpose but one which had an outward-looking 
function as imperial and colonising actors looked not only to defend borders but expand 
beyond them. 
At the margins of the Holy Roman Empire, margravates were established and 
given extensive powers to administer border areas and defend against external threats. 
It was in one of these border areas, ‘terra Orientalis’ – the Bavarian Eastern march held 
by the Babenberg family – where territory was expanded and extended along the 
Danube and as it did so a series of centres of power, each more easterly, was established 
(Strohbach-Hanko, n.d., p. 11). The easternmost and last of these was at Vienna and it 
appears that this effectively marked the reestablishment of urban life there. By this time 
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the settlement’s function was more mercantile than in Roman times, it being close to 
the lands downstream in the Pannonian Plain (now occupied by the modern countries 
of Hungary, with parts of Romania and Slovakia) which were being settled and farmed 
more intensively. Vienna was at the gateway between this productive region to its east 
and south, and to the markets of Germany and beyond to its west and north. In 1221 
Vienna was granted rights as a staple port, ‘Stapelrecht’, which required merchants 
passing by the city to have to stop and offer their products for sale to local citizens for 
three days (Czeike, 2004, p. 316). Vienna, sitting between two long and inhospitable 
mountain ranges, was in a good position for medieval trade. 
This development can be seen in the wider context of the increase in 
urbanisation in central and eastern Europe during this period, the ‘Ostsiedlung’ (eastern 
settlement), characterised by the foundation and chartering of cities with ‘Stadtrecht’ 
(German town law) (Rady, 2012, p. 178). This was a movement of colonisation carrying 
German culture – in part a move from the land to the city by local populations and in 
part a migration of German speakers into previously Slavic and Magyar speaking lands. 
Vienna anchored settlement further to the east in Hungary and Transylvania and 
provided communication with the imperial heartland. Yet despite this elevation of 
economic status during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Vienna still had a lesser 
economic and ecclesiastical role than other comparable cities in the region than in later 
times. It was outshone by Prague (Scales, 2011, p. 81), which became a major imperial 
centre when Charles IV was elected Holy Roman Emperor, and it was subservient to 
Passau which was the seat of the bishop; Vienna only gained its own cathedral and 
bishopric in the late fifteenth century (Herbermann, Pace, Pallen, Shahan, & Wynne, 
1912, p. 417). In the medieval period, other than its economic status, its power came 
from it being the headquarters of the Duchy of Austria and it did not feature as a major 
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imperial or ecclesiastic actor until the election of the Duke as Emperor in 1452. It was 
in the sixteenth century that Vienna became firmly established as the Emperor’s 
permanent residence (Csendes & Opll, 2001, p. 517). 
The shift in imperial power to Vienna had a direct impact on the administrative 
status of the city for the next three centuries. In 1522 it had its civic autonomy largely 
removed (Perger, 2001, pp. 241–242). This was precipitated by actions of the town 
authorities who opposed the Archduke, Ferdinand I, and took the opportunity of his 
extended absence to take full control of the city. On his return from being reconfirmed 
as ruler of Austria, he dealt with rebellious Viennese burghers by executing them and 
abolishing the town council. From then on the city was under the direct control of the 
Archduke-Emperor. Although a degree of autonomy returned in 1783 when a limited 
form of government for the city centre was instituted (Pauser, 2003, p. 80), the imperial 
dominance of city affairs can still be detected in the order initiating the building of the 
Ringstrasse in 1857 when the Emperor Franz Joseph permitted the demolition of the 
city walls and subsequent development by using the formula, ‘Es ist mein Wille’, the 
command coming directly from him (“Amtlicher Theil, Wiener Zeitung,” 1857) rather 
than from the newly re-established town council. It was this direct relationship between 
city and imperial power that detached the Viennese citizenry from significant control 
over the city’s affairs and contributed to an identity that was somewhat tangential to 
that of the state. Other major cities in the Holy Roman Empire gained the status of 
‘Freie Reichsstadt’, free imperial city, and maintained autonomy and answered not to a 
local aristocrat but directly to the Emperor (Benecke, 2007, pp. 391–393). These cities 
represented themselves, in the period before the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, 
at the Aulic Council in Vienna. However, Vienna itself never attained this status; instead 
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it became defined by an imperial presence as the Emperor’s Residenzstadt rather than 
having an autonomous status. 
Closely related to this imperial identity was the emergence of Vienna’s symbolic 
ecclesiastical role as a centre of the Counter-Reformation and the last bastion of 
Christendom protecting Europe from Ottoman incursion and Islam. For the first, it was 
out of the threat of Protestant schism that Ferdinand I had taken direct control of the 
city in the first place. Subsequently over the next two centuries as the wars of religion 
were fought across Europe, the Habsburgs became the staunchest of Catholic defenders 
and to that end not only battled for territorial dominance in Europe and beyond but also 
for cultural dominance through the encouragement of religious orders and art which 
strengthened Catholic influence in Europe. Vienna was besieged twice during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both times the Ottomans failed to breach the city 
walls. The sieges of Vienna were the high watermark of Ottoman imperialism in Europe 
and in its retreat the vacuum was occupied by Habsburg power, especially in Hungary. 
Vienna and its walls, which had been reinforced after the first siege and surrounded by 
cleared land, the glacis, became symbolic of the defence of Catholic Christianity, and 
Christendom more broadly defined. This symbolism retained power such that it featured 
again in the nineteenth century when the walls came to be demolished. 
The final Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683 and the defeat of Ottoman forces 
precipitated a renewal of buildings in the city, with aristocrats moving into the medieval 
core and building their palaces there. Unlike Britain and France where the trend was for 
aristocrats to live primarily at their country estates only coming to London or Paris for 
specific seasons, Austrian nobility used Vienna for their primary residences close to the 
imperial court. A pattern of development emerged in which the centre of the city became 
an upper class enclave and the lower classes, separated by the walls and the glacis, lived 
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in the expanding Viennese suburbs (Olsen, 1986, p. 65). The wall and the glacis became 
a socioeconomic and a very visible class barrier. This was a model which obtained as 
the city developed and expanded for a considerable time.  
In the late eighteenth century, the city’s development was shaped by the policies 
of Joseph II which sought to bring enlightened order to the imperial state. In its 
relationship to Empire, Vienna augmented its status when the royal crown of Hungary 
was moved to it from the Hungarian capital, at that time Pressburg (Kann, 1980, p. 203). 
This was indicative of policies which sought to rationalise the imperial territories from 
a series of interconnected realms to a unified state. Along with policies to promote 
German as the Empire-wide language of administration (Judson, 2016, p. 79) (replacing 
Latin in the Hungarian lands), this had the consequence of a reaction which could be 
seen as local patriotisms opposed to Austrian-German hegemony, a precursor perhaps 
of the full-blown nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On Viennese 
territory, enlightened ‘Josephinism’ during the reign of Joseph II, was expressed in 
developments such as the conversion of the glacis to a public park, in common with 
other European city public spaces created as part of an enlightened public order.  
The enlightened absolutism of Josephinism subsided at the turn of the century 
in response to the revolutionary wars with France and, after 1815, the Congress of 
Vienna, which reordered Europe along more reactionary lines. Austria, under Klemens 
von Metternich, became a conservative state opposed to liberal reform and nationalist 
sentiment (Beller, 2006, pp. 115–117). In this context the city played host to Europe’s 
diplomats and its symbolism as a bulwark against external and revolutionary threats 
was reinforced. This pivot away from liberalism is important in providing context for 
Vienna’s accelerated expansion in the latter half of the century: whereas comparable 
cities, in terms of size and political importance, like Paris and London, were 
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increasingly influenced by liberal politics, Vienna was seen as holding on to a 
traditional idea of the organisation of society and hence its reordering in that later era 
was all the more radical. It was in 1848 that was the beginning of the end for 
conservative Vienna. It was in 1848 that a series of city-focused revolutions took place 
in states across Europe, the so-called ‘The Springtime of Peoples’ (Hobsbawm, 1997, 
p. 21) and this was to have a profound effect on the constitution and politics of the 
Habsburg lands for decades to come even though the immediate aftermath seemed to 
be a victory for reactionary forces. Over the course of the 1850s and 1860s liberal 
politics established itself across the Austrian Empire. For Vienna this meant the creation 
of a city government in 1850 which included the suburbs as well as the core city and 
brought about direct elections (“Kundmachung der f.f. Statthalterei und Kreisregierung 
von Niederösterreich von 20 März 1850,” 1850).  
This opened up the possibility for a new direction for the city of Vienna, one 
which took it from being defined by its imperial, ecclesiastical and military functions 
at the centre of an empire to being a modern ‘Weltstadt’18 defined by its bourgeois 
culture, business and, as the century progressed, by its mass politics. This modernising 
move commenced later in Vienna than in comparable capitals such as London and Paris 
and it did so in the context of an urban culture which was not heavily identified with a 
strong national identity, in contrast to other cities in the Austrian Empire such as Prague 
and Buda-Pest. Its modernity was suffused with a cosmopolitanism that derived from 
being the heart of power in a multi-ethnic empire; this cosmopolitanism was to be 
                                                 
 
18  A term in frequent use in German-language newspapers in the mid-nineteenth 
century, it encapsulates not only the idea of a global city in terms of size but also of cultural 
depth. Compare two articles from 1856, one in which a feuilleton describes the delights of 
‘dieser schönen Weltstadt’, Paris (“Der erste Abend in Paris,” 1856) and the other which the 
hero of a story of immigration drifts around the Weltstadt, New York (Kürnberger, 1856). 
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increasingly challenged by a mass politics, embodied in the form of the Christian Social 
Party whose antisemitism effectively defined a political identity negatively (Schorske, 
1981, pp. 139–140). 
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Urban Forms 
Containing Vienna. The walls of Vienna were a material and symbolic 
constraint on the expansion and development of the centre of the city. Their replacement 
by the Ringstrasse development, then, marked a critical moment in the city's 
modernisation. As has been noted, the walls had been important militarily in defence 
against the Ottomans in the seventeenth century but subsequently their defensive 
relevance was diminished. However, they maintained an important symbolic meaning. 
They represented imperial and Catholic religious order upheld by Austria as it defended 
Christian Europe against the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Therefore, until the nineteenth 
century, the walls and their glacis remained even as Vienna’s population expanded and 
new construction increasingly took place outside of their perimeter.  
Schorske identifies the Ringstrasse with the liberal accession to power in Vienna 
in the 1850s, a time when the city was shaped by the newly ascendant middle class 
(1981). The institutions of liberal constitutionalism and civil society line the 
development, in particular the Austrian Parliament, Vienna Town Hall and the 
University of Vienna which are situated on the western periphery. A museum quarter, 
an opera house, and large palaces for wealthy families reinforced the representation of 
bourgeois culture. So emblematic of the new order was the Ringstrasse that, as Schorske 
shows, it became the focus of debate over competing urbanist visions later in the century 
as the legacy of the Ringstrassenstil was questioned by architects and planners such as 
Camillo Sitte and Otto Wagner.  
This liberal bourgeois order in Vienna was distinct from that in other Habsburg 
cities, however, because its identity was more closely aligned with an imperial vision 
than it was with a national one. In Budapest, not long later, equivalent controlling 
interests were more closely identified with national identity and to some extent 
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associated with the desire for Hungarian autonomy. The urban morphology which 
emerged after the Ausgleich in 1867 in Budapest was quite explicitly at the service of 
Hungarian identity. Vienna, on the other hand, was similarly modernised through the 
construction of grand boulevards and the technical integration of the city but this was, 
at least at first, conducted in the context of the augmentation of the imperial centre 
rather than as a symbol of Germanic pride or national aspiration. As liberalism became 
ascendant the Ringstrasse development was not only associated with bourgeois high 
culture generally but with Jewish secular success in particular; again, making Vienna’s 
relationship to German identity complex (Schorske, 1981, p. 7). Even as liberal politics 
receded and mass political parties emerged, the Viennese political scene became defined 
more in the negative – antisemitic, anti-Slav, anti-Hungarian – than with a positive 
German programme. 
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Hydraulic rhythms. The city’s relationship with water was changed during the 
modernisation and technical integration of Vienna. The city’s proximity to a major 
European waterway navigable to the Black Sea contributed to its position as a trading 
power. Its relationship to the Danube, though, has been ambiguous: the city as it 
developed from medieval times to the modern era maintained a separation from the 
river, its walls keeping out not only invaders from further downstream but also direct 
access to the water itself. Unlike major river cities such as Budapest, Prague, Berlin, 
Paris and London, the layout of Vienna was relatively unintegrated with its river up 
until the eighteenth century. In medieval times the main branch of the river had sat next 
to the city itself but gradually it drifted away until it was at a significant distance and 
the link with the city was via a side channel (Hohensinner et al., 2013). In fact, a series 
of channels ran across a flood plain close to city. So, although the river was the city’s 
principal line of communication it was also a somewhat unruly threat which was kept 
at a distance from the city streets. A tributary of the Danube, the Wienfluss, also passes 
close to the city centre and, in the past, this was also a source of flooding and so it was 
not integrated into the layout of the city. Over the centuries several efforts were made 
to arbitrate the city’s need for access to water and the threat posed by it. It was only in 
the late nineteenth century, however, that a comprehensive solution was enacted which 
integrated the Danube and the Wienfluss (Pollack, 2013, p. 3) and brought fresh spring 
water from the Alps.  
The regulation of water and the development of the Ringstrasse were concurrent 
and there is a sense in which one contextualises the other. The view of the city as a 
system in which fluid dynamics had to be controlled is seen literally in the case of water 
regulation and figuratively in the case of the clearance of walls in favour of a street 
which controlled the flow into and around the city. Eduard Suess, the author in 1863 of 
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the report which brought a fresh water supply to the city (Seidl, 2015, p. 219), was an 
eminent geologist and theorist in whose work the concept of the biosphere originates. 
It is indicative of the scientific and technological approach to developing the city that 
scientists with such a systemic world view were so closely involved. (The mayor of 
Vienna during much of the redevelopment was Cajetan von Felder, an entomologist. 
(Santifaller & Obermeyer-Marnach, 1957, pp. 294–295)) This strong technocratic 
element is found in other urban developments of the time too. In the case of Vienna, the 
absence of a strong ideological driver – nationalist or imperial, for example – brings 
this technocratic motivation into relief.  
Architectural hierarchies. As Vienna entered the modern industrial era, several 
factors contributed to how Viennese urban forms related to the ethnic and social politics 
of Empire. The city was less closely associated with an adjacent national hinterland 
than other Habsburg cities such as Prague and Budapest and was therefore, perhaps, 
more heterogeneous in its outlook. Vienna's administrative role at the centre of the 
Empire, gave more exposure to cosmopolitan ideas. Its physical transformation in the 
nineteenth century occured during by the relatively late rise of a liberal bourgeoisie and 
its transformation signalled the decline of traditional authority. 
Vienna’s varied sources of culture are reflected in the architecture of the 
Ringstrasse’s civic buildings. The mix of idealised historical architectural styles which 
are on display along the street are arranged as a showcase in a capital city which wants 
to be at ease with past forms. The Parliament building is modelled on Classical Greek 
architecture with the rationale that this style would reflect the democratic values of 
Classical Athens. The City Hall imitates the Gothic style of medieval Flemish 
equivalents, for example that of Brussels, which signals a commitment to the autonomy 
seen in northern European cities. The Renaissance elements of the University’s main 
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building echo the flowering of Humanism in Italy (Bergdoll, 2000, p. 257). This mixture 
of styles is synthesised by a high bourgeois culture which is confident in citing historical 
influences as part of a controlled, rational plan. The combination of styles in an urban 
environment is inevitable over time but what is peculiar in the case of the Ringstrasse 
is that these buildings were constructed almost simultaneously and without much 
evidence of high contention over the most appropriate form for each building. Contrast 
this with contemporaneous debate in other parts of Europe, London being exemplary20. 
Later Austrian architects were to rebel against this mishmash of ideas and influences 
and develop more austere buildings in Vienna which eschewed the perceived frivolity 
of Historicism. In the light of more parochial attitudes in other parts of Europe, however, 
the first wave of Ringstrasse buildings as a collection are able to use catholicism of taste 
to signal a more cosmopolitan culture which pre-figures that later austerity leading into 
Modernism. The Ringstrasse’s curve affords this kind of eclectic display where each 
building moves into view like an exhibit as the traveller progresses along the road. 
A cosmopolitan Vienna which could be compared with other great cultural 
centres of the world was one which had emerged out of stages of development that were 
unusual for a significant modern city – Olsen, writing about the city at the start of the 
Gründerzeit in 1857 summarises that development thus: ‘From a baroque Residenzstadt 
                                                 
 
20 The so-called ‘Battle of the Styles’ in London was fought over whether Classical or 
Gothic forms would be used for the new Foreign Office building between Whitehall and St 
James’s Park (Bergdoll, 2000, p. 201). Advocates for the Gothic style insisted it reflected an 
English, Christian, national style, contrasting it with pagan classicism; for their part the 
supporters of Classical architecture derided the Gothic as mired in medieval superstition and 
unsuitable for a modern liberal age (Remarks on a national style in reference to the proposed 
Foreign Office, 1860). George Gilbert Scott, who won the Foreign Office commission on the 
basis of a Gothic proposal, was forced to change the final design to the more Classically-
proportioned Italianate style (Bremner, 2005). That architectural styles were so readily pressed 
into service for conflict over the nature of English, British national and British imperial 
identities throws the Historicism of the Ringstrasse into relief. 
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awkwardly fitting into the physical structure of a medieval Bürgerstadt, Vienna was 
about to transform itself into a metropolitan Weltstadt.’ (1986, p. 58) It is in the contrast 
with cities which had overseas empires but relatively homogeneous ethnic homelands, 
such as London and Paris, with Vienna and its association with a multi-ethnic land 
empire that a distinctive kind of cosmopolitanism is afforded. Internal migration within 
the Habsburg lands made Vienna one of the most ethnically diverse cities in Europe and 
it was in this context that a particularly vibrant culture was able to develop. Incoming 
non-German populations, particularly Jewish immigrants whose ability to return to their 
previous homes elsewhere in the Empire was limited by prejudice, had an interest in 
maintaining a pluralism that was amenable to a cosmopolitan ethic (Beller, 2006, p. 
155). This cosmopolitan ethic was to be increasingly challenged by populist politics 
from the 1880s onwards (Beller, 2006, p. 156) and these two aspects of Viennese society 
and culture – cosmopolitanism and ethnic nationalism – defined its intellectual class 
and its fate. Added to this was Austria’s exclusion from the unification of Germany, 
meaning that Germans-speakers in the Habsburg lands occupied an oddly marginal 
position in German Europe even if the most dominant language was German. Vienna 
went from being the prime centre of German national culture to the periphery as 
Germany was united under Prussian hegemony and Berlin emerged to take Vienna’s 
place. This left space for a more cosmopolitan Viennese culture to emerge. 
There was a sense in which Vienna from the onset of the Gründerzeit was 
playing cultural catch-up: as middle class liberalism came late to Vienna, having been 
stifled by the failure of the 1848 revolution, so it sought to accelerate what it deemed 
appropriate bourgeois culture for a major European capital. Central Vienna had been 
dominated by the aristocracy in a way not seen in comparable cities and the carving out 
of a space both literally, with the Ringstrasse, and metaphorically for the middle class 
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provided an opportunity for rapid cultural expansion. An increase in status for the liberal 
arts and sciences, so admired by the nineteenth century liberal middle class, was 
reflected in its cultural and academic output. 
That Vienna came to define a deep fissure in Austrian politics and culture after 
1918 is indicative of the unusual role it had found itself taking as a city and an urban 
polity. In a region in which the nationalised city was so dominant a concept, with 
Budapest and Prague as newly promoted capitals, Vienna stands out as the imperial 
exception, not fulfilling the role of German national centre to the surrounding territories 
dominated by German speakers. Even on the wider imperial stage, compared to London, 
Paris or Berlin, Vienna had a relative deficit of national identification due to its position 
within a former multi-ethnic empire. When it became co-opted to nationalism was 
through force: in 1934 the Social Democratic Party was supressed by the government 
(Beller, 2006, p. 223) and a one-party state instituted across Austria with the Nazis 
invading in 1938 (2006, p. 231). The return to democracy after the Second World War 
saw a political settlement which carved up government between the Christian Socials 
and the Social Democrats effectively institutionalising the separation of the distinct 
political culture of Vienna and the rest of Austria (2006, p. 255). 
The situation of this new middle class order in place of the city walls and glacis 
is significant. The walls had acted as a boundary for the aristocratic centre of the city 
with the suburbs and its lower classes physically separated. Further, the walls 
themselves were symbolic of a defence of the old order. The replacements of these 
symbols effectively reinforced the calls for reform that had emanated during the 1848 
revolution even as the Habsburgs reasserted their power. This bourgeois relationship to 
traditional expressions of power can be seen played out in the architecture and layout 
of the Ringstrasse. As noted above, architectural forms from different historical periods 
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were used but underpinned by modern technologies, seen in the historicism of the 
‘Ringstrassenstil’. Gothic and Classical could sit side-by-side, both contained in a 
modern setting, made safe and purely symbolic. Thus, the competing interests of state 
and city could be represented by a Classical Parliament building, a Gothic Town Hall 
and Renaissance and Baroque influences on the main University building, brought 
together by the modern infrastructure of the Ringstrasse. This play of architectural 
styles was not necessarily stable: the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest had Gothic as 
its guiding style in contrast to the Classical Austrian Parliament in Vienna which 
preceded it, a particular Hungarian Gothic projecting a particular Hungarian national 
aspiration in contrast with Austrian imperial-liberal universalism embodied in Classical 
form. The diverse buildings on the Ringstrasse were and are in dialogue with each other 
and with buildings beyond and there is no straightforward mapping of style to ideology. 
If there is a unifying theme it is one which Otto Wagner in particular objected to later 
(Schorske, 1981, p. 83) – the expression of multiple and conflicting messages, 
ornamented architecture which is under the imperial aegis. 
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The cultural network of the coffeehouse. The coffeehouse was an institution 
across central Europe and in Vienna it played a critical role in the day-to-day life of 
citizens acting as a place for the transmission and debate of ideas and information. The 
coffeehouse offered services beyond refreshment: a large complement of newspapers, 
expensive to buy and not sold on the street (Twain, 1898, p. 532), was available to 
customers along with the receipt of mail and collection of laundry. The public 
accessibility of the coffeehouse and its freedoms were an important resource for 
intellectual life in Vienna (Johnston, 1983, p. 119). Coffeehouses are also a part of the 
mythmaking about Vienna’s capacity for violent politics, playing host at the same time 
to soon-to-be Soviet revolutionaries and to Hitler – the city not only afforded their 
activity but also the mythmaking about that activity. 
The sheer number of cafes and brasseries in Vienna was extraordinary and they 
were patronized by all sectors of Viennese society in the late nineteenth century. 
Lichtenberger interprets evidence of the declining number of cafes and its correlation 
to the improvement of housing as meaning that this was to do with the poor quality of 
housing and this is compelling as an explanation of the role of the coffeehouse (1970, 
pp. 155–156). Such was its extensive role as an institution that it could be said to a form 
a network which made Viennese citizens more connected in a social space to each other 
and connected to the outside world through the communication of news through the 
cafes. Victor Tissot wrote as a French visitor in ‘Un hiver à Vienne’, published in 1888, 
that, ‘cafe and the brasserie are for the inhabitant of Vienna a second home’ and 
describes a world in which engrained practices are enacted in the café, brasserie and 
wine merchants store that were an essential part of everyday life in the city. (1888, pp. 
283–286) 
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Aside from this more cosmopolitan identity, the mundane functions of the city’s 
technical integration are also representative of a kind of technocratic order which belies 
ethnic particularism. Although this was not unique to Vienna, there are some aspects of 
it which make it more pronounced than elsewhere. The course of Vienna’s development 
in the late nineteenth century produced linkages between inner city and suburbs, the 
regularisation of the medieval core and the creation of exit roads all of which were a 
response to the need to adapt the city to population growth and consequent pressure on 
infrastructure. In the context of the post-1848 Habsburg state, the technical objectives 
of the Ringstrasse project strike a chord of officially-sponsored harmony rather than 
something designed to highlight national prowess. In contrast to Paris, where French 
national technical prowess was on display, or even London, where British 
industriousness could be celebrated in the work of Bazalgette in regularising sewers, 
the Thames and extending the underground railway, the Viennese urban expansion was 
much less conspicuously at the service of promotion of German identity. 
The remodelling precipitated by the Ringstrasse development was bound up 
more in bureaucratic provision for an integrated, interconnected city than it was in 
explicit political concerns. Much as the flow of water was to be controlled and directed 
so too was the city, its people and traffic. Again, this was not unique to Vienna but in 
the absence of stronger national discourse it is thrown into relief here more than in other 
European cities, and especially more than in other Habsburg cities. The old city was a 
feature which could be overcome and given rational order. That this was achieved at 
least initially outside of a recognisable mass-political ideological context marks it out 
in the Habsburg world as different. Gründerzeit Vienna was to be shaped on liberal-
scientific lines, a cosmopolitan city which measured itself against other Weltstädte and 
was above the narrower ethnic concerns of Prague and Budapest. 
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Rhythms of supply and demand. After the 1914-18 war, antipathy towards 
Vienna as it became the capital city of the newly established Austrian republic was 
aggravated by the perception that it was draining scarce rural resources. Austria’s 
sources of food and industrial supplies in Hungary and Bohemia were cut off by the 
disruption of the dissolution of the Empire and so the remaining Austrian provinces to 
which Vienna was attached were for a while its principal source of food. Requisitioning 
by the government was resented, as was the practice of Rucksackverkehr, 
‘backpacking’, in which people travelled from Vienna out into the countryside to buy 
up scarce produce – so widespread that it was explicitly banned (“Der Rucksackverkehr 
Eingestellt.,” 1919; “Gänzlichliches Verbot des Rucksackverkehres.,” 1919). Previous 
trading rhythms between Vienna and the Austrian provinces being disrupted exposed a 
more local fissure between the Viennese and the surrounding Austrian population. 
Without a strong common ‘Austrian’ bond, despite a shared language, Vienna was set 
apart from the German-speaking provinces21. Its former imperial status and weak role 
as a German national symbol made this divide all the more marked. 
 The rhythms of Vienna’s water courses were regulated in a demonstration of 
scientific, technological and technocratic power. This did not preclude the use of such 
technical feats to glorify state or nation; but it also afforded a less parochial 
interpretation, a city modernised and improved for the benefit of a modern citizenry, a 
city fit to lead a multi-ethnic empire. The amputation of non-German dominated 
provinces left Vienna in a German-Austrian state, its modernity turned against it to 
contrast it with the increasingly nationalist hinterland. The image of the swollen head 
                                                 
 
21  See, for example, the electioneering of the Christian-Democrat newspaper 
‘Reichspost’ in which appeals to Viennese voters on the basis that a Red Vienna will mean 
isolation from the States of German-Austria (“Um Sonntag ist Wahltag!,” 1919). 
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on the body of German Austria, and the excessive, greedy Viennese depriving the 
countryside of its food with rucksacks both emphasise this resentment of Vienna’s 
cosmopolitanism and signalled the start of a future of Vienna having primarily national 
rather than imperial concerns. 
Hydrocephalus. During 1918-19 the Empire was dissolved and the Republic of 
Austria emerged effectively as its rump state. The population of Vienna in 1920 was 
over 1.8 million; it was over four times larger than the next six cities in the new Republic 
of Austria combined (Statistische Zentralkommission, 1920). The new state’s 
administration in Vienna was a continuation of the old and therefore disproportionate 
to the much-diminished territory and population. Calls for its reform referred to the 
Viennese bureaucracy as a hydrocephalus (Moser, 1921, p. 2) (see also Blasel, 1918, p. 
6; cited in Healy, 2004, p. 56), the city’s head bloated in comparison to the body of the 
Republic, an apt metaphor not just for the state apparatus but also for the whole city in 
relation to a truncated Austria. 
Rather than being moulded as a German-Austrian nationalised place, modern 
Vienna became a national capital by default. In the Constitution of 1920, Vienna became 
its own Federal State in the new Republic, separated from the rest of the state of Lower 
Austria. The party politics of the new state was effectively separated territorially with 
the Christian Social Party dominating the countryside outside Vienna and the national 
government and the Social Democrats pursuing a programme of socialist 
transformation within the newly created Federal State of Vienna. Having failed to 
secure a grip on power in whole of the new Republic, the socialist retreat into Vienna 
was supposedly tactical; however, it was this partisan separation which was to define 
Austrian politics until the Nazi takeover and Anschluss in 1938. 
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Red Vienna. The Social Democratic administration of Vienna from the early 
1920s precipitated an unprecedented urban social transformation – never before had a 
social democratic party gained power by election in a European city of significant size. 
It had gained an electoral mandate in the city, with 54% of the vote in 1919 (“Die 
Ergebnisse der Gemeinderatswahl am 4 Mai 1919,” 1919) from a newly widened 
franchise which included women for the first time. The separation of the city from the 
Federal State of Lower Austria gave it wide ranging fiscal powers and a high degree of 
independence from the Austrian state (Blau, 1999, p. 33). The administration of the city 
was transformed so that the executive apparatus was highly responsive and accountable 
to political appointees. This enabled a coherent programme of reform to be pursued 
during the 1920s bringing about access to health services, education and housing for all 
Viennese, paid for by progressive taxation. 
The legacy of the Social Democratic administration’s programme is most 
immediately evident today in the form of the ‘Gemeindebauten’, large state-built 
housing blocks whose construction was aimed at bringing down housing costs, 
increasing capacity and introducing forms of social living that would embed socialism 
in Austrian society. The typical Gemeindebau had a large main entrance leading into a 
central, shared courtyard (Blau, 1999, p. 460). The fortress-like, modern construction 
was symbolic of newly-acquired working-class power and the Gemeindebauten were 
targeted as such by assaults of conservative forces in the Austrian Civil War in 1934 
(Blau, 1999, p. 400). 
The contest between ‘wholes’ defined by different interests reflects a contest 
between different worldviews and, potentially, ideologies. In the case of Vienna in the 
nineteenth century, the whole city delimited by the walls and the glacis was one which 
supported a traditional view of the city, its institutions and those of the Habsburg 
 171 
 
 
Empire; the whole city without its walls and with bourgeois institutions encamped on 
the former glacis on the new Ringstrasse supported a modern, liberal ascendancy. The 
removal of the walls afforded a liberal programme and to some extent retarded a 
German-Austrian nationalist programme which could have used Vienna’s symbolism 
as the last bastion of Christianity as an effective bolster to national identity. Instead a 
more cosmopolitan Vienna afforded and was afforded by the Ringstrasse and the 
expanded Viennese whole. It was later with the emergence of mass politics going into 
the twentieth century that this expansive whole was to act as an effective other to a 
German-Austrian identity in the surrounding countryside of the new Austrian republic. 
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Affordances 
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century Vienna provided the backdrop to an 
extraordinary blossoming of intellectual and artistic activity. The development of 
Modernism was concentrated in Vienna with unrivalled intensity, the works of 
Schoenberg and Mahler in music, Klimt and the Vienna Secession and developments in 
Philosophy associated with the Vienna Circle are just some aspects of the energy of 
Viennese intellectual life. Norman Stone declared that, ‘most of the twentieth-century 
intellectual world’ originated in Vienna (1983) and indeed significant parts of the 
foundations of twentieth century thought lie in this period in Vienna, the focus on the 
Self provided by the lens of Freudian psychoanalysis being one. The political and 
cultural environment which fostered such creativity was febrile and the rise of populist 
politics could also be seen as a precursor to later global developments.  
Recognition of Vienna’s role as a centre of modern culture came late. As Beller 
has indicated, until the early 1970s Vienna had not featured, at least in anglophone 
academia, as a noteworthy contender for a central role in the development of modernity; 
Paris, Weimar Berlin and New York were placed in a series of cities which had driven 
forward modernity with Vienna not challenging for position (2001, p. 1). What 
precipitated the rise in academic interest in Vienna’s role in the modern world was the 
work of Schorske starting during the 1960s in which he gave structure to the subject of 
fin-de-siècle Vienna; his essays were collected in the seminal ‘Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: 
Politics and Culture’ (1981). Alongside Johnston’s ‘The Austrian Mind’ (1983) and 
Janik and Toulmin’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Vienna’ (1973), a particularly potent version of 
what Beller refers to as ‘Vienna 1900’ has taken root in anglophone academia. 
Schorske’s contention was that turn of the century Viennese culture was marked by a 
reaction against liberal tenets of reason and progress, a retreat by Vienna’s bourgeois 
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culture into the aesthetic and psychological and a rise in irrationalism in mass politics 
22. It was this thesis which was to shape much subsequent academic interest and debate. 
Vienna as a microcosmic analytical object for the study of modernity was born. The 
arguments over what its role was are well-rehearsed but it is the fact of its emergence 
as a kind of modern parable that is of interest here along with understanding what 
afforded the city’s part in a narrative about modernity. 
The narrative of Vienna’s pivotal role in the construction of the modern world 
is enhanced by stories of migration of intellectuals, largely not by choice but because 
of the suppression of the Jews and of culture deemed un-German by the Nazi regime. 
The effects of these migrations can be most readily seen in the naming of movements 
and schools of thought which have gone on to have global impact: the Austrian School 
in economics; the Vienna Circle in philosophy; the Second Viennese School in music. 
This extension of influence out of Vienna might have found routes other than migration 
had the Nazis not intervened. Vienna and Austria are also not exclusive regarding the 
migration of intellectuals and the naming of schools of thought – the Frankfurt School 
is just one such example. The intellectual migration from the 1930s and 1940s does add 
                                                 
 
22 A slogan that has encapsulated this myth of a Vienna of dangerous ideas is the 
‘proving-ground of world destruction’. It is a phrase which returns 185 results as an exact match 
on Google, the majority of which ascribe it to Karl Kraus talking about Vienna. The earliest 
reference, and likely source, to this translated phrase in English appears to be from Janik and 
Toulmin in 1973. They use it to describe the ‘de-humanizing forces’ which Kraus perceived at 
work in Vienna. Their citation is from Die Fackel in July 1914 and the phrase in German in that 
edition, ‘österreichischen Versuchsstation des Weltuntergangs’ and is used in the context of the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand and how events associated with him are playing out in Austria 
and the world (Kraus, 1914b, p. 2, 1914a, p. 46). This is not to ignore Kraus’s deep loathing for 
much of Vienna’s cultural life but it is telling that this phrase has been mangled and co-opted 
in order to shape a view of Vienna in late twentieth century anglophone academia. 
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a political and moral dimension to the story of Vienna’s modernity and global influence 
that makes it all the more dynamic. 
The phenomenon of fin-de-siècle Vienna as an object of research and analysis 
is one which has a narrative purpose in demonstrating wider lessons – Vienna has acted 
as an allegory for the dangers of populist politics, aestheticism and the abandonment of 
liberal, rational values. The Cold War lessons drawn from this by writers such as 
Schorske riffed on the theme of a degenerate culture which needed to be reinvigorated. 
What made Vienna a candidate for such a role is its position at the physical and political 
interstices of European geography. In the Cold War, Vienna was the city which was 
neither East nor West, its soul seemingly up for grabs by either side. As an imperial 
capital, its role was concluded and the possibility of a state system which was neither 
quite liberal democracy nor dictatorship made it a neat starting point as a historical 
object lesson. Its multi-ethnic pre-war character had the advantage of making it a city 
which had resemblances to the USA which, for Schorske at least, provided an 
underlying analogy between Viennese and American politics in his work. All of these 
reasons were related in some way to Vienna not being a 'national' city but something 
else. 
Vienna was transformed from a backwater trading city into an imperial city with 
a deeply symbolic role in the story of the defence of Christendom and the attempt by 
the Habsburgs to transform itself into a universal monarchy with Austria, and Vienna, 
at its heart. This particular historical context means that Vienna provides a good 
example of a city whose distinctive characteristics are exposed in a way that helps 
understand the link between urban form and political projects. Distinctive social and 
historical structures find physical architectural expression in Vienna and its social 
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structure is instantiated in physical form. By identifying the limitations and obstructions 
to this process in Vienna there are broader conclusions which may be drawn.  
Human settlement leave traces in the landscape beyond the conditions under 
which settlement first occurs. A successful settlement might be initially located because 
of particularly suitable conditions for, say, the growing of a particular crop or the ease 
with which a place can be defended. There is a point at which, however, new activity 
in a place is initiated for the primary reason that the place already exists. In other words, 
human activity can be initiated in a place simply because it is there, or primarily because 
it is there, rather than because it is the best place for a specific activity.  
Where there is existing physical infrastructure and established socio-economic 
activity there is already something shaping whatever comes next. Development of place 
always happens within the context of what has come before: new developments are 
shaped by existing morphology and architecture. Since human construction of place 
almost invariably persists for longer than a single human’s lifespan, developments 
accumulate in a way which makes the persistence of a singular guiding project 
impossible. The accretion of many different projects and ideas make a place unique and 
gives it an identity beyond one that locates it on the earth, divorced from human activity 
or intervention. 
What is generally true for the structure of place is, of course, true of cities and 
not just to the extent that cities are places. Cities are places with scale; however, cities 
gain additional narrative functions because of that scale, or primarily because of that 
scale. This further adds to, and influences, its development. Places other than cities 
might gain strong identities and narrative importance – sacred places might not have 
scale but have other significance, for example. For ordinary settlements where humans 
practice everyday life, though, it is the sheer scale of a city’s construction and activity 
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that can create narratives with emotional and psychological power that can influence 
people's actions and developments.  
These narratives which relate to urban scale provide individual cities with 
unique identities that can have a real effect on how architecture and infrastructure is 
constructed in a city. Monumental architecture is there to glorify the city, to make the 
city worthy of its name in some way. Cities gain a type of autonomous identity which 
is difficult to reduce with a simple definition but is certainly initially related to the scale 
of a place and the power which is associated with it in some way; so it is in the case of 
Vienna. 
Vienna, in order to maintain its identity whilst innovating, has had to recast its 
story constantly in order to justify its next development. An example is that of the 
demolition of the city walls to make way for the Ringstrasse, promotion and resistance 
to which was based in part on the meaning of the walls themselves as a symbol of 
powerful traditional elements in the military and the meaning of a street which would 
encircle the old city with residences and institutions of the emergent bourgeoisie.  
In addition to the contest over traditional symbolism, there is a need to 
understand more progressive developments. During the nineteenth century, old 
European cities were subject to large public works of a scale previously unknown and 
many of which were performed under the broad rubric of ‘improvements’ and tackling 
urban problems identified under categories like ‘circulation’. There is undoubtedly a 
naked economic rationale for the application of new technologies of the urban fabric: 
these improvements allowed for cities to operate on a larger scale capable of handling 
and attracting more traffic and inhabitants, scale providing economies which helped 
cities to be successful economically. However, there is an extent to which these projects 
were as much about simplifying the city, of making it more intelligible and 
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understandable to the growing bureaucracies (Scott, 1998). Developments which create 
more ordered straight lines give a clear language on a map and a plan that can be picked 
up and understood more easily than medieval street layouts and unconventional 
building arrangements. 
Complementary to the project of simplification is one in which the ordering of 
the modern city enables policing and control. This is a project familiar in urban studies 
literature (Harvey, 2006) and identifies Haussmann-like projects to create grand 
boulevards as implementing a system which allows for the transmission of police and 
troops to control radical political activities amongst the growing working class in 
addition to their more prosaic aims of increasing retail space and the value of land. 
There is also the extent to which these projects were there to add to the grandeur of a 
city, augment the identity of a city and increase its narrative power. The monumental 
architecture and processional geographies of avenue des Champs-Élysées in Paris, The 
Mall in London, Andrássy Avenue in Budapest and the Ringstrasse in Vienna all attest 
to the continuing impact and durability of such projects. 
There are four distinct characteristics of the social structure of Vienna, from the 
High Middle Ages until the modern period, which have their expression in the 
architecture, infrastructure and morphology of the city. 
First is the development of an aristocratic core; in Vienna’s case distinct in the 
sense that in other similar European cities, there was a tendency for the aristocracy in 
the modern period to dwell further away from the city and to have their primary 
residences, or to develop their primary residences, away from the city and in the 
countryside. In Vienna the aristocracy maintained a presence in the centre of the city 
that gave its core an identity; and it is a core that although it is now overlaid with modern 
functions and practice, persists in form. The walls of medieval Vienna are gone, 
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replaced by the Ringstrasse. The street patterns of the centre of the city remain, and its 
compactness are a reflection of the persistence of this aristocratic, urban presence. 
Related to this aristocratic core is the imperial presence, Vienna as Residenzstadt. The 
aristocratic-imperial dominance of the organisation of Vienna weighs heavily on its 
layout today. 
Second, Vienna was relatively late in developing bourgeois institutions which 
could influence the growth of the city, most notably an autonomous city council and 
mayoralty. Direct imperial control was far stronger for much of the early modern period. 
Again, the walls around the medieval core city are an example, their maintenance until 
late in the city’s development relates to the desire for imperial, military, ecclesiastical 
symbols of control and power in the city. Although this is not unique to Vienna – as 
noted earlier, Barcelona’s walls, also demolished during the 1850s, had been maintained 
up until that point as a symbol of Castilian power over the Catalan city – it is notable 
for a city that is not under external subjugation to have its development so heavily 
directed by such an autocratic power.  
A third characteristic is the separate track of the nation-state project associated 
with the Germans, they being the dominant ethnic group in Vienna. Vienna’s German 
cultural identity was rooted in its dominance of a multi-ethnic empire rather than to an 
ethnically-homogeneous nation-state. Aspirations to lead Germany-speaking Europe 
through the German Confederation meant that Austria had strong connections to the 
other Germans-speaking states until 1866 (Beller, 2006, p. 136) However, as Austria 
lost prestige and influence to rising Prussia, the potential for an Austrian leadership role 
in the development of a German nation receded (Judson, 2016, p. 259). This had 
consequences for how Vienna developed. German nationalist monuments are not 
prevalent in Vienna and it is imperial symbols and symbols of bourgeois institutions 
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that define the city more than a German ethnic identity. The straight lines of Unter den 
Linden in Berlin, avenue des Champs-Élysées in Paris or The Mall in Westminster have 
national processional roles that Vienna lacks, the curves of the Ringstrasse with its 
diverse historicist architecture providing a more nuanced mix of class, state and ethnic 
identities. 
This segues into the last characteristic which is the ethnic diversity of Vienna. 
A diverse ethnic population is not unique by any means to Vienna, especially as cities 
in Europe and America grew in the nineteenth century. American seaboard cities 
especially had a similar ethnic mix or similar types of ethnic mixing. London and Paris 
also had a significant ethnic diversity. However, in Vienna, because it was the capital 
of a land empire, ethnicities inhabiting Vienna from that empire had some claim on 
Vienna, or at least perceived a claim on Vienna. For example, Czech speakers who in 
Vienna could see themselves as not emigrating to a foreign city but rather to the capital 
of lands of which Bohemia and Moravia were a thriving part. Consequently, there was 
a complex relationship between the large ethnic groups that made up Vienna in terms 
of their identity as imperial citizens with their identity as outsiders. The material effect 
of this diversity on the architecture is less obvious than the effect of the other three 
characteristics identified but it has a significant effect on its politics and consequently 
an effect on its entire development. 
Although Vienna and Budapest shared many characteristics as large cities on 
the Danube, the urban forms which developed and operated as Vienna modernised, at 
least at first, were not put to service as part of a project of Budapest style nationalisation 
of the city. Vienna's expansion was a more cosmopolitan affair fitting its role as imperial 
centre. It was only later that the mass politics, to which a large city such as Vienna could 
play host, was to be fully exploited by more nationally minded politicians such as the 
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Karl Lueger, who came to power in the late 1890s. Even then, the city's monumental 
and architectural geographies were not nationalised to quite the extent of Budapest. 
Indeed, the narrative of Vienna as a parasite on the Austrian national body politic which 
formed after the First World War and the division of the new republic between Vienna 
and the rest of Austria on party political lines meant that Vienna's national status came 
to be defined negatively. 
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6. Venice 
In this chapter, hard boundaries constructed between land and water are shown 
to trace the limits of a Venetian 'whole' form. Following this, the rhythms of decay and 
preservation necessitating constant administration and maintenance are defined. 
Networked forms are examined, including the canal network as the setting for 
processions and the move from traditional to modern internal urban transport; also, 
Venice’s connection to the rail network, whose positioning upheld a separation from 
the historical core of the city and set it off as an artistic object of desire, contributed to 
the affordance of the city’s status as an object of desire for the Italian nation. The 
inhabitant/visitor hierarchy is shown as affording views of the local population and of 
visitors as potentially destructive forces in the city. 
The case of Venice demonstrates a fundamentally different relationship between 
urban forms, the state and territory. The setting of Venice is such that the city requires 
constant vigilance to keep it viable in a more intensive way than cities built for the most 
part on more stable land, like Budapest and Vienna. Such a persistent need for 
maintenance has a bearing on narratives associated with the city: the speed with which 
the city could decay should it be neglected means that the question of what defines 
Venice is foregrounded emphatically throughout its history. That there is something 
‘different’ about Venice, as a European island city and former city-state, is evident 
through contrast to other cities; nevertheless, it is important to highlight just what this 
difference means in the context of modern urbanisation. One notable difference is the 
institutional effort required to change the morphology of a city which is built on liminal 
territory. The role of a deliberate urban plan, even if not formally declared as such, must 
be at work in a place where the regulation of waterways means a change in one place 
almost always has an immediate impact on the urban whole. Second, the impact of 
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significant remodelling of the city centre is necessarily that much greater than in 
‘conventional’ cities held together with roadways rather than canals since a canal does 
not afford the ambulatory movement that roadways do. Third, the regulation of water 
in these conventional cities is one in which water is tamed, buildings are as far as 
possible separated from waterways and water is put to use as a sanitary utility. For 
Venice, this is much less the case: buildings are effectively built to co-exist with water 
rather than to be fundamentally separated. 
Venice’s differences are declared upfront not to use them to explain directly how 
its forms relate to ideology but because they underlie to some extent all of its urban 
forms. There are many ways in which these three essential differences might have been 
overcome – not least a wholesale move of the city to the Venetian republic’s Terraferma, 
its adjacent mainland territory – but the fact that they have remained is a much a part of 
a deliberate attempt to enhance and preserve a historical particularity as anything else. 
In Budapest, modern sites may have been co-opted at times to the service of 
nationalism; in Vienna, that co-option might be said to be more in the service of 
nineteenth-century middle-class liberalism; in Venice, as far as can be generalised, the 
cityscape is at the service of Venetian particularism, a significant construct in itself. 
Bosworth sets out a couple of recurring tropes which form a part of this 
construct. First, there is the modern planning axiom of ‘com'era, dov'era’, ‘how it was, 
where it was’, an expression which was formulated to sum up what would guide 
development to preserve the city, if not in exact form then in spirit; the city as it was 
when its independence of over 1,000 years was lost on 12 May 1797. This pivotal date 
has been given a significance which comes into play each time there is a major decision 
about the future of Venice to be made (Bosworth, 2014, p. 49,187). Second, there is the 
recurrence of the claim of imminent death: ‘Death in Venice’; the sinking city in crisis; 
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the Disneyfication of the city; the decline in the number of residents; the influx of 
tourists that is perceived as destructive of an authentic Venice; the pollution of the 
Lagoon; the list of threats to Venice’s existence is long. To bring these two tropes 
together, a powerful narrative of preservation and loss is formed which is augmented 
by other aspects of Venetian historical context – its autonomy, standing alone as a city-
state long after the decline of others; its mediative role between East and West, Greek 
and Latin worlds; its status as a ‘work of art’. These other aspects have a common 
element which is their significance beyond the city. Indeed, the claim on Venice as a 
universal work of art which needs to be saved for humanity is set against the claim on 
it by its inhabitants. A universal role for a city is not unique – Paris as Benjamin’s 
‘Capital of the Nineteenth Century’ comes to mind – but, in the case of Venice, this role 
overrides others like perhaps no other city. Venice is different and it apparently needs 
to be saved from the Venetians. 
Venice shared with Budapest the distinction of being a city governed by 
Austrians and yet having another allegiance. However, whereas Budapest became and 
remains the quintessential Hungarian city, the Italian claim on Venice was initially less 
clear-cut. There is a Venetian identity, and indeed language, which muddies the Italian-
ness of the city. The desire to detach Venice from Austria and attach it to Italy during 
the early nineteenth century was strong amongst Italian nationalists but not necessarily 
a prime political goal amongst Venetians for most of the period (Laven, 2002, p. 226). 
In Budapest, the infusion of Hungarian identity was boosted by migration into the city. 
In Venice, no such demographic transformation can be identified: there was no mass 
immigration from other parts of the new Italian state that might have adjusted its local 
identity. Rather the local population, and local organisational structures, made 
accommodations with Austrian, Italian and occasionally French masters. The city was 
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an object to be gained by various nationalist and imperialist projects but it was not 
strongly shaped architecturally and spatially by these projects. Instead the accretion of 
changes to the city under these external forces added to a Venetian identity rather than 
replacing it. 
Turning to technological transformation, Venice was profoundly affected by the 
arrival of the railway which turned it from an elite tourist to a mass tourist destination 
during the nineteenth century. The medium for transport on the central islands 
themselves though was not significantly altered by technology – roads for anything 
other than pedestrians were minimal and transport by water retained primacy. 
Improvements and modernisation were focused on housing and sanitation, the latter 
being a particular problem for a city at sea level sited in a relatively stagnant lagoon 
(Bosworth, 2014, pp. 32–34). Typical urban problems that were being addressed in 
other European cities at this time – for example, those of traffic circulation and military 
mobilisation – were not as relevant in the case of Venice due to its low number of land-
based thoroughfares and internal dependence on waterborne transport. Given the lack 
of space for the large public parks and gardens of many other European cities, public 
space in Venice is more evident in enclosed squares such as St Mark’s. In terms of other 
infrastructure and housing, both have been significantly upgraded during the past two 
centuries and Venice has not resisted the adoption of technology to a greater degree than 
elsewhere. Modern consumer culture has taken a central role in the life of Venice both 
for tourists and residents. Finally, industrialisation has occurred – and Venice was 
historically early to large industrial concerns with it glass making and ship building 
activities going back to its early days (Horodowich, 2009, p. 71) – but in the twentieth 
century has occurred in zones outside of central Venice and in Venice’s industrial 
surrogate, Mestre (2009, p. 222). 
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Indeed, it was these technical modern improvements that acted, and continued 
to act, as the threat to which a response of ‘com'era, dov'era’ could be invoked. Between 
the completion of the railway bridge in 1846 and the completion of the train station in 
1852 came the insurrection of 1848 and the subsequent short-lived Republic of San 
Marco. It was during the aftermath of the retaking of Venice by Austria and the arrival 
of rail travel that Ruskin was to write his influential ‘Stones of Venice’ in which he used 
the Gothic architecture of Venice to illustrate a theory of architecture that looked to the 
past for its inspiration against soulless modernity and traced Venice’s decline through 
its adoption of more Classical architectural forms (2007). From the outset, then, 
Venice’s emergence into modern urban life was framed as an existential threat rather 
than just damage to an older urban idea. 
The institutional effort required to maintain a low-lying archipelago affords 
more frequent, conscious consideration of urban forms. In Venice’s case, this has meant 
urban forms are constantly responding to historical narratives guiding their planning 
and development, the ‘com'era, dov'era’ doctrine being a prime example. This makes 
for a city whose historical identity is heightened. Canals have different affordances to 
roadways and since they are the principal thoroughfares in Venice, Venice’s layout has 
different affordances including the affordance of ideological projects. Likewise, 
buildings and public spaces that co-exist with close proximity to water provide a 
constant, everyday reminder of the liminal existence of the city and the possibility of it 
succumbing to being washed away. This impermanence and fragility affords different 
historical narratives which in turn make for different narrative interpretations. As 
Venice’s urban forms and affordances are elaborated in more detail, so these special 
conditions need to be considered. 
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Historical Context 
Situated on the Adriatic Sea in a protective, marshy lagoon, the islands which 
were to form Venice acted as a refuge for those fleeing attacks from invaders (Norwich, 
2003, pp. 4–5) and the rule of the Lombard tribes in post-Roman Italy (2003, pp. 10–
11). Citizens of cities in the old Roman province of Venetia were on the main route for 
invasions from beyond the Balkans and the Alps and, at various points in the fifth and 
sixth centuries, were increasingly dependent upon the sanctuary offered by nearby 
marshy land from mounted invading tribes. Inhabitants of Altinum, for example, were 
effectively transplanted to the island of Torcello in the northern part of the Venetian 
Lagoon during the invasions of Attila (Horodowich, 2009, p. 8). Liminal land was 
slowly transformed as techniques developed to stabilise land using, for example, closely 
situated logs as piles on which to build. This occurred all along the northern Adriatic 
coast from modern Grado in the north to Ravenna in the south with the Venetian Lagoon 
centrally located and later becoming dominant. (Horodowich, 2009, pp. 3–10) All large-
scale construction projects entail clearing and stabilising the land on which 
development takes place but it was the extent to which Venetians did so in close 
proximity to water which distinguished Venice’s development. The notion of a distinct 
identity is heavily encoded into the morphology and edifice of Venice; its low-lying 
location with the mainland on the horizon gives the sense that this marginal settlement 
is sited in proximity to, yet just out of reach of, neighbouring powers. Whereas other 
cities might have prospered because of their accessibility, it was inaccessibility and 
defensiveness which defined early Venetian settlement in the north Adriatic. It was to 
enable inhabitants of the Lagoon to control access for trade as well as having a military 
advantage and this became increasingly important as Venice found itself at crux of trade 
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between western Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, and northern and southern 
Europe, as it entered the High Middle Ages (2009, pp. 29–31). 
In addition to the production and trading of salt extracted from marshes in the 
Lagoon (Norwich, 2003, p. 7), Venice’s initial commercial and strategic advantage was 
attained by serving as the entrepôt for goods from the Byzantine world (Nicol, 1992, 
pp. 41–42). As power struggles in the Adriatic and eastern Mediterranean settled and 
became regularised after the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire, so Venice was 
able to develop trading partners and it acted as a bridge between mutually hostile forces 
and territories. Initially commodities and goods moving from east to west were salt, fish 
and luxury items exchanged for wheat and other staples moving from west to east. As 
trade developed and Venetian merchants established themselves, their grip on Adriatic 
markets increased and slaves and lumber were added to their inventories. (Tilly, 1992, 
p. 144) Until the early ninth century, the Venetian Lagoon was a collection of small 
island settlements and it was only as the area was contested between the Franks and the 
Byzantines that the central settlement which comprises the core of Venice today 
emerged as concentrated centre of defence and power (Norwich, 2003, pp. 18–22). It 
was at this time that the Rialto was systematically reclaimed, its watercourses defined 
and significant building work on top of deeply driven piles untaken. That this effort was 
initiated by the first historically attested Doge, Agnello Partecipazio, is instructive as it 
was local leadership which had proven itself in struggles against the Franks that led the 
move to the Rialto in a position in the Lagoon which provided for the maximum defence 
against interference from both the Franks and the Byzantines – even the Byzantine 
Emperor sent craftsmen from Constantinople to assist the construction of the settlement 
(2003, pp. 22–26). So, although the settlement of the Venetian Lagoon might have 
occurred until this time in a piecemeal fashion, the foundation of the central Venetian 
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urban settlement was the result of a deliberate plan executed through the exercise of 
effective local autonomy. 
The development of Venetian state-like institutions was a process which was 
distinct from many of its neighbours in the northern Mediterranean. The imperative to 
trade drove the city to seek dominance of sea lanes and hence trade with coastal 
Mediterranean settlements. This provided a powerful motivation for the expansion of 
Venetian military power which came before a desire for colonial settlement. The use of 
galleys in the Mediterranean from Roman times up until the early modern period 
governed the scope of shipping lanes and navigation. Both commercial and naval ships 
made use of coastline hugging shipping lanes and the labour required to power galleys 
meant frequent stops at intermediate ports during long journeys. Such a system made 
shipping a capital-intensive industry and long distance trade was, by and large, only 
cost-effective for carrying high value cargo. (Pryor, 1992, p. 177) Effective maritime 
power for a state was exercised by securing either direct control of, or privileges at, a 
series of ports on major shipping routes. Venice’s geo-political position meant that it 
was able to acquire the necessary control of many Mediterranean ports needed to make 
it the region’s most influential maritime power. Consequently, it had access to more 
diverse markets than most of its competition and its established power enabled it to 
defend against challenges both from other states and from piracy. As a participant in 
crusading, it was instrumental in providing and extending access to the eastern 
Mediterranean to enable western Christian states to capture territory and trade from the 
control of Islamic competitors and this in turn significantly expanded its sphere of 
influence. In 1203 and 1204, Venice effectively diminished Byzantine imperial power 
as it seized Constantinople and took control of large portions of the Empire for itself. It 
then established dependent local rulers with the prime objective of maintaining access 
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for Venetian shipping. After the capture of Constantinople in 1453, it undertook a long-
term, demanding strategic struggle of attrition against Ottoman maritime power. (Pryor, 
1992, pp. 172–178; Tilly, 1992, pp. 144–145) 
As trading links expanded Venice also expanded its power, first by conquering 
the adjacent Italian mainland, the Terraferma, and then taking territory along its trading 
routes on the Adriatic and as far away as Crete. It lay at the heart of a Mediterranean 
trading zone and kept a controlling grip on trade between east and west. As its wealth 
and power grew, administrative, military and financial functions of the city expanded 
and the archipelago at its heart became a densely populated and increasingly lavishly 
adorned centre (Norwich, 2003, pp. 268–276). Although the city could and did expand 
through land reclamation, the islands were a constraint such that it meant that nobility, 
artisans and the poor were in very close proximity. Its citizenry had a strong 
identification with the republic across different classes, though small local 
neighbourhoods, the ‘sestieri’, provided the most immediate local identity and were 
often in violent conflict with each other (Davis, 1994, p. 20). What was common 
throughout was a deep sense of connection with other inhabitants, a clear separation 
from a rural hinterland and a greater barrier between other cities than in other city-states 
in Italy during the Middle Ages and early modern periods. 
As the city grew and its overseas empire expanded, it was its commercial 
interests which drove its main ventures and policies. A system of government evolved 
in the republic which had the Doge at its head but whose power was subject to 
representatives in the patrician Great Council and a series of bodies and procedures 
which ensured the interests of the major families were upheld and that autocratic power 
was curtailed (Norwich, 2003, pp. 282–283). Venetian economic policy protected its 
centrally established elite and guided its trade through the city rather than it being 
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dispersed across its empire and its sphere of influence (Apellániz, 2013, p. 163). Due 
to this, and its geography, the projection of Venetian power was as much an idea as it 
was to do with control of territory and populations. In order to control trade in the 
Adriatic and to force non-Venetian merchants to go through Venice rather than trade 
point-to-point, there was a requirement for a strong naval presence (Lane, 1973, pp. 
124–125) but also a clearly articulated idea of Venice as a power and as part of a legal 
structure with could be applied outside of its home territory. Its identity as a go-between 
for East and West was also predicated on a narrative idea which fed into legal 
justification to exert its power independent of Byzantium. Founding myths helped unpin 
this narrative idea: the application of historical events such as the flight of citizens of 
former Roman cities away from barbarians to the Lagoon to seek liberty was a part of 
this myth-making (Brown, 1996, pp. 12–15). In addition, the use of the relics of Saint 
Mark, apparently stolen from Alexandria by Venetian merchants eager to protect them 
from Muslim possession or destruction, gave the city a patron who was one Christ’s 
apostles, something which drew the city to the level of Rome with its association with 
Saint Peter (Brown, 1996, p. 12). 
By the late eighteenth century there was a sense in which Venice’s difference 
has become accentuated by a perception of anachronism. As the major nation-states of 
Europe were solidifying and Enlightenment philosophy was influencing and reordering 
state administration in many territories, Venice’s diplomatic power was waning rapidly 
and its future independence was no longer taken as secure by other European powers 
(Norwich, 2003, pp. 601–604). Its uniqueness became a weakness in the face of the 
Napoleonic transformation of continental Europe which not only saw France 
conquering states including Venice but also whose revolutionary mind-set looked to 
eliminate special privileges and sought to standardise. Much as the last vestiges of the 
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Holy Roman Empire were destroyed by Napoleon in 1806, a precursor in 1797 was the 
destruction of the Most Serene Republic of Venice (2003, pp. 628–631) and its 
absorption into, variously, French, Austrian (Horodowich, 2009, pp. 190–200) and 
finally Italian state structures (2009, pp. 200–203). It was during the period of French 
domination, however, that some key changes were enacted which brought Venice into 
line with the prevailing revolutionary mood of Europe. Symbolic acts, such as the 
removal of the gates of the Ghetto (Ravid, 2001, pp. 27–28), signalled the 
implementation of a modern citizen-state relationship and the demise of an old 
corporatist idea of society. At the same time the French made other structural changes: 
some public works such as the Via Eugenia, a thoroughfare covering an old canal; new 
public gardens for the enjoyment of ordinary Venetians (Plant, 2002, p. 59); and the 
removal of artworks, most notably the Horses of St Mark, to Paris where they were 
exhibited (Horodowich, 2009, p. 187). These changes set precedents that were followed 
later, of filling in old canals, regularising walkways (2009, p. 209) and the 
aestheticisation of artworks, separating them from their symbolic power and role in the 
old Venetian Republic. 
The end of over a thousand years of Venetian political independence put Venice 
in play as an object of diplomatic negotiation during the nineteenth century among the 
Great Powers (Plant, 2002, pp. 43–48). The transfer from Austria to France and back to 
Austria during the Napoleonic wars saw the city and its hinterland territory used as a 
tactical pawn in a much larger game. It was as part of a French client state between 
1805 and 1814 that Venice first became part of a political entity that was identified as 
Italian, the Kingdom of Italy (of which Napoleon was himself king). National feeling 
was inspired by the creation of such Napoleonic states in other parts of Europe though 
its direct effect on Venice is difficult to ascertain. Under Austrian rule resistance was, 
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until the 1840s, muted and when it did become strong was associated as much with the 
cause of Venetian autonomy and independence – Viva San Marco! as much as Viva 
l’Italia! (Ginsborg, 1979, p. 100) – as it was with the cause of Italian unity and the 
Risorgimento. 
Venice, like Rome, became an object of desire for Italian nationalists as the 
Italian state evolved in the 1850s and 1860s. The Venetian language had much in 
common with other northern Italian languages and dialects but had a history of use 
associated with Venice that gave it power and prestige and the promotion of a 
standardised Italian national language was bound to reduce the prominence of Venetian. 
A standard Italian based on the Florentine dialect was to replace those diverse languages 
and dialects (Lepschy, 2002, p. 44). Although Venice resembled what nationalists 
understood as an Italian city, its differences were marked. Venice, along with its 
surrounding province, was transferred to the newly constituted Kingdom of Italy from 
Austria after the defeat of Austria by Prussia in 1866 (Judson, 2016, p. 259). It is 
arguable to what extent the Venetian public were enthused by becoming citizens of Italy 
though there had been little support for the departing Austrians either. This is not to 
overplay Venice’s detachment from the Italian national project or to place Italian 
incorporation of Venice on a par with an imperialist annexation by Austria but relative 
to the urban identity of other large cities associated with national projects at this time, 
the overlap between Venetian identity and Italian identity is complex. 
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Urban Forms 
Defining the whole on marginal land. Venice’s demarcation brings into play 
several different urban wholes. The core Rialto archipelago on which the classic 
cityscape sits is one such whole, one that is most frequently cited in guidebooks as 
historic Venice. However, the entire Lagoon has many different settlements and its 
islands and waterways are interconnected ecologically, economically and politically in 
such a way as to make the entire Lagoon an urban system. A simple separation of urban 
from rural is not easily made in such a system; though the outlying islands are 
experienced as rural they are dependent upon the Lagoon’s urban system. The whole 
Lagoon is a managed environment in the service of an idea of the preservation of 
Venetian life. This set of relationships constitutes a Venetian whole which goes well 
beyond the so-called historic centre. Although Venice has long had a relationship with 
the Terraferma, the early twentieth century saw a deliberate effort to move large-scale 
industrialisation from the islands to the mainland and to incorporate Mestre into the 
Venetian administrative orbit, the commune (Zucconi, 2003, p. 74). This expanded 
whole completed a separation of historic and modern which began at least as far back 
as the creation of the rail and maritime stations at the edge of the core of Venice. Like 
any other urban territory, Venice has and has had a variety of overlapping wholes which 
afford control of the city, the difference with Venice being that these wholes are not so 
much determined by hard demarcation (like walls) and by territorial annexation but 
rather by different ways of controlling a volatile physical environment. 
Venetian exceptionalism in revealed in the variance from formal urban norms – 
its whole form is separated more exclusively; the development and transformation of 
its institutions were out of step with its neighbours; as a former city-state it retained and 
retains a place to the side of more normal state-region-city hierarchies; and, it 
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interrelation to external actors and institutions is different in the sense that it is an object 
of desire and concern and is in some sense universally ‘owned’ more than many other 
cities. This exceptionalism can help reveal processes and practices which govern the 
relationship between space, architecture and ideology. At first glance, the urbanised 
island of the Venetian Lagoon, and the core city in particular, present themselves as 
‘organic’ in opposition to a sharp-angled rational or planned city. Horodowich offers an 
explanation of Venice’s non-conformity to the gridded Roman urban plan – widely 
maintained in Italian cities throughout the Middle Ages – which takes the Byzantine 
influence as determinative of the jumbled arrangement of canals and streets (2009, pp. 
12–13). Although this eastern influence might be a factor in the layout of the city, the 
engineering challenge of stabilising the land and regulating water would have been 
significant and overridden an imperative to follow normal orders of town planning, 
Roman or otherwise. What is in evidence, however, is the early presence of 
administrative capability and power to bring about this kind of engineering (Mutinelli, 
1841, p. 11). The fact that at the time of the development of the Rialto archipelago local 
autonomy had been confirmed by the Byzantine Empire and that the prestige of the 
office of the Doge was enhanced by victory of the Frankish Empire would have meant 
that the order to transform the Rialto would have been easier to carry through since 
options for resistance from imperial authorities would have been limited. Coupled with 
the Grand Canal following a pre-existing watercourse and the islands being small and 
not clearly marked off from the Lagoon, the absence of normal Roman urban 
organisation does not necessarily support evidence of an alternative, competing 
influence. Rather, the Venetian urban whole is one in which particularly strong 
incentives have been in place to make radical changes to the landscape and waterscape 
in order to create an exceptional urban site. It is the exceptional site of Venice, the 
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placement of the whole, which affords a different path for urban identity. Its layout and 
architecture are afforded by this placement. 
Venice, of course, is not unique for the prevalence of canals, its location on 
islands or even it relationship to large neighbouring empires. Amsterdam is an example 
which might be said to be comparable. However, whereas modern Amsterdam has a 
dominant role in the nation-state which has formed around it, modern Venice is 
peripheral to mainland Italy both physically and politically with more dominant 
regional voices influencing Italian politics from Milan, Turin, Naples and Rome. Prior 
to its inclusion in the Italian nation-state, Venice certainly played a dominant role 
through the Venetian state apparatus but it was not, unlike Amsterdam, a part of a 
network of large urban areas across a wider territory; rather it produced a state whose 
aim was to sustain the island city itself with considerations of other territories 
subservient to that aim. In other words, there was not a significant wider territorial 
identity of which Venice was a constituent part, unlike Amsterdam and Dutch identity. 
The Venetian urban whole is distinct for transcending a state/city hierarchy of identity. 
The central Venetian islands are susceptible to flooding. This is not uncommon 
for many cities. However, the extent of possible flooding is unusual as is the sense of 
existential threat brought about by such flooding. The so-called ‘acqua alta’ in which a 
significant part of the city is inundated occurs with enough frequency for there to be 
permanent mitigating arrangements in place. The flooding, which has been exacerbated 
by works on the Lagoon since the fifteenth century to redivert rivers and clean 
sedimentation (Bondesan & Furlanetto, 2012), can typically cover 14% of the city’s 
walkways and on average every 4 years cover more than 50% of the city’s walkways 
(Boato, Canestrelli, Facchin, & Todaro, 2009). In 1966 almost the entire city’s 
walkways were underwater (Horodowich, 2009, p. 223) and the islands were effectively 
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cut-off from the mainland. The ready possibility of universal flooding means that land 
in the city has a vulnerability that does not allow for something that other cities have – 
effectively protected higher status areas which are either on high land (like Buda in 
Budapest) or in a well-regulated area protected from the water by walls (like Vienna 
prior to the Ringstrasse being built). The relative equality of flooding in Venice means 
that hierarchical demarcation takes different forms to other urban environments. 
The canal network. 
 
Figure 22: Map of Venice (Clark, 1853) 
Venice’s physical isolation was significantly reduced by the arrival of the 
railway in 1846. The bridge carrying the tracks terminated at the edge of the core 
Venetian islands and was appended to Venice rather than integrated. This relationship 
is instructive – Venice was the object of modern urban sensibilities as a preserved 
attraction rather the subject of a thoroughgoing modernisation itself. The influx of 
tourists after the arrival of the railway and the failed revolution of 1848-49 presented 
new infrastructure and traffic management challenges (Bosworth, 2014, pp. 9–10). 
Modernisation was generally predicated upon a desire for the improvement of traffic 
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circulation and accommodation (2014, p. 33). The city was not well positioned or 
equipped for the kind of modernisation prevalent in many other European cities for 
which the opportunity for national aggrandisement was afforded. The reinterment of 
Daniele Manin in 1868, with its dramatic fleet of gondolas processing down the Grand 
Canal, is an example of how an old urban artery was used for the purposes of celebrating 
a Venetian/Italian nationalist figure (Bosworth, 2014, p. 26); unlike the similar funeral 
procession for Lajos Kossuth in Budapest twenty-four years later, the apparent technical 
prowess demonstrated by newly engineered boulevards, which could be used to 
reinforce a narrative of national prowess, was not afforded by the city’s layout and 
instead the romanticism of unpowered transport and ancient affinities with the water 
offset by Venetian Gothic palazzos were the order of the day. 
This noted, some of the objectives which could be labelled as ‘liberal 
improvement’ which were pursued by many contemporary urban modernisation 
schemes were also pursued in Venice. The aim of bringing hygiene to the city, both 
physical and moral, was expounded in arguments for major public works to upgrade 
working class housing and general sanitation (Bosworth, 2014, pp. 33–34). In addition, 
many canals were filled in, both by city authorities and private landlords, during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in order to reduce putrid standing water, 
increase pedestrian walkways and to reduce the cost of maintenance. (Horodowich, 
2009, p. 221) 
As the canal network was rationalised, so use of the traditional method of public 
transport, the gondola, declined. As cities in Europe became more attuned to efficiency 
and speed, human powered gondolas were an anachronism as the prime means of 
transport. Gondoliers put up considerable resistance to competition but vaporetti, steam 
ferries, were introduced to Chioggia in the south of the Lagoon in 1873. By 1881, the 
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Grand Canal was being served by vaporetti , the inaugural journey completed by the 
‘Regina Margherita’ named after the Italian queen and a notable nod to Italian 
nationalist sensibilities. (Bosworth, 2014, pp. 34–35) Technology was being adapted to 
the city’s morphology, maintaining a pre-modern Venetian cityscape with modern 
underpinnings. As such, the city developed an ongoing debate between the imperatives 
of progress and the pieties of preservation. As the economy of Venice industrialised 
further and also came to rely more on tourism for income, this contest inevitably became 
more animated. Ideological positions did not necessarily neatly align in these contests 
but different sides could be co-opted to views of what should change and what should 
remain in the city. 
The railway network. The arrival of the railway in Venice was responsible for 
vastly increasing the potential volumes of visitors. The positioning of the station is 
significant given the effect these visitors have had had on the city’s capacity for internal 
traffic. The station has been located at the western end of the central islands at a point 
nearest to the mainland since the inception of the railway. It is peripheral to the central 
archipelago and it is not well-integrated into the city's other modes of transport other 
than to disgorge pedestrians on to the city’s walkways. The building of the railway 
bridge ended Venice’s water-bound isolation and did not proceed without great 
controversy (Plant, 2002, pp. 109–111), so the railway did and does symbolise the 
entrance of modernity into an older cityscape. 
The station site is an example of the beginning of the use of zoning in Venice 
whereby larger industrial developments began to be separated out from the centre of the 
city. Given that the city had been built by and for trading and associated industries, this 
was a departure and strengthened an opposition of a historical core and industrial 
periphery. The railway station’s site was soon joined by the modern maritime station, 
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again taking trade out of the centre and placing it to the side of the central islands. The 
rail and maritime stations feed the central core with goods and passenger traffic but take 
away a function of the centre of the city, particularly the Grand Canal, of being an 
entrepôt. 
This zonal separation of historical core from modern industry reinforces the 
objectification of the core city as a protected work of art. The connection to the rail 
network facilitates an audience, renewed daily, which enters the city via a modern portal, 
yet the city's core appears unintegrated and untainted by the network’s physical 
infrastructure. The lack of significant volumes of motorised traffic on land or 
underground underlines the city's exceptional status. The railway aside, transport 
around the city by foot or waterway produces an unusual urban experience. The visitor 
does not experience the city’s architecture or layout at speed, unlike in other modern 
cities. Rather the optical effect of the rail connection is to present the cityscape on the 
horizon, a distant goal bridged by a modern railway, approached at speed but once 
disembarked the visitor’s speed slows down enforcing a reverential entrance to the city. 
200 
 
 
Decay and preservation. As has been noted, there have constantly been special 
environmental concerns which derive from Venice’s position lying low on marginal 
land in water. While it is not the only city to have to negotiate its relationship to water, 
Venice has been particularly susceptible to flooding and erosion and this has required 
constant vigilance and maintenance to keep it liveable. Moreover, any reduction in that 
maintenance is more immediately apparent in the cityscape: institutional deficiency is 
reflected in the decay of the cityscape perhaps more immediately in Venice than in 
equivalent urban contexts. Despite this tendency to be unforgiving in exposing neglect, 
the city’s situation requires an ongoing process of regeneration, even if what is 
generated is modelled on what went before. This peculiar process makes possible the 
narrative of Venice as a living relic. The material for Venice’s patrimony is embedded 
in the ‘everyday’ city. That this ‘everyday’ is one which is shaped by mass tourism does 
not take away from the integration of contemporary and the historical. 
The collapse of the campanile in Piazza San Marco is a case in point. The 
structure of the tower was frequently compromised by lightning strikes, earthquakes 
and instability of the foundations over centuries. Despite this, the structure was 
maintained and embellished until its catastrophic failure in July 1902. The subsequent 
debate regarding its replacement involved many different proposals; however, the 
decision was taken to follow the ‘com'era, dov'era’ principle by recreating a building 
whose exterior was a facsimile of the structure before its collapse but whose foundations 
and frame made use of modern stable building techniques. (Bosworth, 2014, pp. 51–
54) This process of preservation augmented with modern underpinnings was one in 
which the aesthetics of the cityscape reflected an idealised Venetian past leapfrogging 
French, Austrian and Italian influences post 1797. 
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It is through the doctrine of com'era, dov'era that Venice has taken on a self-
consciously historical role. In taking the preservation of the city at a particular point in 
time, the city’s institutions have identified it with a moment at which its authenticity 
was supposedly suspended. That this moment has been selected before the development 
of popular Italian nationalism has meant that Venice’s relationship to the Italian nation 
is mediated through other myths, those surrounding the lost independence of the city. 
This is not to ignore efforts to introduce the national into the Venetian urban setting or 
to suggest that Venice is in some way a reluctant appendage to the Italian national 
project. Rather, it is to emphasise the special role that the city’s institutions have carved 
out for Venice within that national project and that this role is afforded by the rhythmic 
form of Venice as a city in a constant state of decay and preservation. 
The special conditions of Venice and their effects on the aesthetics of the 
cityscape leave it open to an interpretation of a city that is dying. In the late nineteenth 
century, this interpretation had particular resonance for artists who looked to 
romanticise Venice’s decay. Artistic appreciation and mass tourism were brought 
together as museumified Venice was captured in guidebooks as an object to be gazed 
upon and for artists the perceived unique light available in the Lagoon, along with a 
reputation for pleasure in which they could be more free in their life and work, was an 
attraction. Wagner’s residence there further mythologised the city as a place for 
brooding artists and his death there in 1883 wrote the city into real-life Wagnerian 
drama (Barker, 2008, p. 3). 
Nietzsche’s stay in Venice allowed him to muse on the city’s qualities, his 
perception, according to Plant, being that the city was a kind of image of the ‘man of 
the future’, melancholic and atomised. (Plant, 2002, pp. 197–198) The decaying 
rhythms of Venice afford self-dramatisation and an escape from a modern malaise. 
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Inhabitant/visitor hierarchy. The restrictions on Venice’s expansion within the 
Lagoon have meant that increasing the population normally would entail increasing 
population density. Between 1300 and 1800, the population fluctuated within the 
100,000 to 150,000 range and in 1800 the population stood at 44% greater than in 1300 
(de Vries, 1984). Compared to Budapest which, more typically for similar European 
cities, grew around 5 times larger and Vienna around 10 times larger during the same 
period, constraints on population growth were apparent even during the economic 
heyday of Venice. Coupled with an imperial policy which sought less to add territory 
and people but rather to control trade for the core Venetian citizenry, the distinction 
between inhabitant of Venice and visitor was driven by local geography and resources. 
The priorities in this relationship have been reversed as the Venetian population 
and institutions have moved from being active agents in governing the direction of 
development of the city to the object of concern in preserving the city. Ruskin, for 
example, decries the ignorance of the citizens of Venice during his stay there in 1849: 
 
‘… the shafts of St. Mark’s at Venice were used by a salesman of common 
caricatures to fasten his prints upon … and this in the face of the continually 
passing priests: while the quantity of noble art annually destroyed in altarpieces 
by candle-droppings, or perishing by pure brutality of neglect, passes all 
estimate.’ (Ruskin, 2007, p. 371) 
 
Ruskin’s treatment of Venice as a study of the principles of Gothic architecture 
follows a narrative which sees the city as a living museum and one that is constantly 
under threat from the Lagoon, railways and neglectful inhabitants; the desire to ‘save’ 
Venice from these threats arises from the belief that it is only external appreciation and 
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resources that can fully comprehend and preserve a unique and universal work of art. 
This made the city a symbolic prize for Italian nationalism – Venice was as much a 
possession which was fully formed and whose prestige was used to enhance Italian 
national aspirations as it was a city that must be Italianised in some way. After 1860, 
only Rome and Venice remained as mainstream Italian nationalist objectives (Riall, 
2009, p. 147). This bound Venice to Rome in the early 1860s in the nationalist political 
imagination. However, when it came to Venetia and Venice being incorporated it is 
significant that a plebiscite was required in Venice – one in which a tiny minority took 
part. When the vote indicated that Venice should join Italy, the Italian king came to 
Piazza San Marco by barge (Bosworth, 2014, p. 18). By having the Italian king arrive 
in traditional Venetian style, Venice maintained a distinct doubled identity, both Italian 
and Venetian. 
However, another dynamic was disturbing the configuration of Venetian identity. 
As the Ruskin quote highlights, there was a concern for Venice from well beyond Venice, 
Venetia and Italy. The internationalisation of Venice was a phenomenon that began to 
see the city as part of an international patrimony. Concern for its fate from the nineteenth 
century onwards crystallised into pressure on local authorities to preserve the city. The 
elevation of the city to a position of being a work of art created a critic/citizen/tourist 
hierarchy in which the sensitive, concerned international critic seeks to save Venice 
from its local, oblivious population and cretinous visitors. This is summed up by Henry 
James writing in 1909: 
 
‘Venetian life, in the large old sense, has long since come to an end, and the 
essential present character of the most melancholy of cities resides simply in its 
being the most beautiful of tombs. …The everlasting shuffle of these 
204 
 
 
irresponsible visitors in the Piazza is contemporary Venetian life. Everything 
else is only a reverberation of that. The vast mausoleum has a turnstile at the 
door, and a functionary in a shabby uniform lets you in, as per tariff, to see how 
dead it is.’ (James & Auchard, 1995, p. 33) 
 
Ordered by this hierarchy, the city’s identity is problematised in relation to a conception 
of the city mediated by nationhood. It is a city populated by Italian citizens who are not 
in full control of its destiny, Italian or otherwise. 
The economic dependency of Venice upon tourism orders its relationship to the 
outside world in ways that are distinct. The sandbars which protect the Lagoon were 
home to some of the original Venetian settlements and as the centre of gravity for the 
city moved to the Rialto archipelago they provided a defensive role as well as port 
facilities directly on the Adriatic Sea. As the defensive role became redundant after the 
Republic’s demise and as port facilities were developed on a larger scale elsewhere, the 
Lido sandbar was opened up for a new form of activity. Sea-bathing, which had become 
fashionable in Europe during the late eighteenth century, opened up to a wider public 
with the introduction of the railways as well as providing the possibility of travel to 
more exotic and pleasant locations (Horodowich, 2009, p. 206). The Lido was 
developed as an exclusive sea-bathing resort and into the twentieth century became an 
internationally renowned and frequented tourist destination. Venetian entrepreneurs and 
local authorities sought to develop Venice as a cosmopolitan magnet and the city’s 
marginal location, the Lido’s especially, afforded that role. 
As Venice opened up then to an international audience, so the narrative of its 
past glories became available to the Italian nationalist cause. If it were not possible for 
the city to be fully possessed by Italian identity then its history could be put into service 
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to bolster that identity. Gabriele D'Annunzio’s speech at the closing of the first Venetian 
international art exhibition, now the Venice Biennale, was a florid celebration of the 
traditions of Venice and yoked them to the ambitions of an expansionist Italian 
nationalism. (Woodhouse, 2001, pp. 143–144) The right-wing writer, poet and 
journalist was born in Pescara in central Italy but closely associated with Venice in his 
writings and activities from the time of his first visit in 1887 for the unveiling of a statue 
to King Victor Emmanuel II. (Bosworth, 2014, p. 45) His themes of ‘murder, eroticism, 
cruelty, and madness, along with hints of incest and necrophilia’ (Woodhouse, 2001, p. 
151) nourished his outrageous celebrity in Italy and beyond and added a dynamic 
libidinal quality to the artistic narrative of death and corruption associated with fin de 
siècle Venice.  
As Bosworth indicates, D'Annunzio indulged dark Venetian motifs but also was 
able to draw something from Venice’s history with which to elaborate a future. 
(Bosworth, 2014, p. 46) In much the same way as Nietzsche, Venice offered some kind 
of route out of modern malaise but for D'Annunzio this was through the glorification of 
Venetian imperial power in the Mediterranean in its heyday. In particular, it was the 
naval tradition of Venice that he sought to appropriate for Italian nationalism, 
supporting his view expressed in 1888 that Italy, ‘either will be a Great Naval Power or 
it will be nothing’. (2014, p. 46) 
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Affordances 
Victor Emmanuel II, the first king of newly united Italy, died in 1878 and was 
immortalised across the country with an array of memorials and monuments. Venice’s 
contribution to this collection is an equestrian statue with reliefs and figures 
surrounding its pedestal. The striking statue is of Victor Emmanuel himself, wielding a 
sword astride his battle horse. His heroic posture and the readiness of the horse to charge 
are somewhat undermined by the implication that from this point in Venice in order for 
him to combat the enemy, the Austrians, the king would need to dismount and embark 
on a vaporatto at the San Zaccarria stop on the quay in front on the monument. The 
allegories depicted by the two figures at the foot of the monument tie Venetian struggles 
against the Austrians with the wider Italian national effort for unification and 
independence. One is ‘Venezia soggiogata’, Venice subjugated and the other is The Lion 
of St Mark defending the plebiscite result of 1866 in which the Venetian electorate voted 
to join the Kingdom of Italy. Even as they bind Venice to Italy, they assert a local 
identity that voluntarily opts in to the Italian nation. 
A comparison with the equivalent equestrian figure in the Piazza del Duomo in 
Milan is telling. There the statue stands proud in the middle of a large square which 
could represent itself as a parade ground or battlefield. The monument is sanctified by 
its relationship to the imposing façade of Milan’s cathedral and is also complemented 
by the triumphal arch entrance to the Galleria Vittorio Emanuele II, itself a 
Haussmannesque development combining modern retail and architecture with national 
glory. Here the dynamic, mounted king has somewhere to go and a place in a symbolic 
network. In Milan Victor Emmanuel is an all-conquering hero, in Venice he is another 
visitor. He is welcome on the banks of the Lagoon but there is no place for him in 
Venice’s equivalent to Piazza del Duomo, Piazza San Marco. 
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Venice lacks formal aspects which many other cities, such as Milan, are able to 
offer for ideological service. Its tenuous connection to the mainland means that it cannot 
reinforce a national narrative of community unified by land. The way in which the 
islands have been stabilised for construction mean that it does not lend itself to the 
building of grand, wide streets which can be pressed into service for national 
aggrandisement. Its processional geography is water-bound: not in itself a barrier to 
procession, of course, but closely associated with the city itself, the city’s distinct 
identity impressing itself through the signature of a gondolier fleet processing along the 
Grand Canal. Even as Venice’s whole has expanded to include the mainland, the 
symbolism of the historic centre has the potential to overpower. For Venice to work in 
the service of an ideology like nationalism, different techniques need to be brought to 
bear on its distinct formal arrangements. 
For the Italian national imagination, it could be that Venice itself is the 
monument at the focal point of a fine vista. The nationalisation of European cities had 
inward and outward facing features: inwardly it reinforced the idea of national 
achievement, the genius of the nation instantiated in the forms of the city; outwardly 
the city was in contest with other nationalised cities, just as nationalisms were perceived 
as part of a struggle between nations for supremacy. For the inward aspect to work for 
Italian nationalism in Venice, the national genius is perhaps best showcased as the 
whole form of Venice, since to foreground other forms of the city leads Italian identity 
into strong competition with other Venetian narratives that could conflict with Italian-
ness. For the outward aspect to work there is perhaps a need for cities to have shared 
common components for comparison: the collection of buildings around the Ringstrasse 
could be compared to the collection on Andrássy Avenue but Venice cannot offer up an 
equivalent for comparison with Vienna and Budapest. 
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Having been a major political entity in its own right in Italy prior to 1797, 
Venice's role in nineteenth century nationalism was at first peripheral. Unlike the 
previous two case studies, Venice's development in the nineteenth century was not 
marked by expansion out from the core of the city to create a new urban whole but a 
consolidation of its existing footprint. The city's urban forms were honed and the 
narrative of Venice as an exceptional work of art was augmented. This work of art was 
an object of desire for visitors and for Italian nationalists. Under such circumstances the 
city's status was reinforced as much by the idealisation of the city as it was by its actual 
physical and social conditions. Venice’s formal configurations afford diverse and 
complex co-option to service ideological goals. The ‘whole’ forms of the of the city are, 
by virtue of placement, exceptional. Its historic position between East and West, 
politically and culturally, makes its national status less secure. Venetian networks have 
reinforced a logic of separation which in the modern era has revealed itself as a 
separation of historical and industrial parts and therefore the integration of nationalist 
symbols is hampered by the preservation of the historical zone. Hierarchically, the 
concept of citizenship in Venice is complicated by particular concerns: interventions 
from the outside which deem Venice part of the international patrimony and which make 
the local inhabitants just one more stakeholder in the city’s plight; and the prevalence 
of tourism which comes from within and outside Italy make for a local citizenship 
experience which is under pressure day-to-day and which makes local solidarity an 
attractive counterpoint. 
 209 
 
 
7. Reconsidering Haussmannisation 
In the three case studies, the theoretical framework of forms and affordances 
has been applied to show how cities interact with projects of nationalisation. 
Broadening this will show how modernised cities were more generally implicated in 
political projects in the late nineteenth century. The restructuring of Paris in the late 
nineteenth century under Baron Haussmann was on such a scale and profile that the 
concept of Haussmannisation became a phenomenon which influenced the 
modernisation of many other cities and the cases of Budapest, Vienna and Venice share 
the influence of Paris’ renovation. This chapter will look at the phenomenon and what 
the reconfiguration of Paris afforded politically while critically examining the concept 
of Haussmannisation as it has been interpreted since. 
 
‘The temples of the bourgeoisie’s spiritual and secular power were to find their 
apotheosis within the framework of these long streets. The perspectives, prior 
to their inauguration, were screened with canvas draperies and unveiled like 
monuments; the view would then disclose a church, a train station, an equestrian 
statue, or some other symbol of civilisation. With the Haussmannization of Paris, 
the phantasmagoria was rendered in stone.’ (W. Benjamin, 2002, p. 24) 
 
Several cities might be taken as forerunners or early adopters of modern 
urbanism: London grew explosively at this time and New York and Chicago were to 
present superlative examples of modern urban grid systems, far less incumbered by 
historical urban forms than their European counterparts. However, it was 
Haussmannised Paris which has been held up as the most complete template for others 
to follow. The scale and ambition of the transformation of the city inspired and repulsed 
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generations of urban planners and builders. It is appropriate then to examine 
Haussmannisation, in terms of its genesis in the remodelling of Paris, how it came to 
mean something for other cities and to a subsequent critics, and its limits as a concept. 
Much has been written on the phenomenon of Haussmannisation and its 
significance both for Paris itself and for modern urbanisation more generally. For 
Mumford, Haussmann was one of the ‘regimenters of human functions and urban space’ 
(1961, p. 172), at best serving bankers and speculators rather than citizens. For Lefebvre, 
what Haussmann unleashed on the city was ‘an authoritarian and brutal spatial practice’ 
and ‘the effective application of the analytic spirit in and through dispersion, division 
and segregation’ (1991, p. 308). Robert Moses, the American developer who 
transformed New York in the mid-twentieth century, took inspiration from Haussmann 
but saw a tendency of his plans ‘to neglect the lower middle class and the poor’ (1942). 
Harvey’s more nuanced analysis of Haussmann’s work acknowledges him as ‘one of 
the founding figures of modernist urban planning’ (2006, p. 112). Leonardo Benevolo 
decries the damage to European architectural heritage initiated by Haussmann as 
‘historical urban and structural forms were used schematically as models for modern 
planning’, leading to ‘the destruction of a large part of the earlier setting: the widening 
of streets, the isolation of ‘monuments’ and the substitution of stylistic copies for early 
structures’ and consequently, ‘Europe began to squander its historical patrimony, 
preserving certain elements in museums or in the new open urban spaces, which 
functioned as outdoor museums’ (1995, p. 186). 
The redevelopment of Paris from 1852 has become the canonical example of 
modern urban planning. ‘Haussmannisation’ is the historical reference point for 
understanding the origins of modern urban spatial relations and it temporally coincides 
with the emergence of mass politics and ideology. The development of new urban forms 
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in modernising cities such as Haussmannised Paris afforded new forms of ideology. It 
is valuable to explore the possibilities for new ideological practices afforded by 
Haussmannised urban forms while at the same time being sensitive to the limitations of 
‘Haussmannisation’ as an analytical category. 
Benjamin positioned Paris as the critical urban structure in the history of the 
development of modern capitalism and implicated the city deeply in the project of 
modernity (2002, pp. 14–15). Benjamin’s unfinished ‘Arcades Project’ was an 
investigation of an early iteration of the industrialised development of Paris, namely the 
iron and glass arcades, which were constructed from the 1820s and which were 
superseded in popularity, form and in spirit by the fundamental remodelling of the city 
which took place after 1852. His investigation placed the arcades in the context of that 
later remodelling led by Haussmann and looked at the dizzying pace of destruction and 
rebuilding. He also documented the emergence of an urban form which was capable of 
rendering a distinctly modern ecstatic experience, the heir to traditional sacred 
architecture. In this view, capitalism had destroyed limited traditional spiritual places 
and replaced them with something more spectacular and fantastical. For Benjamin, this 
process began before Haussmann with the glass arcades marking the start of a transition 
from a society of production to one of consumption but it was Haussmannisation which 
did this on a terrific scale, creating grand boulevards and avenues lined with extravagant 
sites for bourgeois fantasy in the café, the theatre and department stores (2002, pp. 14–
26). 
By examining phenomena which came together in Haussmann's Paris, it is 
possible to detect the foundations of a new kind of city, one which became a model for 
many others just as a more strident nationalism developed in Europe and as smaller 
nations, yet to be states, began to assert their presence. This opens up discussion of what 
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possibilities Haussmannisation created in European cities for aspirant nationhood and 
nationalism and how this sat with a cosmopolitan conception of Paris23 and also what 
this did to reinforce and renew already existing nation-states and to late nineteenth-
century imperialist fantasy in the larger European nations. In the realisation of 
Haussmann's plan there was already the demonstration of how the state imposes and 
communicates order through the city; there was also a use of the city for the purposes 
of a glorious imperialism. The opening up of the possibility of a mass nationalist politics 
can be seen to be preceded by a process of nationalisation of the city. Finally, the 
concept of ‘Haussmannisation’ itself should be scrutinised as a potentially limiting 
analytical category and the need to account for its relationship to ideological ends within 
a deeper analytical framework should be explored. 
                                                 
 
23  The opposition of nationalism and cosmopolitanism describes a tension 
philosophically between particular and universal claims and conceals a complex relationship 
between the two: ‘Nationalism par excellence is thus not foreign to philosophy, like an accident 
come along to pervert an essentially universalist, cosmopolitan, essentialist destination of 
philosophy. It always presents itself as a philosophy, or better, as philosophy itself, in the name 
of philosophy, and it claims a priori a certain essentialist universalism—showing thus that 
philosophy, by virtue of a structural paradox that will dominate this seminar, always has in 
some way the potential or the yearning, as you wish, for nationality and nationalism.’ (Derrida, 
1992, p. 17)  
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Affordance of a New Paris 
The modern city’s transformation was made possible by a combination of 
innovations which were introduced in an increasingly sophisticated way. These changes 
often followed a similar pattern and cities which adopted new, modern forms early 
could act as templates for others to follow. Paris’ renewal not only changed the city’s 
morphology but also introduced a new kind of urban existence. Long established urban 
forms in the city afforded this programme of modernisation and in the process enabled 
a new kind of urban order, one in which urban administration became focused on an 
endless enhancement of both the functioning and prestige of the city. Such an order, in 
turn, created new urban forms which enabled different ideological practices. 
By the 1840s Paris had, like many western European cities, experienced rapid 
population growth. Between 1800 and 1850 the population grew 121% (de Vries, 1984). 
Linked with the processes which were driving the industrial revolution in western 
Europe, this population increase was powered by migration from the countryside. The 
industrial revolution also precipitated technological change across France with canal 
and railway networks expanding rapidly to serve industry (Heywood, 1995, p. 16). This 
in turn made the existing Parisian urban infrastructure strained in terms of housing, 
sanitation and traffic and in the context of technological change (Osterhammel, 2014, 
p. 245) the medieval layout of the city was improved to address what was understood 
to be unsustainable pressure. 
In addition to this, a changing legal context was enabling methods of property 
acquisition and control that had previously not been possible. Revolutionary France had 
swept away many of the ancien régime’s social and legal arrangements and the complex 
web of duties and rights associated with property in the city was codified and simplified. 
This led to laws which specifically enabled compulsory purchase in urban environments 
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with arrangements to compensate private property owners (Benevolo, 1995, p. 169). So 
regularised property relations and, crucially, a sharpened distinction between public and 
private places and spaces which had emerged during the 60 years prior to 
Haussmannisation, structured urban hierarchical forms and enabled the massive scale 
of intervention, destruction and construction required for Haussmann’s plan to be 
realised. 
It should also be noted that significant alterations and improvements to Paris, 
on a lesser scale but with grand ambition, had taken place during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The walls fortifying it were removed by Louis XIV and replaced 
with a circuit of what became known as boulevards24. Added to this was avenue des 
Champs-Élysées which extended out from the Tuileries Garden (Jacobs, Macdonald, & 
Rofé, 2002, p. 63), developing as a fashionable boulevard during the eighteenth century, 
and the commencement of rue de Rivoli as a principle axis in the centre of the city by 
Napoleon I (Hanser, 2006, pp. 121–122). These boulevards and other developments 
provided a model to follow and an existing network to augment and integrate into 
Haussmann’s modern plan. 
More immediately, the revolution in France in 1848 ended with the rise to power 
of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, later Napoleon III, who initially won over the French 
electorate with promises of the restoration of order and national glory (Hobsbawm, 
1997, pp. 36–40). When he nominated himself Emperor for life in 1852 he effectively 
granted himself extraordinary administrative power and it was out of that power that 
Haussmann gained office as prefect of the Seine region with a remit to renovate Paris 
                                                 
 
24 ‘Boulevard’ originally meant the top of a military rampart, synonymous with the 
English word ‘bulwark’ (Jacobs et al., 2002, p. 63) 
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and raise it to the status of London25 as a thoroughly modern and ordered capital. 
Haussmann immediately set about enacting a programme of public works which 
continued up until 1870, near the end of the Second Empire and included the demolition 
of much of the medieval layout and the construction of the major boulevards which still 
structure the centre of the city today. 
The Haussmann plan was on a scale never previously attempted and 
fundamentally reconfigured Paris’ form and provided a model for others to follow 
(Benevolo, 1995, p. 171). Haussmann was to fuse existing techniques of urban 
transformation into something new. The city was an organic whole which could be 
operated upon, improving its circulation and its respiration through the opening up of 
thoroughfares and the creation of large green spaces. Through legal regulation, private 
development in the city would be consistent with its surroundings (Bergdoll, 2000, p. 
249) creating an aesthetic urban whole greater than the sum of its parts. 
The city had long been the dominant centre of French culture, administration 
and politics. As unrest increased in the 1840s, due in part to massive social change and 
distress (Hobsbawm, 2014, p. 141), Paris itself acted, as it had long done, as the conduit 
for national social and political action (2014, p. 154). As King Louis-Philippe was 
deposed in 1848, triggering a series of revolutions in the cities of Europe (Hobsbawm, 
1997, p. 22), its inhabitants played a central role in the sort of radical revolutionary 
activity which terrified the bourgeoisie across Europe’s cities (1997, p. 28), some of 
which proved vulnerable to the tactics demonstrated by the revolutionaries of Paris. The 
subsequent new regime under Louis-Napoleon consolidated its position over the next 
                                                 
 
25 Louis-Napoleon spent much time prior to 1848 exiled in London and appears to have 
been influenced by projects such as Nash’s Regent’s Park (Hall, 1997, pp. 315–316)  
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four years until Louis-Napoleon became Emperor in the wake of a coup (Hobsbawm, 
2014, pp. 39–40). The attempt to adjust to modernity through democratisation and 
through socialism – the aims of many revolutionary groups in the 1830s and 1840s – 
had failed (Harvey, 2006, p. 85) and instead France became governed by a regime which 
had the trappings of monarchy but which put in place the underpinnings of a modern 
technocratic, and authoritarian, state (Furet, 1995, p. 451). The energies of French 
political and military institutions became focused on the glorification of an imperial 
project as bourgeois power was consolidated. 
It was in this context that Napoleon III’s appointee, Haussmann, was tasked 
with the remodelling of Paris. Plans for the modernisation of the city had existed before 
but it was the scale and totality of Haussmann's vision which was to have such a 
fundamental impact on its physical shape and social structure. What was different this 
time was that the modern French state’s organisational resources provided the 
possibility of a development of such scale that Paris’ streets and buildings could be 
turned into spaces whose function was not predetermined as such. Real estate in the 
centre of the city was turned into a fungible asset to be exchanged at will. Again, this 
was not a new practice but its operation at such magnitude was novel. Wide boulevards 
created by the Haussmann plan turned the city’s streets into a place for anonymous 
conduct. Wide boulevards had existed before but the number of them and their 
domination of the central cityscape was effectively able to create a new urban 
experience. A massive reconfiguration of the street plan was undertaken in phases, from 
1853-1860 creating the central Croisée de Paris plan and from 1860-70 creating an 
extensive network of roads cutting through the old layout (Hall, 1997, p. 78). 
Concurrently, work was undertaken to create a modern system of sewers and other 
urban infrastructure improvements (1997, p. 88). There was also a fundamental 
 217 
 
 
improvement of services in the city. The central hospital, Hôtel-Dieu de Paris, was 
renovated and modernised (D. P. Jordan, 1995, p. 198). The old buildings making up 
the central market, Les Halles, were replaced (1995, p. 208) with a modern glass and 
iron construction and markets across the city were both established and renovated. 
Schools were renovated across the city (Hall, 1997, p. 88) ensuring a school in every 
arrondissement. Town halls in several arrondissements were built or enlarged (D. P. 
Jordan, 1995, p. 358). The palais Garnier was commenced to house the Paris Opera 
(1995, p. 160) and several new theatres were completed and opened. Two large public 
parks were created from old royal hunting grounds, Bois de Boulogne to the west and 
Bois de Vincennes to the east (1995, p. 10). 
The legacy of Haussmann’s work is often interpreted in conjunction within the 
wider context of Napoleon III’s rule and the Second Empire. While this is reasonable 
in terms of understanding the personal and political motivations driving Haussmann 
and his collaborators, it should be distinct from an interpretation of the outcomes of that 
work in the city. Further, a critical view should be taken of the intervention of 
Haussmann which draws a hard line between the old city versus the new, not least 
because this is an interpretation which Haussmann himself was so eager to promote 
because it enabled him to frame his remodelling of the city as essential and a way to 
counter objections to the destruction of urban patrimony (Harvey, 2006, pp. 9–10). To 
draw too sharp a dividing line between pre- and post-Haussmann is to pass over existing 
older urban forms in the city which afforded modern innovation. It was an interaction 
between these older forms and larger historical forces such as technological advances 
which were changing the wider world and were demanding a response from large cities 
such as Paris, which crystallised in the Haussmann plan. The destruction and the 
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construction which resulted opened up a series of possibilities, including the possibility 
of enforcing greater state control on the population. 
The language of health and the language of nation can overlap: just as citizens 
can either be choking under industrial conditions or thriving in healthy garden cities, so 
nations seemed to be in a struggle against one another and could be perceived as in 
decrepit decadence and destined to disappear or emboldened, thriving, competing and 
winning26. The project of state-building, with its need to create strong political identities, 
could coincide with state power being used to order urban environments to reinforce 
those identities. The double potency of the use of health as a justification for large scale 
re-ordering of the city was in its ability to inform a narrative of progress, both social 
and economic, and a narrative of hygiene which could augment ideological rhetoric. 
 
‘How one stifles in these dark, damp, narrow corridors which you are pleased 
to call the streets of Paris!’ – Delphine de Girardin 1838 (quoted in Pike, 2005, 
p. 106) 
 
Themes of health and cleanliness recur frequently in nineteenth century 
narratives of urban improvement. That these themes refer to the need to combat 
epidemic diseases such as cholera is not in doubt. Improving conditions under the label 
                                                 
 
26 Hungarian nationalist politician and writer Gusztáv Beksics boasted of the Hungarian 
race in his 1895 book, ‘The Romanian Question and the Battle of the Species in Europe and 
Hungary’: ‘There is no race in Europe, not even excluding the Russians and Germans, which 
would have more fertility than Hungarians. It is therefore very natural that because of a high 
mortality rate which, due to the climatic conditions of the Great Plain, particularly affects the 
Hungarian species, this species has been attacking other species by a small minority since the 
last century. If the high mortality rate of the Hungarian race would cease - and in this respect 
the development of public health will do a lot - the spectacular Hungarians would overwhelm 
the empire of St. Stephen with incredible speed.’ (Emphasis added) (1895, p. 189)  
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of health was a critical motivation for the project of Haussmannisation and was an 
overriding concern when it came to initiating major urban restructuring (Haussmann, 
1893, p. 240). A combination of factors made this motivation paramount, not least 
improvements in medical science and epidemiology. It became possible to envisage a 
humanly-constructed healthy city which left behind medieval reliance on religious 
institutions for care of the sick which had had little other provision for directly 
maintaining the health of citizens. However, there are additional aspects to this that bear 
drawing out. First, the arguments for cleaning up an unhealthy district regularly 
coincide with a powerful economic argument on the part of the developer. Railways, 
for example, ploughed their way through working class areas of cities because housing 
in these areas was often built on the land of a single landowner with whom a deal could 
be made, the land being cheaper to purchase, providing an easier route for eviction of 
residents (Kellett, 2013, p. 334) and, in moving those residents further down the line, 
provided paying commuters (Lees & Lees, 2007, p. 138). The argument that these 
districts needed to be abolished because of ill-health was potentially subsidiary to the 
economic case. Second, there is an aspect more pertinent to the question of nationalism 
– the extent to which there is a parallel in the regularisation of unhealthy districts with 
the regularisation of identity. 
The significance of Haussmann's plan for Paris was not found in it clearance of 
old districts and the building of new roads – as Benjamin points out these were achieved 
with simple tools which had been available for a long time (W. Benjamin, 2002) – but 
the fact that the state could direct such a massive effort and that financial capital could 
be raised on such as scale as to create a new city on top of the old, the new city being 
itself a work of art guided by a creative mind. The modern state provided the 
organisational resources to reorder the whole city and to treat the city as a whole form, 
220 
 
 
this modern state’s administrative power being structured by pre- and early modern 
institutional practices. 
Arrangements for financing the public works in Paris were complex and 
controversy surrounding them followed Haussmann to the end of his tenure there. 
Initially the underlying financial justification for the schemes was based on an 1841 law 
which allowed the city authorities not only to buy up land needed for public works but 
also to purchase adjacent land (D. P. Jordan, 1995, p. 114). This allowed the city to 
benefit from the increase in value of the land through disposals after development was 
completed and a system of debt was set up to enable this. Investor confidence was 
essential for a debt model to work and that confidence was engendered by, amongst 
other things, the ability of the state and of administrative law to execute compulsory 
purchases and ensure that local opposition was overcome, with the implied guarantee 
of the backing of the state should things go wrong. As was the case for Vienna and 
Budapest, new development in Paris was controlled by powers outside of the regular 
city administration. The process was radically altered, and to some extent undermined, 
by a court judgement in 1858 which stopped the city benefiting from the increase in 
value of appropriated land (W. Benjamin, 2002, p. 130). At this time the ‘caisse des 
travaux de Paris’, a body which appears to have only answered to itself, organised the 
financing of land appropriation and construction through the issue of bonds (Faure, 
2004, p. 443). Development continued to be funded by this and through loans agreed 
by Haussmann with the state. 
However, debt accumulated off the books and away from outside oversight, 
through a system of debentures. It was only in the late 1860s that the size of this hidden 
debt became public, partly through the work of opponents of the regime such as Jules 
Ferry and Emile Zola. Haussmann was effectively forced to retire as a result, but on his 
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own terms and after his work had fundamentally changed Paris (Hall, 1997, p. 74). Prior 
to the scandal, however, the displaced control over development of the city was a feature 
which permitted controversial decisions to be made while making opposition difficult 
and it focused investor confidence by putting bond investments outside of the control 
of normal politics. What Haussmann's Paris afforded was the opening up of extensive 
new opportunities for the deployment of capital. Whereas previously a city might be 
developed primarily through the use of citizens’ taxes, the city became an investment 
opportunity in the same way that an industrial concern can take on investors and provide 
a return. 
These characteristics of the new city, alongside more prosaic justifications for 
redevelopment, were the context a new phase of capitalism starting in the late 
nineteenth century. The period from around 1870 to 1914, after the Second Empire in 
France, was marked by what has been termed as a second industrial revolution (Geddes, 
1915, pp. 60–83) which described a collection of technical innovations emerging 
primarily from ascendant German and American commercial enterprises and research 
and was most readily seen in the electrification of cities from the 1880s onwards. 
Electrification allowed for mass transit, in the form of street trams, trolley buses and 
electrified metro systems to take off. It also provided lighting for the city at night, 
extending hours of functional use and, through innovative use of lighting in advertising, 
made the city at entertainment. After the initial remodelling of Paris by Haussmann this 
second industrial revolution continued to transform it and cities across Europe, 
providing a potent mix of rapid urbanisation and technology which went beyond the 
shift in a relationship between citizen and city and produced a fundamentally new way 
of living. 
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The transformation of Paris was enabled by institutional forms which were 
radically evolving: the regularised institution of public health which matured during 
this period and informed justifications of massive intervention in the cityscape; 
financial institutions which created new markets for public debt and effectively 
mortgaged property in the city whilst keeping the financial instruments outside of any 
democratic political control; and, an expansion of capitalist ventures which drove 
technological change. These evolving institutional forms afforded not only the physical 
transformation of the city but also the context for the opening up of a new kind of mass 
politics and identity. 
This new environment went beyond the straightforward glorification of state 
and nation and took on a broader significance – one which began to elide the 
particularism of the medieval city and which was more universal and cosmopolitan. To 
this extent the European city, in the remodelling of Paris, began to grow out of its 
European context and into a universal frame. As part of this process, the construction 
of the boulevards was in effect the creation of undetermined sites: places which do not 
just serve to enhance existing functions or ideological practices but which is open to 
new, as yet undefined, functions and practices and from which there is a potential for a 
financial surplus to be garnered by financial speculators. It was one in which the 
relationship between state and citizen was essentially mediated by the city and by 
technology, a new relationship which at the same time created the conditions for the 
emergence of a truly mass politics. Later this relationship perhaps sowed the seeds for 
a counter move towards the depoliticisation of the urban citizenry (Schmitt, 2007). 
 223 
 
 
Haussmannisation and Its Affordances 
Urban development of the magnitude entailed by the Haussmann scheme 
requires a vision which is collectively inspiring if not collectively inspired. Rather than 
the accretion of buildings and streets over time to form a city, which implies the gradual 
response to discrete interests, there is the abrupt appearance of new forms over a wide 
area which responds to and creates multiple interests. Whereas 'improvements' made to 
cities imply a discrete response to a clearly identified problem, the modern city is 
characterised by generalised and open-ended development on a large scale. In the case 
of the Haussmannisation of Paris, as each element was put in place the map was made 
more regular, was expanded with the annexation of suburbs at Haussmann’s behest and 
a new aesthetic order began to take hold on the city. The city was no longer a collection 
of different buildings and districts but was a work of art in itself. 
From 1852 Charles Marville, later to be named as Paris’ official photographer, 
captured images of the process of redevelopment in the city. A comparison of Marville’s 
image of the former rue Tirechape (Figure 23) and an image of the street which replaced 
it under Haussmann's scheme, rue du Pont-Neuf, (Figure 24) highlights the changes 
which took place both in terms of absolute and abstract space, to use Lefebvre's 
categorisation (Lefebvre, 1991)27. In terms of absolute space, the new boulevard was 
wider than rue Tirechape and overran its buildings. There is the creation of broad, 
uniform pavements for pedestrians; the Tirechape pedestrian had to walk on the cobbles 
in the street. There is also a new uniformity in the size of the buildings. There is much 
more, however, to identify within abstract rather than absolute space. Rue Tirechape 
                                                 
 
27 Many of Marville’s images are compared with modern day equivalents in Patrice de 
Moncan’s ‘Paris avant-après: 19e siècle-21e siècle’ and the comparison of rue Tirechape with 
a photograph taken by Moncan is made in that book (2010, p. 41). 
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shows itself to be a street with many possible residences and trades, but the dairy shop 
on the corner is a presence which intervenes in Tirechape's identity in a way not possible 
in rue du Pont-Neuf. In rue du Pont-Neuf the street's scheme – its furniture, its 
uniformity – overwhelm the singular identity of shops. Were the dairy shop at the corner 
of Tirechape to change there would be a perceptible change in the character of entrance 
to the street; in rue du Pont-Neuf the trade and the shop are interchangeable with respect 
to the street's identity. The boulevard stands on its own account, unlike rue Tirechape. 
 
Figure 23: Rue Tirechape in 1854 by Charles Marville (1854) 
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Figure 24: Rue du Pont-Neuf in 2016 (Google, 2016)  
Marville’s earlier photography shows a city empty of people – the technical 
result of long exposure times (C. Marville & Moncan, 2010, p. 16) but it also reveals a 
way in which Paris was being documented, not by observing social activity but by 
gazing upon empty spatial forms and buildings frozen in time. The fault to be corrected 
by Haussmann was the narrow, crooked street and consequently the faults of the city’s 
occupants could also be corrected. The citizen-people in this view were interchangeable, 
objects to be reinserted into a restored, rational city plan. 
At the centre of the plan was the grand croisée, the perpendicular arrangement 
of two major thoroughfares, boulevard de Sébastopol and rue de Rivoli. Both were 
based on routes in place beforehand and indeed rue de Rivoli had been begun under 
Napoleon I but the orderliness which was applied to their intersection and the widening 
work which took place gave the city principle arteries for the transmission of increasing 
traffic and readily accessible retail units in a high traffic area. The grand croisée meant 
that the gare de l’Est, completed in 1849, was connected directly through the boulevard 
de Sébastopol and attached Boulevard de Strasbourg axis, as was the nearby gare du 
Nord. In this way passenger arrivals at stations to the north of the city would be ushered 
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to the centre along a wide, airy and luxurious route. Once at the crossroads, features 
such as the tour Saint-Jacques and the fontaine du Palmier were arranged, setting them 
off against the modern thoroughfare as monumental destinations. The fountain, which 
has a column topped by a Victory statue celebrating Napoleon I’s exploits and conquests, 
was moved as one piece into an expanded place du Châtelet and two new theatres built 
at the sides of the square (D. P. Jordan, 1995, p. 197). A view of the Hôtel de Ville from 
boulevard Sébastopol in the vicinity of these central features was achieved by breaking 
through a maze of streets with a new straight road, avenue Victoria. This combination 
of new roads, renovated and rearranged monuments and new perspectives on historic 
structures had the effect of reconfiguring the centre of the city and afforded an entirely 
new urban experience, one in which an integrated network of historic and modern 
landmarks was presented to the citizen and visitor as sights to be consumed. Interaction 
with the city was made as simple as possible and a passive consumption of its wares 
was emphasised. 
As well as creating a new relationship between city and visitor, Paris’ citizen's 
relationship to urban space and place shifted dramatically as the city was remodelled. 
A form of consumerism can be perceived to be on the rise with the arrival of long streets 
lined with shops and cafés. As Sennett has noted, café practices changed during this 
period. Prior to the 1850s, the café was a place for interaction between customers, from 
casual conversation to organised meetings. The new boulevard café provided something 
different – the customer became an observer as pavement seating was turned to look 
outwards on to the street rather than inwards to make customers face each other (Sennett, 
1996, p. 345). It was the city as the place of mass consumption. The boulevards’ straight 
lines provided the setting for the grand presentation of retailing, the multiplication of 
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premium urban vistas, for premium residential units with premium prices, at a scale 
unknown beforehand. 
Starting with pioneering cities like Paris, the development of urban 
infrastructure in the latter half of the nineteenth century produced a massive increase in 
the scope of what a city could offer its occupants. The period is a crossing point in the 
process of European urbanisation: Europe moved away from a majority rural population 
to a majority urban one; cities became much more accessible to inhabitants of the 
surrounding countryside through newly built railway networks; as modern 
communication links improved, industry moved increasingly away from areas where 
the natural resources they consumed were produced and to urban production centres, 
transportation costs having been lowered enough to justify the expense; the working 
urban population began to be more organised and class identities coalesced. Mass 
consumption in the city thereby became possible: mass transportation through 
commuter railways and omnibuses; mass entertainment through sporting events and 
music halls. 
Yet even as urbanisation enabled mass consumption, mass politics and identities 
to form, as Benjamin observed, the urban design promoted by Haussmann seemed to 
militate against collective social action on the streets, from the wide-open spaces in 
which speeches to crowds could be absorbed by background noise, to the urban 
distraction of the shop window, the people-watching opportunities at the café and the 
sheer overwhelming size of the architecture which serves to inspire awe. A key feature 
of Haussmannisation was the disruption of the social structure of, and the reinforcement 
of bourgeois values in, the city centre itself. Class tensions were now played out as 
urban core against urban periphery (Harvey, 2006, pp. 236–238). Despite the best 
efforts of Haussmann, the revolutionary thirst of the city failed to be entirely quenched 
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by its beatification, as was seen in dramatic form during the Commune of 1871 when 
even the barricade received a reprieve on the wide boulevards, though those boulevards 
did also serve their purpose to shift troops to quash the rebellion (Fetridge, 1871, pp. 
281–338). 
Urban transformations such as Haussmann’s create a tension here between a 
passive consumer and active politics. The modern city offers new modes of urban 
experience and political engagement. Two examples could be called a fantastical28 
mode and a utilitarian mode. The former sees the city as the setting for a dream, whether 
it be Romantic, utopian, dystopian; the latter sees the city as the place at which the 
satisfaction of human need is sought. These two possibilities lend themselves to 
political projects across the spectrum. There can be cosmopolitan outcomes in both 
modes as there can be nationalistic ones. Both are reflexes against modern pessimism 
and aim to superimpose meaning on the city. The modern city, and its 
interconnectedness, is the place in which a fantastical community can emerge: the limits 
of space and time are eased.29 This phenomenon would be distinct from, though related 
to, a collective consciousness which can come about because of new forms of work 
under capitalism. Despite segmentation by class and inequalities of income resulting in 
vastly different lived lives in the city, there can be a common modern urban experience 
even if it is rudimentary. Ideologies which can acknowledge this can take advantage of 
                                                 
 
28 Cf. Benjamin’s use of the phantasmagorical, taken from Marx, to describe a kind of 
celebratory false consciousness which has its own ideological existence and which potentially 
transforms society’s base (2002). 
29 Benedict Anderson makes the case for print capitalism as being the primary enabling 
factor in the production of nationalism in ‘Imagined Communities’, print and literacy being 
vital to the creation of a simultaneous readership made up of people who will never meet but 
who nevertheless demonstrably share the same language. Communities imagined in print and 
made fantastical in the streets can be said to share a poïesis of community and it is in the city’s 
streets that nationalism’s communal praxis flourishes. (1991)  
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it and nationalism was well-placed to take advantage of the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of the modern, interconnected city. 
The area in which Haussmannised Paris particularly excels as an example is in 
performing the role of a fantastical city, a setting for dreams. It is notable that for a city 
whose redevelopment was predicated on and justified by rationalisation and 
modernisation should come so quickly to be seen as the archetypal romantic setting. In 
Paris, Haussmann's scheme made the romanticisation of modern urban culture possible, 
moving beyond the pre-modern urban ideal embodied, for example, in neo-Gothic 
architecture. There is no prevalent ‘French’ historicism prescribed in the architecture of 
the renewed city and aesthetic unity achieved is through the application of a relatively 
simple building code rather than adherence to the tenets of architectural schools. On the 
other hand, Haussmann went to some lengths to ensure that the new boulevards served 
to display monuments in their best light, framing such nation-glorifying monuments as 
the arc de Triumphe. The layout presents a unity and viewed as such produces an effect 
of national and imperial grandeur. It is the nature of post-revolutionary French political 
projects that a tendency towards universalism, even as a particular French culture is 
realised, reveals itself. So, the relationship of the form of the new city to the national 
project is complex. 
Haussmann's, and Napoleon III's, objectives in urban remodelling were clear 
enough. They were explicitly designed to ease traffic congestion, improve the 
productivity of the various districts of the city by making them accessible to each other, 
create a unified urban order through strict building regulations and to beatify through 
the aesthetic of the boulevard. (Hall, 1997, pp. 55–83) The street was no longer just a 
collection of individual buildings but an architectural whole in itself. What the new plan 
also afforded was not just an aesthetic order but a complementary imposition of social 
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and political order through the creation of wide boulevards which could efficiently 
transmit police and military forces to quell unrest. After the French Revolution, the city 
had been at the heart of revolutionary activity in Europe and to this extent Paris provided 
an example for others to follow. What came about in Paris in the 1850s was the 
commencement of a project which would see the shape of the city moulded to align 
with the aims of the state, glorifying French imperial ambitions on an unprecedented 
scale, providing an efficient national transport hub where connections between railway 
termini were cleared quickly and providing social and political order. These were 
objectives which could aimed at in any modern nineteenth-century city and the pursuit 
of them in Paris spurred emulation. 
Haussmannisation has many of the characteristics of programmes which 
fundamentally alter the possibilities of ideological projects in the city. Consequently 
Paris, in providing a template for other cities to follow, enabled the propagation of such 
ideological affordances. The opening up of wide thoroughfares afforded a new 
processional geography for the demonstration of mass organised power. Processions 
and demonstrations on a scale that was not possible before allowed marginal radicalised 
groups to be able to contend possession of the city. The scale of the city was changed 
such that the imprint of state and city government power was reproduced at the lowest 
level, meaning that the opportunities for highly localised autonomous and independent 
identities and politics were reduced.  
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Figure 25: Barrière de Neuilly and environs 1850 (Maillard, 1850) 
 
Figure 26: Place de l'Etoile and environs 1870 (Vuillemin, 1870) 
232 
 
 
The Haussmannisation of the setting of the arc de Triomphe is an example which 
demonstrates how the transformation of the urban layout afforded new possibilities for 
ideological practice while building upon existing forms. In Figure 25 the moment is 
shown on a map in its setting at barrière de Neuilly. It is aligned with the centre of the 
avenue des Champs-Élysées and, outside of the image, with the Tuileries Garden and 
the Louvre. Its position as a monumental arch is already prominent, an effective 
entrance into Paris from outside of the old walls and highly visible to observers at the 
centre of the city. It is also at the centre of the view from two other major boulevards. 
The map in Figure 26 shows how the prominence and centrality of the 
monument has been transformed by the Haussmann plan. The arch is now at the 
intersection of 6 axes containing twelve boulevards most of which are new and have 
pierced through a series of older streets which were not aligned with the new plan. The 
symmetrical boulevards beaming outwards give new meaning to a name for this area, 
Etoile. What is marked on the map in Figure 26 as rue Circulaire, also known as rue de 
Tilsitt and rue de Presbourg, creates a space to relieve the main monumental area of 
traffic and also to add emphasis and grandeur. One of the old boulevards, Rome, has 
effectively been moved westwards simply to line it up with another to make an aligned 
axis. Whereas in the old scheme the monument has been placed prominently as an 
adornment to the streetscape, the new scheme integrates the street plan itself with the 
monument creating a vastly expanded monumental and processional geography which 
has been used for military parades on Bastille Day and at critical junctures in French 
history for displays of national pride, and indeed national humiliation under conquest. 
So, developments in modern institutional and administrative forms such as 
public health, finance and technology enabled by capitalism, afforded a new kind of 
large scale city. Haussmann was a relatively early innovator taking advantage of these 
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new affordances and in the process of modernising Paris afforded new urban 
experiences and politics. A fantastical mode of living in the modern city created an 
abstract space for new ideological imaginaries and the realignment of streets created 
absolute space for the practices of ideologies such as nationalism. 
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The Affordances of Modernised Cities 
Haussmannisation as a concept is applied in a variety of ways and for a variety 
of ends. It is to an extent useful to apply Haussmannisation conceptually to understand 
how the modern European city, beyond Paris, developed and was structured. It is 
descriptive of a period and a style of urban development, characterised by wide 
boulevards cutting through an older street layout, the creation of large public squares, 
the alignment of monumental architecture for optimal display to the public and the 
creation of modern commercial and residential space which attracts a premium income 
over what went before. It is applied normatively as political phenomenon, often 
negatively, associating Haussmann and his imitators with a violent intervention in the 
city, demolishing working class housing, creating socio-economic barriers and 
providing maximum efficiency for the deployment of police and military power to 
prevent revolt and to protect property. It is also applied romantically, Haussmannisation 
as the bringer of modern aesthetics to the city, the City of Light which has unashamedly 
left behind the traditional medieval city. All of these applications of the concept of 
Haussmannisation contain a degree of deterministic thinking: that the urban plan on 
such a large scale, in fundamentally altering the urban experience, contributes to a 
particular set of outcomes. However, it can instead be seen as a phenomenon which 
changed what practices were possible in the city without determining them as such. In 
other words, Haussmannisation created new affordances in the city which could be used, 
or not, depending on the social and ideological conditions and context. In the case of 
Budapest, the wholesale transformation of a polyglot collection of urban centres to an 
integrated, modern and Haussmannised capital city infused with the practices and 
symbols of Hungarian-ness and Hungarian nationalism tends to suggest that 
Haussmannisation generally is a critical means by which modern urban ideological 
 235 
 
 
intervention can take place. However, the example of Venice is one where, while 
sharing some of the characteristics of a Haussmannised city, the affordance of 
nationalism was not highly dependent on a visible ‘Haussmannised’ aesthetic.  
Haussmannisation can be seen in the wider context of rapid urbanisation and its 
affordance of modernity, creating radically altered urban forms and opening up new 
affordances which could then be contested. That the Second Empire sought to narrow 
what the city’s form afforded through ideological intervention, an act of decontestation, 
did not mean that the new urban forms apparent in Paris were themselves responsible 
for restricting alternatives to French imperialism and capitalism. It was when the 
Commune of 1871 briefly imagined an alternative that other affordances were made 
visible, even if this was to be short-lived. What Haussmannisation did do was to create 
urban forms whose potential uses were far more open than before; spaces and places 
were created which could be appropriated for a greatly widened array of possible 
activities. Haussmannisation secularised the city and removed much of its traditional 
and sacred geography. At the same time this removal left Paris open to more imaginative 
geographies and it was the imaginaries of Second Empire triumphalism which were 
most successfully projected upon the newly renovated cityscape. 
Cities in Europe prior to the acceleration of urbanisation in the nineteenth 
century were relatively isolated from each other, linked to a hinterland but with 
relatively weak links to areas outside. By the end of the century, the continent's 
population was well on its way from being predominantly rural to predominantly urban: 
its cities were connected by a system of communications which meant that information, 
goods, services and people could be transferred with relative ease. The forms of cities 
themselves had been transformed with the built environment being designed and 
planned as part of a much larger urban system; the ends of such planning went from 
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being largely limited improvements to radical undertakings. The whole urban system 
now required ongoing attention and intervention. 
Over the nineteenth century, the European city became more rationalised and 
depersonalised and as it grew in size new urban forms infiltrated citizens’ everyday 
lives more deeply. Aspects of urban life which had played their part in controlling the 
everyday life of the city: the regulation of building; a citizenry which was served by a 
commune or corporation with a degree of autonomy; the policing and control of the 
urban population by formal and informal local institutions and customs, were all to be 
transformed. Even as this was the case, however, the opportunities for people to break 
free of traditional social constraints both because of a shift of values and an increase in 
the possibilities that anonymity gave them for greater individual liberty than before. 
The story of the transformation of European cities in the nineteenth century is not 
simply one of a shift in administrative attitudes. Instead, it indicates a tipping point 
reached in the history of market capitalism. The large projects which shaped the newly 
transformed cities were funded on an unprecedented scale by private capital and public 
debt. The latter half of the century was the point at which globalising economic forces 
meant that there was often no longer an agrarian economy capable of taking back those 
who had migrated to the city. The new cities were places in which a newly-minted 
modern citizenry of all classes had to play their part in modernity. The population and 
the fabric of the modern city might be driven by economic imperatives but they are 
shaped by cultural forces too. Nationalism represents itself in abstract terms such as 
‘people’ and ‘nation’ but its outworking must come in an environment where there is a 
mass of people who can respond to its calls to the exclusion of others. Rural Europe 
was not such a place – though the peasantry might be rallied to the call of a national 
idea, it is an idea which is rooted in the personality of monarchy or the authority of the 
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Church. It is in the city that the idea of a self-sustaining nation can really take hold as 
the abstractions of nation and people can be visualised in the masses on the street. 
Ideologies such as nationalism were successful in mobilising the citizenry, giving them 
a meaningful role aside from, and elevated above, production and leisure. 
Haussmann's Paris is a reference point for the modern European city not because 
it was the first example of rational town planning but because of the scale of its 
execution and the fundamental shift in the application of a far-reaching and 
encompassing plan which acted as a template which others followed. The execution of 
the plan was heavily criticised by opponents for its insensitivity to the old city, and for 
its financial underpinnings. Yet at the time it served to influence many subsequent urban 
development projects. Aside from the original scheme, it is the template this provided 
for development which matters when it comes to understanding how the modern 
European city took shape. In other cities, the Haussmann model was adopted in the 
context of emergent nationalisms and nationhood. 
The city was a benchmark against which other cities could measure themselves; 
what it provides now is an ideal type of modern city by which other European cities can 
be interpreted. On the first, it is important to note that Haussmann’s plan did not provide 
an exact form to be followed. Rather, conceptually it built certain foundations of urban 
modernity that provided an underpinning for modern urban ideology. To isolate parts of 
those foundations: interchangeable sites are manufactured on a grand scale; hygiene is 
built into the urban fabric through, among other things, the universal provision of water 
and sewerage services; the city becomes a military object, it is no longer a fortified 
bastion to be defended but rather an open system of clean lines of communication via 
which the military can penetrate the city and bring order; grandeur and spectacle are 
inbuilt through the use of processional geographies and monumentalisation. None of 
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these parts are exclusive to Haussmannisation. Instead, it is the gathering of these 
particular parts which promotes emulation. It is in this emulation that the resulting form 
of the city – its architecture, infrastructure, institutions and social relations – generates 
ideological possibilities and in the late nineteenth-century nationalist ideology in 
particular was able to thrive on the setting of modernity. More broadly, what is imported 
to a city when it adopts the Haussmann template is an environment into which a mass 
citizenship can move freely and project its own fantasy as never before. That fantasy is, 
as far as the city's developers are concerned, the coda for a kind of consumer desire and 
one which it is hoped is profitable. What it cannot preclude, however, is other desires 
appearing, ones which project revolutionary hope, nationalistic fervour and utopian 
schemes on it. 
How far Haussmannised Paris actually acted as a template for the late 
nineteenth-century modern European city is, however, difficult to measure definitively. 
Many of the European city improvement projects in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, as has already been highlighted, were responding to problems thrown up by 
industrialisation and urban migration. The extent to which it was a direct reference point 
differed from city to city: Budapest certainly shows Hausssmann’s influence and 
Glasgow’s redevelopment from the 1860s was directly influenced by his work (Hunt, 
2004, p. 233) but others such as Barcelona, Berlin and Vienna show their own unique 
features and, given their close temporal proximity, are projects which might only have 
a tangential relationship to Paris (cf. Lees & Lees, 2007, pp. 169–170). Further, the 
immediate political context of each application of Haussmannisation by and large 
differed from the Second Empire. In Barcelona's case, Cerdá's Eixample had socialist 
aspirations and was realised in the context of a nascent Catalan nationalism; in Vienna's 
case, it occurred as a modernisation under Habsburg administration, initiated by fiat by 
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the Austrian Emperor. It would seem that Haussmannisation was able to accommodate 
and be accommodated by many different political forms and ideologies. These disparate 
projects, however, have in common a response to the consolidation of bourgeois power 
in Europe and a new modern European cityscape shaped by the socio-political 
possibilities of the future urban order. 
The name of Haussmann has become associated with a form of urbanism which 
has attracted much criticism. During his time this was largely because of his financial 
practices but also because of his administrative arrogance. The opponents of Napoleon 
III's regime singled out Haussmann for attack as a way of undermining the Empire itself. 
The totalising aspect of the design has also lamented, both at the time and in subsequent 
years. Benjamin's Arcades Project is, in some ways, an ode to a Paris which he saw as 
destroyed by Haussmann. Haussmann's disciples in the twentieth century – Le 
Corbusier and Robert Moses being the most prominent – are the epitome of a kind of 
bureaucratic planning that has become deeply unfashionable in the neo-liberal era. 
However, focusing on the rationalisation and commercialisation promoted by state-
sponsored planning in Paris on such a large scale misses a wider point. The Haussmann 
model in itself does not determine its despotic use as some would claim Haussmann (W. 
Benjamin, 2002, pp. 189–220; Lefebvre, 1991, p. 297). Whatever the intention of Paris' 
planners, it was the flexibility of the scheme within a well-defined organising structure 
that goes a long way to explain its endurance. 
Any restructuring of the city on such a massive scale would necessarily alter the 
lived experience of the Parisian and the radical possibilities of social and political action 
within the city. The demolition of old parts of the city and the construction of grand 
boulevards did not, as Benjamin would have it, give the city an ‘inhuman character’ or 
‘estrange[s] the Parisians from their city’ (2002, p. 12) but it was the interaction of 
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Haussmannisation and the Second Empire which narrowed the affordances of the newly 
emerging modern city. It is a mistake to understand urban forms as being the extensions 
of a singular expression of the power of one world-historical actor, class or ideological 
movement. Though any of these might motivate and enable the production of new urban 
forms, those forms have an excess of affordances which could support or undermine 
those original aims. It is the goal of ideology in the city to reduce those affordances 
through the shaping of social practices, both externally and internally policed. When it 
came to the Communards erecting barricades where apparently they had been 
engineered out of the design of the city, it was a less a failure of engineering of the 
environment to ideological ends and more a discovery of new affordances of 
Haussmannised Paris which had previously been occluded by ideological language and 
practice. 
In ‘The Arcades Project’ Benjamin theorised Haussmannisation as the whole 
form of Paris’s actualised modernity with all its fantastical and unstable aspects (2002, 
pp. 14–26). He perceived a contradiction between the straightness of the boulevards 
and the crookedness of methods used to build them. Haussmannisation for Benjamin 
aimed to remove the revolutionary potential of Paris as a city with the widening and 
straightening of the streets being directly motivated by the desire to remove the 
possibility of insurrectionary barricades. In this conception, Haussmannisation is a 
monolithic agent of destruction and control; viewed in class terms it is an act of 
bourgeois triumphalism over the working class, destroying working class districts and 
redirecting their labours to the construction of a luxurious capital city. This 
understanding of Haussmannisation has been highly influential in critical urbanism and 
is predicated upon the notion of monolithic state power and the ability for planners to 
use architecture and urban form to determine urban experience and use. 
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While this is undoubtedly a powerful analysis, it is problematic for several 
reasons. It confuses the rationalised straight lines of the Haussmann plan as a single-
minded expression of bourgeois dominance, as if the interests of a class are so readily 
schematised. It is an analysis which can be applied to outline conditions for resistance 
and the imagining of other urban possibilities. However, in doing so it locks urban 
development into a deterministic logic which can only be thoroughly overturned. 
Benjamin interpreted the Paris Commune in 1871, which saw a radical alternative 
arising at the height of Haussmannisation, as a movement which exposed unsustainable 
contradictions in the design of the city. This need not have been the case – the forces 
which produced the new city were complex and although the guiding minds of 
Haussmann and Napoleon III were clear in their narrative about what they want to 
achieve, their attempt at determining Paris’s direction need not be accepted as rigidly 
followed through. 
Using Haussmann’s work as a reference point for the development of the 
modern European city has its benefits and limitations. On the one hand, the scale of the 
Haussmann project and the fact that it is a relatively early example of modernisation. 
Earlier examples in London were on a much smaller scale, for example Nash’s Regent 
Street master plan which does not have quite the same overwhelming effect on the 
experience of London. With Haussmannisation, the new boulevards did not have their 
use determined; ideologues could perceive what they afforded and attempt to make use 
of those affordances. 
The concept of Haussmannisation can be used as a kind of shorthand to 
understand a phenomenon which affected many European cities during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More than anything else this phenomenon is 
indicative of the application of new technologies, enabled by industrialisation, to the 
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urban setting. Haussmannisation is taken one step too far perhaps when it is stretched 
to understand some of the ideological constructs and motivations surrounding this 
process of modernisation of European cities. Indeed, there is the danger of parochialism 
in taking the project of Napoleon III, Haussmann and the French Second Empire Paris 
to be a rigid template. Despite the fact that many cities can be demonstrated to have 
been influenced by Haussmann’s Paris, it was neither original nor the essential template 
of European urban modernisation. The modernisation of Europe's streets would and 
could have happened without Paris. Instead a complex set of processes were already in 
train. These processes were ordered both by what came before in the urban setting and 
by wider influences and forces at an international, global level. 
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8. Conclusion 
Urbanisation during the last couple of centuries occurred within the context of 
movement from traditional social arrangements to secular ones and was rendered as a 
desacralisation of urban space. The process by which traditional customs and 
institutions became modern can be summed up as a simple principle which underlies 
much of this project’s use of the theory of affordances: the new is afforded by the old. 
For example, as the authority of traditional institutions such as the Church and 
Monarchy waned, so space for new identities and ideologies was cleared. Yet there is 
an irony in this reading of the relationship of traditional authority to cities. Both of these 
examples of traditional institution have in the past been in some way disruptive of rural 
life in favour of the urban: early Christianity was an urban phenomenon and it was only 
in the Early Middle Ages that the Church made a concerted effort to Christianise the 
countryside to replace paganism. The term paganism, though there is considerable 
debate about its late Roman meaning, came to be associated with the countryside, with 
its sloppy adherence to Christian practices and even with peasant susceptibility to 
immorality (Le Goff, 1980, pp. 92–93). In contrast to this was the civilisation of the 
Church reinforced by centres of religious life and learning which were associated with 
urban life. Pre-modern monarchy was in some ways a more urban counterweight to the 
rural aristocracy. Both institutions have in the modern era made some efforts at 
modernisation and accommodation of industrial and urban society. This would suggest 
that they were institutions which could adapt to modern conditions and that could make 
themselves available to modern urban society as cohesive alternatives to other more 
novel ideological alternatives. A separation of older institutional structures from new is 
artificial then – nationalism did not just ‘borrow’ aspects of religion and traditionalism, 
it was in many ways a traditional response to modernity. 
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This reading of how forms interact and respond to each other in human 
environments and cultures addresses how modernisation and modernity in cities is 
gravid with ideological possibilities. Those possibilities are not necessarily the intended 
consequence of modernisation. Individuals like Haussmann, state administrations and 
entire social classes have been ascribed intent in a way that flatters the power of 
individuals, institutions and social classes to envisage the use of urban structures. Such 
structures are immediately in the reach of millions of people whose interests and desires 
do not necessarily align with the urban planner or controlling authorities. Urban 
structures, of course, can shape and direct human behaviour over time but the means by 
which they do this are unstable. A straight boulevard might make military interventions 
in times of revolt more efficient but it also provides the stage for mass demonstration 
and protest. 
Mass politics, ideological movements and large-scale urbanisation in the 
nineteenth century made for a combination of interrelated and interplaying forms. These 
forms had capabilities which enabled their own and others’ development and progress. 
The relative strength of their interactions in different contexts is indicated by the extent 
to which a city could be said, for example, to have ‘nationalised’. In the case studies 
here, it was only Budapest which could be fully designated such. The urban forms 
which structured, and structure, Budapest afforded a range of possibilities and the 
Hungarian nationalist project, broadly defined, was able to make use of these 
affordances. In turn, Budapest’s urban forms were themselves afforded by an 
ideological backdrop in which nationalist sentiment and aspiration were a significant 
feature. Urban forms and political projects can feed off each other. In the cases of 
Vienna and Venice, modernisation afforded a different set of outcomes and these 
outcomes were more weakly associated with nationalist programmes. This said, both 
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cities were to be drawn into extreme nationalist projects from the 1920s to the 1940s. 
Their earlier modernisations afforded their integration into nationalist narratives. In the 
case of Vienna, modernisation created the possibility of it becoming the cosmopolitan 
centre of a multi-ethnic empire and its scale enabled a mass politics, both of which were 
to have later unforeseen effects on German and Austrian nationalism. Venice afforded 
a dramatic backdrop to 1930s fascism (Ferris, 2012), the use of its imagery and myth 
being a potent instrument for the enforcement of Italian nationalist claims of the long 
persistence of an Italian genius in historical Venice. 
Having expanded upon the three city cases and also demonstrated the operation 
of forms and affordances in many different examples, it is possible to remark upon the 
affordance of ideological projects for each category of form identified. Urban wholes 
are found to have both physical and institutional manifestations. Physically, they can be 
most readily observed through their external boundaries, through their internal 
configurations, through their vulnerability and through processes of consolidation and 
bridging. Institutionally, they can be observed through the overlapping of authority, 
through claims on urban resources, through claims on social classes and through 
statistical control. Physical wholes are found to afford ‘territorial integrity’ analogous 
to a national homeland or a component thereof. Institutional wholes afford a new kind 
of claim of allegiance from a population freed from traditional bonds and authority. 
Physical urban rhythms are created when unpredictable or uncertain forces are 
brought under control to make them more predictable and safe. Regulation of 
watercourses and flooding is one such example. Institutional urban rhythms are created 
by the declaration of rules and principles. Timetables are a manifestation of a series of 
negotiations and decisions regarding routing, labour and capital expenditure among 
many other conditions which coalesce into a publicised regular plan of services. 
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Physical urban rhythms afford spatial control and the consequent control of city 
dwellers. Institutional urban rhythms afford temporal coordination – places can be 
linked to other places on an everyday basis. 
Urban hierarchical forms impinge on cities in two ways, internally and 
externally. Internal hierarchies are found encoded in the material of the city. 
Architecture enables a hierarchy of meanings, often much contested. Morphology 
structures spaces and buildings and organises them hierarchically. External hierarchies 
place cities within a wider context. Other than being within state structures, cities find 
themselves within historical legal structures which position their institutional autonomy 
and power. Semi-official external hierarchies, such as city rankings, also position them. 
This crosses over with cultural hierarchies where, for example, the importance of a city 
can be contested. Internal hierarchies afford readings of the cityscape which can be co-
opted by ideology: architectural styles and morphological arrangements provide 
material for narratives not just about immediate functional purposes but also for deeper 
imaginaries and memory. External hierarchical forms put the city in its place, so to 
speak. They are the forms through which cities acquire ‘status’ and such status claims 
afford further claims on behalf of a city's inhabitants and for wider state structures in 
which the city is located. 
Urban networks place cities in a web of contacts with the outside world and also 
operate within cities, holding them together. Technical networks are built from physical 
infrastructure, providing the means to allow intra-city services – urban transit, power 
and sanitary facilities are examples. Networks also interconnect cities, transport again 
being a prime example. Cultural networks are critical to the everyday operation of cities, 
interpersonal and business relationships being the most immediate examples and deep 
cultural norms and formal rules structure and govern the conduct of such relationships. 
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Innovations in technical networks afford new social practices such as mass tourism in 
the case of the expansion of railways. They provide the means for growth of economic 
activity through trade in goods and services. They work symbiotically with cultural 
networks which order social practices. As technical networks expand, they afford the 
possibility of larger communities, communities which might seek or have imposed upon 
them common identities. 
Physical urban wholes are observed in the demarcation of territory and in claims 
on a city’s identity. In Venice, a continuous process over many centuries of stabilisation 
of the Rialto archipelago was part of a process of creating and maintaining an urban 
whole. The Venetian case is instructive in showing how the whole is constructed and 
institutionally maintained – tied in with rhythms of decay, Venetian urban whole forms 
have required constant maintenance over time to sustain territorial integrity. Venice’s 
marginal position in the Lagoon accentuates this but it is a process that is at work in 
every functioning city. It is enabled by expertise and as such is a demonstration of 
institutional power.  
The case of Budapest shows processes of consolidation of whole forms. This is 
demonstrated in three events: the flooding of Pest in 1838, the opening of the Széchenyi 
Bridge between Buda and Pest in 1848 and the unification of Pest, Buda and Óbuda in 
1871. The flood afforded the opportunity to reconstitute Pest as a more modern city, the 
whole form was recovered and improved within previous territorial limits. An extension 
of this improvement came in the form of the bridge which created a permanent link with 
Buda and effectively afforded the formation of a new urban whole. The removal of 
aristocratic exemptions from bridge tolls indicated the bourgeois hold on this new urban 
whole spanning the Danube, the older, traditional arrangements of the old urban wholes 
overwhelmed by the superimposition of the new form. Official unification completed 
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this process but also demonstrated a further move, this time from a bourgeois civic 
conception of the city to one augmented with national characteristics as the new 
Hungarian capital. 
Viennese urban wholes show something different again. The demolition of the 
old walls was a more violent interruption of previous urban forms as liberal bourgeois 
Vienna broke down the bastions of aristocratic old Vienna and created a new, expanded 
city to accommodate its institutions, grand residences and symbols of power. 
The consolidation of the whole afforded the development of other types of urban 
form: the technical integration of Vienna became possible, creating networks of services 
for the expanding city; the Ringstrasse opened up the possibility of an architectural 
hierarchy under which different cultural and political imaginaries could be negotiated. 
Modernising schemes such as the Ringstrasse and Haussmann’s plan for Paris 
make for a legible city. This legibility transfers to the citizen from the city as an ordered 
city organises residents and daily life in a way which make citizens’ activities more 
readily predictable to authorities (cf. Scott, 1998). This is also seen in the example of 
Barcelona where justification for the Eixample and the demolition of walls was 
predicated on Catalan and regional aspirations but also upon the need to regulate what 
was an unhealthy, enclosed city and provide clear order to the residents of the city. 
These examples perhaps overstate the singularity of an urban whole and 
understate the possibility of the plurality of urban wholes. Rome provides a useful 
expression of the latter where multiple urban wholes, both secular and religious, 
overlapped and competed with each other in the modern city. These overlaps are 
characteristic of urban whole forms and the tension created by them drives a politics in 
which the identity of cities and their citizens are at stake. 
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The rhythms of the water courses around Vienna were increasingly brought 
under control through the application of hydraulic technologies to channel and prevent 
flooding. Regular water flows and seasonal fluctuations were brought under control and 
made predictable. This afforded both the opening up of more parts of the city to 
expensive development, having reduced the risks of flood damage. It was also for the 
model to follow in other areas of infrastructure as the hydraulic view of the city could 
be applied in other ways, such as to traffic circulation. The rhythmic form affords a 
view of the city as a dynamic system – not the only tool to enable this view but a very 
powerful one nonetheless. 
Water features as the key agent in urban rhythms in Venice too, of course. It is 
its proximity to water which makes the city so susceptible to decay and rhythms of 
rejuvenation are governed by the principle of com'era, dov'era which place the city's 
development and maintenance in a cyclical form. 
These water-related rhythms are efforts to control and make predictable cycles 
that are external and previously unpredictable. There are also examples of rhythms 
which are controlled from the start: the timetable of the London to Birmingham Railway 
is one such example. This shows the power of the manufactured rhythm as it creates 
empty events, pre-set times on the table to be used at will by potential passengers. Such 
rhythms create novel urban experiences, compressing space and time (cf. Giddens, 1990, 
pp. 112–150). 
The desire for a city which has a moral purpose necessitates examples which 
are not to be followed. A hierarchy of urban moral purpose is seen in Rousseau's 
exaltation of Geneva over Paris and it is to be found more directly engaged in the 
nationalist rhetoric found in Táncsics’ call for Budapest to be the Homeland’s Altar. His 
contrast of this high moral purpose against the luxury of Paris is telling at the time when 
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Haussmannisation was in full flow in Paris which is at this time a backdrop to 
Budapest’s development. That Altar, though, finds its accommodated in Andrássy 
Avenue with the construction of the Millennium Memorial, other Hungarian nationalist 
monuments and the use of the new boulevards for nationalist events such as Kossuth’s 
funeral. The moral purpose sought after by nationalists can be afforded by modern 
boulevards as much as it can enable Parisian luxury. 
Such hierarchical forms find their way into architecture. The historicism of the 
Ringstrasse takes as its underlying theme not one superior architectural style but a series 
of executions of different styles set in relation to one another. Though this can appear 
to be relativistic, some styles vie for superiority over others as, for example, the 
Classicism of the Parliament claims an older heritage than the Gothic of the Town Hall 
while the Town Hall claims a vital civic pride originating in mediaeval Europe over a 
moribund, sterile Classical Parliament; each building symbolising a claim to be a step 
above the other in a hierarchy of styles. 
Internal morphological hierarchies are at play too. The example of Krakow, with 
Wawel Hill set apart, shows not only how exclusive space can be used to create 
hierarchy but also how such a layout can persist long after its original hierarchical 
meanings have declined. The layout of a city affords sets of spaces which can be utilised 
to order function and meaning hierarchically. 
External hierarchical forms impinge on cities and define their relationships to 
other places. The inhabitant/visitor hierarchy is a key political factor in ongoing debates 
about the development and economy of Venice. The rights of citizens to a normal life 
unaffected by tourism compete with the external claim on Venice as an item of global 
patrimony. Cities are also ranked, or rank themselves, in tables to show off certain 
desirable attributes. The desire of cities such as Vienna and Budapest to become 
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Weltstädte meant that the relative strengths of each city were measured against positive 
criteria: quantity and size of cultural institutions, size of economy and size of population 
all featured, as well as less easily defined criteria such as the extent of their modernity, 
and so forth. 
The construction of technical networks underpinned nineteenth and twentieth 
century urbanism. Railways afforded territorial expansion and control by state and 
colonial powers. Rail also enabled the interconnection of existing urban places and the 
expansion of those places through migration and commuting. In the case of Budapest, 
rail was particularly important with regard to Magyarisation as its rural hinterland 
contained a population which could be converted to Magyarised immigrants. It also 
afforded mass spectacle, as shown in the case of the funeral of Lajos Kossuth and the 
Hungarian Millennial Exhibition, both in 1896. 
In Venice’s case, rail afforded the development of mass tourism and the 
exposure of the city to a kind of objectification in which the city became part of a global 
patrimony to be protected from local residents. Rail did not permeate Venice the way it 
did most other cities: despite several proposals the city still does not have a metro 
system and the railway station clings to the edge of the city. However, the railway, and 
later the airports at its periphery, disgorged visitors on a massive scale. As for internal 
transport, the vaporetti took the everyday business of ferrying people away from the 
gondoliers and made more regular and efficient services available. This internal 
network of efficient movement in Venice was a waterborne version of the omnibus 
service, started in Nantes. Omnibus-like services were, unlike the gondolier-provided 
services, depersonalised and not dependent on demand from specific customers. This 
afforded the compression of the city, navigable by all-comers who needed no expertise 
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and little money to move around. This kind of urban network became a key feature of 
the modern urban experience. 
Cultural networks can form independently or symbiotically with technical 
network forms. In the case of Viennese coffeehouse culture, several forms afforded this 
cultural network. Coffeehouses in Vienna effectively acted as distribution points for 
several networks, not just as outlets for the sale of refreshments and food. Newspapers 
were distributed to coffeehouses for patrons to read – since the sale of newspapers on 
the street was restricted this was a crucial outlet for the print distribution network and 
afforded coffeehouses being public places for the discussion of news and ideas. Since 
Vienna’s housing stock was of poor quality in the late nineteenth century, coffeehouses 
had domestic functions such as taking in laundry, receiving mail and acting as places 
for study. This concentration of end points in a series of distribution networks – print, 
laundry, postal and others – also concentrated people and afforded the development of 
cultural networks. Although cultural networks can form at a local level without 
technical innovation, it is technical networks which enable geographically widespread 
communities the form cultural networks. Cultural networks can conform also through 
the development of shared standards, rules and norms. The example of the Saharan trade 
network shows how permanent trade links across the Sahara were underpinned by the 
establishment of a shared Islamic culture. Here the cultural network was key in the 
enabling a technical network, camel transportation, to develop and thrive and a series 
of trading cities to emerge on the periphery of the Sahara. 
Groups can make claims over territory only if that territory is defined. A feature 
of claims over urban wholes which is distinct from those over state territorial wholes is 
their relative lack of portability. A claim over an urban whole has a relatively fixed 
range of coordinates on the globe compared to that over a state territory. The modern 
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city of Kaliningrad is an example of this. Between 1945 and 1947 the identity of the 
city at Kaliningrad changed more dramatically than almost any other city in Europe 
ever has. Its conversion from the Prussian city of Koenigsberg to the Soviet city of 
Kaliningrad was accompanied by a wholesale transfer of population which entirely 
changed the city’s ethnic composition. The bombing of the city in 1944 all but destroyed 
its city centre along with key landmarks, Koenigsberg’s castle being the most symbolic. 
Yet Kaliningrad’s mapping on to the city of Koenigsberg has seen a retention of some 
kind of continuity: ontologically, the city is in some way the same place32. Compare 
this to the change in state claims over the wider territory in which the city of Kaliningrad 
now sits. At the end of 1944 this territory belonged to the German Empire as part of the 
province of East Prussia. In 1945 it was invaded and then, after the Potsdam Conference, 
transferred in part to the Soviet Union (Stalin, Truman, & Attlee, 1950, p. 42). Although 
a similar population transfer took place in the territory around Koenigsberg also, the 
sense of an underlying continuity with what went before is far weaker at the state level 
than at the city level. The successor to the German Empire is the Federal German 
Republic which has not made any claim on former eastern lands. The sense that the 
                                                 
 
32 Koenigsberg today has an identity which persists in Kaliningrad and it is one that has 
been invoked through the name of Immanuel Kant. Its cathedral on Kneiphof, now named 
Kant's Island, has been restored and contains Kant's grave. Kant acts as a cypher for a 
Koenigsberg-Kaliningrad in which German identity of the site must not be acknowledged. 
Kant's name is invoked to suggest a continuity. The Kaliningrad State Pedagogical Institute was 
renamed Immanuel Kant Federal University of Russia in 1996. As the University's website in 
2011 proclaimed: 
‘The University's greatest alumnus is Immanuel Kant, the world-famous philosopher, 
who was a Russian citizen for some time. The name of I. Kant forever linked the city of 
Königsberg and the Albertina University with the spiritual heritage of humankind and the 
history of the region.’ (“History | IKBFU,” 2011)(“History | IKBFU,” 2011) Thus an institution 
which is not continuous with the Albertina University of Königsberg from an administrative or 
personnel perspective can identify with a Koenigsberg identity purged of its German-ness. 
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German-ness of Kaliningrad’s hinterland has all but been erased is far greater than is 
the case with the city itself. 
What is at stake with whole urban forms, then, is the identity of a place which 
is anchored to the land. Plutarch describes the ancient practice of establishing a city by 
digging a ceremonial ‘mundus’ then forming the boundaries of the city around it using 
a plough (2001, p. 32). This ritual emphasises the fixedness of urban wholes, even 
though urban whole forms might be conceived differently, overlapping each other and 
consolidating other territory. It also indicates the possibility of the creation of an urban 
whole being an act which is itself like an ideological claim: urban morphology has had 
and continues to maintain a ritual underpinning. The characteristics of most urban 
wholes include some kind of boundedness and centre. Such a geography offers the 
possibility of inclusion and exclusion and the affordance of naming what is included. 
Again, to take a comparison with a state as a way of putting this possibility into relief, 
the English name for the modern Czech Republic in ordinary speech can remain 
relatively ambiguous – attempts at naming it Czechia have so far not caught on – but 
the idea that Prague could sustain such uncertainty in its identity is difficult to imagine33. 
This fixing of the identity of urban wholes affords them being the objects of ideological 
attention. The degree to which nationalist ideology was able to do this in the cases of 
Budapest, Vienna and Venice will be returned to. 
                                                 
 
33 Ambiguity about identity might be a sensible strategy in a naming dispute, however. 
Derry-Londonderry currently has extraordinary multiple administrative identities. A local 
planning document from 2017 contains this introductory paragraph which touches on sensitivity 
about the name of the city: ‘Derry City and Strabane District Council area comprises the second 
largest city in Northern Ireland / fourth largest city on the Island of Ireland. Derry-Londonderry 
is the ‘Capital of the North West’ and is at the core of the only functional economic city region 
of its scale which straddles the border into the Republic of Ireland.’ (Derry City & Strabane 
District’s Inclusive Strategic Growth Plan 2017-2032 Our Community Plan, 2017, p. 6)  
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Some basic, unmodified rhythms afford possibilities for cities; weather 
influences ambient conditions necessary for the production of textiles and inhabitants 
of more humid regions, governed by the rhythms of the water cycle, may take advantage 
of this by building mills there. What has been of particular interest in the case studies, 
however, is the modification and control of human made rhythmic forms: timetables, 
the regulation of water flows and longer-term cycles of decay and renewal. Such 
rhythms are closely associated with engineering regularity, making everyday urban 
processes more predictable. Although it is through technology that such rhythms are 
engineered, it is human behaviour that ultimately becomes regulated and ordered by 
these rhythms. 
Institutional rhythms, such as regular performances in theatre, afford not only 
the opportunity for the dissemination of particular ideas but also animate an institution. 
The schedule of events is performative in its own right. The formal existence of 
institutional schedules is separated from the content. A city can have cultural institutions 
whose programming is obscure and unpopular whilst at the same time laying claim to 
a cultural ‘life’ by virtue of the existence of such programmes. Accordingly, this effect 
works with institutional hierarchies governing reputation. It is a powerful combination: 
the proceedings of The Hungarian Academy of Sciences are not only important because 
of scientific findings they facilitate but also because the institution is seen to be alive 
by virtue of its regular output and its place on a reputational scale relative to other 
institutions. Obviously without content these rhythmic and hierarchical forms are 
insufficient but content is operationalised in service of the institution by these kinds of 
form. What they also do is permit a city to lay claim to this institutional output and in 
the case of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest its very identity puts it at 
the service of nationalist aspiration. 
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Control of environmental conditions is critical to the maintenance of a stable 
urban system. Regarding water, cities must contend with the ebb and flow of rivers, 
oceans and the water table to create stable land for building and to prevent chaotic 
ingress. Simultaneously, they must harness water to provide sustenance and sanitation. 
The means by which this double challenge is tackled inevitably gives rise to changes in 
how the water cycle impinges on urban territory and, if they are to be applied 
successfully, need to ensure that these rhythms are, as far as possible, predictable. 
Control of these rhythms affords the consolidation of territory, as was the case with 
Vienna and the example of Amsterdam. Such hydraulic schemes inspired other kinds of 
systematic integration in modern cities as the dynamics of water circulation apply to 
traffic and public transport. The required technical competence in producing predictable 
rhythms increased the prestige and power of city authorities and underpinned the effort 
to make cities clean and healthy. 
Institutional and environmental rhythmic forms combine in the case of Venice 
and its principle of com'era, dov'era – as the waters of the Lagoon corrode the Venetian 
urban fabric, the city needs to be constantly maintained. Should any large scale 
construction be required – the rebuilding of the Campanile being a good example – this 
principle ensures the city returns cyclically to how it was prior to modernity. The 
rhythmic form affords a conservative approach to the development of the city, one 
which in turn reinforces social structures in the city. 
As technology has developed to provide services to cities, so rhythms afford the 
creation of new ways of life. Motorised transport compresses space and time not just 
because of its facilitation of speedy journeys but also because such journeys are regular 
– they are governed by timetables. The reliability of these rhythms means that new and 
stable communities are afforded both within cities as larger populations are sustained 
 257 
 
 
and through opening up cities to outside visitors and trade. Rhythmic forms combine 
with networks to enable communities that are not immediately visible to each other to 
be maintained. If combined with print technology (Anderson, 1991), for example, this 
could be a potent force for nationalism to tap through rapid distribution of political 
publications through a national territory. 
Particular nationalisms embed themselves within hierarchies of people grouped 
as nations. Even ‘civic’ nationalism has an understanding of itself as superior to more 
chauvinistic nationalisms. Political programmes which structure themselves within the 
concept of nation are entered into competition with other nations. The nation in this 
scheme must acquire characteristics which distinguish it from others. Hierarchies of 
cities afforded nationalisms the opportunity to claim cities as national accomplishments. 
In expressing the desire for Budapest to become the Homeland’s Altar, Táncsics not 
only looked to the city to provide a moral centre to Hungarian nationalism but also to 
place the city above others, such as Paris, which in his view took luxury as a guiding 
principle. The development of the modern city with all of its facilities and conveniences 
not only afforded a kind of output legitimacy for urban authorities but also produced a 
symbolic excess which could be soaked up for ideological use. 
Hierarchical forms which place the city within a wider context, as opposed to 
hierarchies which are internal to each city, are essential in structuring cities’ 
relationships with each other, with other types of community and with larger state-like 
structures. The ‘rights’ available to particular city authorities and their citizens are 
governed by a historico-legal order, as seen in the case of emergent cities of northern 
Italy set within the context of imperial and papal power. This order can be contested 
and urban identity can be shaped by the conflicts and benefits which accrue through it. 
The urban identity which is consequently afforded can be applied to ideological 
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programmes. Venice's identity formed at the margins of the Byzantine and the Holy 
Roman Empires was later available to modern Italian nationalism for co-option: Venice 
could be held up as a continuous ‘Italian’ polity which could be seen to counter the 
Italian peninsula’s domination by external powers. 
Internal hierarchical forms structure and reinforce everyday urban experience. 
The architecture and morphology of cities embed hierarchical assumptions and conflicts, 
most readily seen in ‘Battle of the Styles’ type building collections in places like the 
Ringstrasse, in relative building sizes (for example, London's national parliament 
buildings had been much larger than the accommodation of its various city authorities 
for many centuries whilst Vienna’s national parliament building, in contrast, is on equal 
terms with its Town Hall) and morphology creates an ordering of space which affords 
displays of power both permanent – castles on hills – and temporary – processions in 
squares and boulevards. 
Social hierarchies, such as social class, have not featured directly in this analysis 
but they are implicated in all of the internal and external hierarchies tackled. The simple 
hierarchy of inhabitant/visitor comes most close to describing a social hierarchy even 
if it is by definition temporary. The distinction of inhabitant and visitor is important to 
political programmes for several reasons. First, it helps define who is an acknowledged 
political actor – the inhabitant, with other qualifications – and who has not earned the 
right for political participation in the life of the city – the visitor. This noted, the visitor’s 
role in shaping the city should not be underestimated, as the example of Venice has 
shown. This hierarchical form affords, then, not only a participatory community but 
also affords observation and judgement of an outside world, reinforcing the hierarchy 
of all cities, for example. The visitor is the subject to be convinced of the excellence of 
a city, one to whom the best face of the city must be shown. The inhabitant/visitor 
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hierarchy, along with the economic logic which sustains visitors, affords the 
development of urban centres that are fit for visitors, and makes possible the city acting 
as a showcase of national achievement and pride. 
Large technical networks which provide the infrastructure and services of the 
modern city, and indeed the modern economy, created vast and complex connections 
that are difficult for individual citizens to perceive. Successful technical networks, 
however, are not dependent on their individual participants perceiving their complexity 
but seek to make themselves easy-to-use. Further, the use of technical networks 
transforms social relations. Giddens refers to this transformation as ‘disembedding’ in 
which social relations are taken from their local context and abstracted to ‘indefinite 
spans of time-space’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 21). For Giddens, what underpins this 
transformation in modern society is the concept of ‘trust’, applied in a technical network 
as the user’s confidence that the system will reliably produce the desired result of its 
intended design whilst mitigating ‘risk’ (1990, pp. 29–36). The example of the Saharan 
caravan trade shows how this mechanism could exist prior to modernity though Giddens 
might contend that what also marks out the modern condition is its incompatibility with 
the religious forms which permeated the pre-modern Saharan network (1990, p. 109). 
Modernity would depend instead on rational consideration of the efficacy of technical 
networks. What the example of rail in Budapest shows, however, is a more complex 
association of modern technology and ideology. Trust in the Hungarian rail network 
rested on something more than bare, rational calculation. It built on cultural norms that 
preceded it and it afforded the development of ideological forms in terms of national 
and nationalist spectacle in the city setting. In other words, modern network forms are 
not so much underpinned by a radical break with tradition as by an evolution of social 
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phenomena. They do not exist independent from culture but are deeply implicated in 
modern social practices. 
The scale and complexity of modern network forms afford an experience of 
anonymity which was unavailable in most pre-modern settings. This experience might 
suggest that modern networks also afford a divorce from ideology as social bonds are 
occluded and the individual becomes the subject-user of the network. Modern networks 
stretch and regulate social bonds in ways that would have been previously unimaginable. 
However, they continue to facilitate communal experience even if it is radically 
transformed. Further, the social aspect of the modern network form is open to 
ideological co-option. The effect of depersonalisation in modern networks is not a final 
atomisation of human relations but their reconfiguration. 
This survey of modern urban forms has made use of a separation of categories 
which in practice cannot be readily perceived. The experience of the Viennese 
Ringstrasse is not a series of separate transactions with an expanded urban whole, the 
regulation of water courses, an architectural melange and the technical integration of 
urban services and infrastructure but rather an experience of the synthesis of the whole, 
rhythmic, hierarchical and networked forms. This synthesis in itself is a kind of urban 
whole form which is critical to the identification of an experience of the Viennese 
Ringstrasse. Forms are constantly subject to adjustment both within themselves and in 
relation to each other. Their interplay is distinct to each place and is what underlies that 
uniqueness. It is what opens up cities as places in which political and ideological 
projects can be sustained but also what prevents the final domination of particular 
ideologies or, indeed, prevents attempts to eliminate ideological interventions. 
It is this formal synthesis which was, perhaps, first perfected by Haussmann in 
Paris. Haussmann’s personal motivations, or those of Napoleon III’s regime for that 
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matter, have a limited bearing on understanding what Haussmannised Paris afforded 
and affords to political projects. The observation that the straight lines of the new 
boulevards might remove insurrectionary potential is telling: it at once contains a 
concern that the modern city as conceived in Paris can afford the enhancement of power 
and bourgeois ideology and also fatalism about what architecture and urban 
morphology do to dominate citizens. Rather than reading class dominance as solidified 
in the urban fabric, Haussmann’s Paris is better understood as the wholesale creation of 
a new urban world in which multiple possibilities are afforded. The arc de triomphe in 
Etoile has afforded the celebration of Bastille Day by the French state military, the 
victory of the Prussians over France in 1871, the French victory over the German 
Empire in 1919, the German invasion in 1940, the Allied victory in 1945, student 
protests in May 1968 where initial demands were presented (Schulz –Forberg, 2009, p. 
137) and many other processions, marches, demonstrations and acts which have utilised 
the space and symbolism around the arch. What has been emulated elsewhere is not just 
the technologies of a new, modern urban system but more widely a synthesis of urban 
forms which create new sets of affordances. Those affordances can be controlled by 
ideological narratives and social norms but the modern urban world embodied in a 
Haussmannised city always has the potential for excessive affordances to break through. 
Nationalist political thinking needs to account for the presence of cities in 
modern nation-states. Cities are embedded in networked forms, for example, which 
expose them to ethnic diversity and consequently challenge monocultural conceptions 
of the nations that contain them. In reference to Rousseau, the city could be taken as the 
place which embodies a moral national project and Táncsics call for Budapest to be the 
‘Homeland’s Altar’ could be seen as this logic playing out. It is notable that both 
Rousseau and Táncsics used Paris has the counterexample to the city with ‘moeurs’ they 
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sought. Rousseau, of course, was writing long before the Haussmannisation of Paris; 
Táncsics was to an extent responding to Haussmannisation. If the city in which amour 
propre and luxury prevail is to be avoided, a city which is radically altered by 
Haussmannisation might facilitate this. Clearly for Táncsics, a Budapest fit for a 
Hungarian nation is possible in a modernised city. The development which makes 
Budapest an integrated, modern city is one which also makes it more Hungarian, the 
clean lines of the boulevards reflect the ordering of ethnicity in Magyarising Hungary 
and Budapest. 
Long term institutional evolution played its part in enabling the modern 
European city to emerge and, through the passage of several centuries, made possible 
the conditions for imagining a city of ‘moeurs’. In identifying changes in 
communitarian, secular and constitutional conditions, Harold Berman’s account of the 
eleventh century ‘Papal Revolution’ indicates an opening up of a new kind of political 
urban form affording many of the developments in European cities in subsequent 
centuries. These were innovations which created modern urban conditions. They were 
largely the product of relatively localised conflict but they marked something close to 
the commencement of a new kind of social membership, one which fed into the notion 
of modern citizenship. It is this urban political space in Europe which permitted, later 
during the Enlightenment, a much more radical reimagining of social relations in the 
context of modern states and cities. The interaction of technological change and this 
reimagining helped create the conditions in which the purpose of a city and urban life 
could be considered and contested. These conditions were present across the spectrum 
of political programmes, affording conservative, liberal and socialist responses amongst 
others. It is within this emerging urban order that Rousseau and Herder can be read as 
theorists seeking to shape an urban future, one which would be able to accommodate 
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new kinds of community. Their thought did not necessarily accord with cosmopolitan, 
Enlightened thought but nevertheless they could integrate urbanisation into their 
thinking. In the same way, nineteenth century nationalists appealed to concepts of 
nation rooted in a distant past that could make use of the modern city, not just dismissed 
as centres of the corruption of the nation but as the positive locations of their political 
programmes. In order to achieve this, though, there was a logic required which could 
bring together both the idea of the modern city as corrupt and also as a national 
achievement. 
The dynamic which creates this moral tension in nationalist urban political 
programmes is derived from the exceptional position of cities in politics. It is an 
understanding of anthropological time which places the city as a special entity in human 
history, an entity which is deeply implicated in the formation of the idea of ‘politics’ 
and hence makes urbanism a unique problem to be continuously thrown up and resolved. 
It is an understanding that can be used narratively by political programmes and affords 
both emancipatory and reactionary politics. Nationalist thinking can draw on this 
narrative to account for the presence of cities in national territory that do not conform 
to more monocultural conceptions of nation, to claim urban territory for nationalist 
practice and display and to claim them as products of national genius. The rapidly 
expanding cities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provided the demographic 
material for nationalist political programmes with recently uprooted populations 
available for co-option to political programmes both through mass politics and by 
claiming individuals for a particular nation group: the inclusion of Jewish migrants in 
Hungarian statistics making Budapest more ‘Hungarian’ is an example of this. 
The means by which nationalism has been afforded by and has afforded urban 
forms are very diverse, as the case studies show. Further, the extent to which nationalism 
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and urban form have worked together varies significantly according to context. The 
examples of urban forms in Budapest have shown the strongest relationship with a 
nationalist project. The examples in Vienna and Venice are more nuanced. In Vienna, 
urban forms, which in Budapest were strongly associated with the nation, were quite 
detached from a national project, German, Austrian or otherwise. Budapest’s whole and 
rhythmic forms in the case study were, in part, afforded by the national project as much 
as they, in turn, afforded nationalist use. The creation of a unified Budapest in 1873, as 
well as its short-lived predecessor in 1848-49, was given impetus by the political project 
to give Hungary more autonomy within the Habsburg lands. Its promotion to Hungarian 
capital produced an urban whole which consequently afforded a project of 
Magyarisation. 
Other institutional forms operated alongside the development of the unified 
urban whole in Budapest. The example of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was one 
which, again, was motivated by an emerging national consciousness and which, through 
its continuity expressed in its rhythms, animated Hungarian cultural life and contributed 
to wider national cultural expression in the city. Other aspects of Budapest’s late 
nineteenth century development in the case study are seen in forms which were and are 
common across many cities, including all of the cases examined here. The hierarchical 
arrangement of architecture, showcasing cultural institutions and expressing priority for 
some, like opera houses, over others, is far from unique. Likewise, the connection of 
Budapest to the rail network was part of a European and then global phenomenon of 
railway construction. The Budapest examples were ones in which nationalist 
symbolism and events were afforded by the presence of these hierarchical and network 
forms and which contained an open set of affordances available to all political and 
ideological projects including nationalist ones. A synthesis of urban forms afforded the 
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nationalisation of Budapest and nationalist symbolism and practices. They coalesced 
both coincidentally and intentionally to support Hungarian nationalist aspirations. 
Ideology could be applied to limit what Budapest’s urban forms could afford – a modern 
city which was later to be a fascist and then socialist centre was in the late nineteenth 
century co-opted for nationalism. 
Vienna’s modernisation was close in time that in Budapest and both Danubian 
cities shared many characteristics of large, river-based cities of medieval foundation. 
However, the urban forms which coalesced in Vienna were put to use in a different way. 
Whereas the expansion of the urban whole in Budapest was accompanied by policies 
to reduce ethnic diversity in the city, Vienna’s expansion was, at least initially, a more 
cosmopolitan affair. The demolition of the walls, the development of the Ringstrasse 
and the integration of the outer suburbs into the whole produced a different response: 
the display of bourgeois power and wealth was one. 
It was later in Vienna when nationalism became enmeshed in city politics. The 
decline of Liberal politics in Vienna and the rise of the Christian Socials under Mayor 
Karl Lueger in the 1890s was accompanied by the increasing deployment of nationalist 
rhetoric mixed with social concern for the urban lower classes. The form of nationalism 
associated with this made use of increasing antisemitism in Europe from the 1880s 
onwards. (Schorske, 1981, pp. 140–146) The ethno-nationalism of Lueger was 
predicated less on a call to make the city a ‘German’ city – though this did feature – 
than on the demonisation of an Other could be used to consolidate German votes and 
instil ‘Christian’ principles in the politics and life of a city which would remain 
ethnically diverse (Beller, 2006, pp. 155–157; Johnston, 1983, pp. 63–66). 
Monumentalising ethnic German achievement in the city was, in this context, less 
politically potent than the exclusion of competing influences of non-Germans; this was 
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a Viennese and Austrian context which subsequently meant that late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century nationalism has left a more obvious mark on Budapest than on 
Vienna. The rapid growth of Vienna, nevertheless, afforded a mass political domain 
which populist politicians like Lueger could exploit. 
Venice's incorporation into a national project was quite different again to the 
other two cases. Budapest, Vienna and Venice in 1815 were all in a multi-ethnic 
Austrian Empire under the Habsburgs. Despite having been a significant power with 
Italian affinities until 1797, Venice's entanglement with a nationalist project was 
marginal, at least at first. Of the three cases, the city is also an exception in that its 
population level was relatively static during its modernisation. 
What the case of Venice does is produce an example of a city as what might be 
referred to as an ‘ideological object’ against examples of cities as ‘ideological subjects’. 
An urban ideological object would be an urban form which could act as a goal or the 
backdrop to an ideological narrative. The everyday content of this form would be 
peripheral to this narrative. Another city example of an ideological object would be 
Jerusalem, the object of desire to different religious and ideological powers and 
movements over many centuries. The narratives of these ideologies do not necessarily 
regard the content of the city, its population, its contemporary institutions, or even its 
morphology and architecture to be of primary importance but rather the idea of the city 
and its possession are their goal. Venice was an object of desire for Italian nationalists 
and Venetian urban forms in the case study all afforded the positioning of Venice as an 
urban object. This is not to exclude the possibility of active nationalism within the city 
of Venice but to show how ideology might interact with urban form independent of this 
internal activity. A contrast with Budapest highlights this further. Budapest was, of 
course, the object of nationalist desire but the internal configuration of urban forms was 
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vital to making it a ‘Hungarian’ city. In Venice it was more a case of claims over its 
identity than change to its internal configuration which made it ‘Italian’, the principle 
of com'era, dov'era making such internal reconfiguration difficult anyhow.  
* * * * * 
 
‘If you ask the people you meet, “Where is Penthesilia?” they make a broad 
gesture which may mean “Here,” or else “Farther on,” or “All around you,” or 
even “In the opposite direction.” 
‘“I mean the city,” you ask, insistently. 
‘“We come here every morning to work,” someone answers, while others say, 
“We come back here at night to sleep.” 
‘“But the city where people live?” you ask. 
‘“It must be that way,” they say, and some raise their arms obliquely towards an 
aggregation of opaque polyhedrons on the horizon, while others indicate, behind 
you, the specter of other spires.’ Invisible Cities (Calvino, 1997, pp. 141–142) 
 
In contrast to Zora, Penthesilia’s inhabitants appear uninterested in the layout 
of the whole city but rather their interaction with what they unquestioningly identify as 
the city of Penthesilia. Penthesilia’s identity is entangled in the lives of its inhabitants 
and, although Marco Polo is tormented by the idea that it is wholly owned constituted 
by ‘the outskirts of itself’, it offers the possibility of a city which at once manages to be 
subjectively defined by the individual experience of its inhabitants and also to have a 
strong shared identity. It is a city of many, overlapping urban wholes. It is not frozen in 
time like Zora but a city which is lived in.  
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Cities which are lived in do not just provide a neutral stage for the performance 
of citizens but are instead in constant dialogue with those citizens, each shaping the 
other. The framework of urban forms and affordances offers one way to think about 
how this dialogue proceeds. Cities are complex systems whose multitude of processes 
and parts interact with the actions of the animals which inhabit them and as such are 
beyond complete comprehension. Analysing their forms offers a pragmatic way to 
enhance understanding of this interaction of the politics and material of cities without 
succumbing to a simple determinism. 
The framework of forms and affordances has been applied to cases of cities 
which started the process of modernisation with some common state-territorial context, 
cities which have core morphologies initiated in medieval Europe and which were all 
open to multiple ethnic influences but which, by 1919, had become part of ethnocentric 
states. By taking examples of different categories of urban forms within each case it has 
been possible to explore how the physical city and political projects. Wider examples 
from other European cities and beyond have helped deepen this analysis by showing 
the context within which urban modernisation was taking place. The political 
philosophy and thought influencing nationalism has been interrogated to show how 
ideology can make intellectual space for the physical city and how nationalism came to 
terms with and made use of modern urbanisation. 
In the current era, Budapest, Vienna and Venice continue to accommodate urban 
forms which afford ideology. In the case of Budapest, a resurgent nationalism under the 
government of Fidesz has had its impact on Budapest’s urban forms, boulevards 
continuing to be sites of official procession and oppositional protest, institutions like 
the House of Terror museum on Andrássy Avenue highlighting the victimhood of the 
Hungarian nation and academic institutions in Budapest under suspicion of malevolent 
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influence from outside Hungary. Vienna remains a morality tale for liberals about the 
abandonment of liberal values for populism. Venice retains its place as the exceptional 
city, always under threat and an object of concern from art historians and 
environmentalists concerned about rising sea levels and the levels of consumption 
caused by tourism. Urban forms continue not just to be containers in which politics 
takes place but are themselves enmeshed in politics. 
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